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West Europe Report



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DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN SINOWATZ, YOUNG SOCIALISTS

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 9 Mar 84 p 3

[Article by Hans Werner Scheidl: "Young Comrades on the Leash--the Conflict Between Sinowatz and Gusenbauer"]

[Text/ "Comrades, this is nothing but a bunch of sh..! They are nibbling away at us." These are the rather vernacular terms with which socialist high school students once upon a time in one of their last leaflets expressed their "frustration" with the SPOe /Socialist Party of Austria/ until the parent party turned their heat and light off and locked their office. That was during the Kreisky era, long before there was a green-alternative movement. Kreisky and his Central Secretary Marsch had decided to take this step when it became clear that the once upon a time rather promising Association of Socialist High School Students was, if anything, working against the objectives of the party in power because of radical left-wing tendencies. Today, the VSM /Association of Socialist High School Students/ is leading a rather miserable existence, cut off from all party money sources.

Of course, things are not going to get as bad as all that in the current conflict between Federal Chancellor Sinowatz and the newly-elected leader of the Socialist Youth, Alfred Gusenbauer. The persons involved in this situation are not suited for that. But the cause of the dispute is also different.

The occasion for criticism currently expressed by Sinowatz as regards the party youth was the most recent nationwide Congress of the SJ /Socialist Youth/, during which Josef Cap turned over his office after 6 years as chairman to the 24-year-old university student Gusenbauer. The heavy presence of communist organizations and the vehement acclamation of the left-wing class comrades by the Congress rang the alarm bells with Sinowatz and his adviser Pusch. And the new man on Ballhaus Square and on Loewel Street found himself forced early this week to mark some clear boundary lines. The "Eisenstadt Declaration" by his predecessor in office Kreisky in 1968 supposedly continues to be fully applicable for every SP /Socialist Party/ member: No common action with official and camouflaged KP /Communist Party/ groupings. Violation of this guideline will inevitably lead to a party trial.

Thus it was and is, in theory. Of course, the broth is never consumed as hot as it is served. Kreisky always kept the young party members on a long leash and often looked the other way when the peace movement, firing

from the hip, managed to hit between left and far left. From time to time, this was followed by a wrathful look from topside but more frequently there would be a rather juicy slap for Josef Cap. But the party chairman, who in his advancing age again leaned more and more to the left, never concealed the fact that he held Josef Cap in high esteem personally. He liked him intellectually and Kreisky, among the circle of his trusted friends, again and again mumbled something to the effect that, when he was 30, he would have thought and acted exactly the same way.

But those days are gone forever. The blast of icy air which has been blowing through Loewel Street for several months, which has already driven out some party employees, and which has confused quite a few lower-level officials, for the time being made a discussion on principles impossible between the party establishment and the organization of the young members. The meeting between Sinowatz and Gusenbauer this coming Thursday will probably also serve only for mutual "sniffing the other fellow out" and, at best, could take the bite out of some of the harsh words that have been spoken in recent days. The discussion itself will take up more time.

Observers inside the ruling party speak of "shadow boxing," nothing more. And perhaps they are right in their judgment. The verbal dispute should not be taken too seriously because it actually helped both sides: Sinowatz was able for the first time since taking office to stress his authority inside the party (in dealing with a party grouping which really does not carry too much weight); Gusenbauer on the other hand was able to make points among his followers by kicking up his heels and forcefully arguing with his lord and master.

That might be so. If, of course, there were not also a circumstance that sprang from the heat of battle and which probably was bound to anger and wound Fred Sinowatz most of all. For the first time, the leader of a party grouping went public and engaged in unconcealed criticism of the most personal leadership style of the party chairman. Since the humble Burgenlander took office, this was the first warning voice from a comrade that uttered something which the political opponent had been reporting loudly for many months: that the election of Fred Sinowatz to both of these high offices perhaps could not have been the very latest piece of wisdom, that the throne elevation of the former party secretary and subsequently undisputed education minister perhaps after all was too much for him. The man who knows how sensitively Sinowatz reacts to such criticism behind his hard outer shell, that man will understand perhaps better how completely angered and peeved the chairman is now with his Young Socialists.

On top of that, the Young Socialists were met with approval from broad party circles with their criticism. The administration's constant need for coming to terms with the rather liberal coalition partner pushed the SPOe into an identity conflict which it is laboriously trying to find a way out of. It has still not been possible to get the party rank and file to realize that socialist ideas are one thing while governing daily on Ballhaus Square is something entirely different. It was, last but not least, Gusenbauer himself who, already during the decisive party congress in autumn, had pointed out this dilemma.

And finally, it is also pointed out in SP circles that there is another unresolved conflict smoldering here. Was it not Sinowatz's adviser Pusch who helped in putting the then deputy party boss Blecha "out to pasture?" Blecha's secretary Rudas, it was reported, is now playing a certain role in the anti-Pusch campaign being conducted by the Young Socialists. In other words, is the whole thing just one facet of the game between Sinowatz and Blecha?

It remains to be seen whether Alfred Gusenbauer will let himself "be domesticated" by the party and how long the whole thing might last. Sinowatz is a historian and he can derive consolation from the party's history. So far, all Socialist Youth chairmen somehow came to an arrangement with the party. Josef Cap remains silent and was a good boy in voting in parliament with his delegation and noted that his predecessor in office even "amounted to something" in politics: Josef Hatzl was Socialist Youth boss until 1978 and before him the association was led by Peter Schieder. Today, both of them are in the Vienna city government. And they have gotten used to having to wear neckties.

5058

CSO: 3620/210

PRESSURES, PREMIUMS SPUR TURKISH RETURNEES

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 27 Feb 84 pp 97-99

[Text] In Duisburg the Mannesmann Company is demonstrating how the new Return-Assistance Law can be applied. Four thousand Turks have already left the city. By fall 200,000 throughout the FRG are to follow.

Ercan Bulut, 47, has been a man of Mannesmann for 20 years. In the Duisburg plant of the steel company, the Turk works "always on good terms" with his German colleagues and compatriots. Bulut: "Ercan gladly here."

In a few weeks, the crane operator from Sivas in Anatolia will have to pack his bags and return to his old homeland. Like more than 900 other Mannesmen [employees of Mannesmann] from Turkey, Ercan Bulut has vacated his job in return for a settlement and, in addition, has obligated himself to leave the Federal Republic.

In the working class district of Huettenheim, which Germans have long called "Tuerkenheim" [home of the Turks], most of Bulut's colleagues and their families have already vacated the plant-owned apartments, entire rows of houses have been deserted. Altogether, according to an estimate by the Turkish social scientist Faruk Sen, "approximately 4,000 compatriots have already left the city."

The exodus from the unemployment-plagued steel city, in which 46,000 plus Turks constitute one-eleventh of the population, is the up to now most pronounced reaction throughout the Federal Republic to the "Law to Encourage the Willingness of Foreigners to Return", which was passed in November in Bonn. Since that time workers from Tunisia, Morocco, Portugal, but also and above all from Turkey, may occasionally collect travel money at once twice:

- They can apply for the refund of their employee contributions to the statutory pension insurance, and
- they receive--if, after 31 October 1983 due to plant closing, they were affected by unemployment or by continuous short-time work--in addition 10,500 marks, as well as another 1,500 marks for every child under age, from the Federal Treasury.

In return for the assistance from the Federal Government, the recipients of the money obligate themselves to leave the Federal Republic within 4 weeks after submission of their application. Those who exceed the deadline will have 1,500 marks deducted per month.

But the offer praised, by federal minister for labor and social affairs, Norbert Blum, as an indication of "care" for the "returnees", has met with a mixed response among those to whom it is addressed. To be sure, Bavaria's minister for social affairs, Fritz Pirkel, is counting on 50,000 applications for refund of the employee pension contribution by the end of September among the 560,000 Turkish employees in the Federal Republic; counting family members, fully 200,000 Turks less would then live in the the Federal Republic. And already 25,000 Turkish workers have submitted the corresponding applications to the state insurance corporations.

Considerably smaller, on the other hand, is the number of Turks who, for 10,500 marks obligate themselves to cross the border within a month. Instead of the expected 20,000 applications, a mere 4,000 plus applications have been received by the Federal Institution for Labor in Nurnberg. The Mannesmann Turks alone account for almost one-fourth of these.

The flood of applications from Huettenheim, which reduces the Turkish employees of about 1,300 to almost one-fourth, is not only a result of the restructuring decided for this year, causing the destruction of approximately 1,000 jobs. The Turks feel pressured, above all, by an internal company test, which examined their knowledge of languages. The purpose of the test supposedly was to ascertain who, after the restructuring, could be used for more highly qualified work.

"After the examinations, which the bulk of the compatriots did not pass," the Turkish social worker Kalender Dogan describes the effect of the test, "the majority believed that they would lose their job tomorrow."

Bulut and many colleagues readily accepted the settlement offer added by the Mannesmann bosses when the law became effective. "The bosses and the German workers," Ercan Bulut explained his decision, had "said: Better to go now with money than termination later on without money."

The company management had not only arranged for the print-out of the company's own "settlement in connection with dissolution agreement" on computer sheets, but also the "refund of contributions from the statutory pension insurance" and the return assistance from Bonn. "With at times 100,000 marks, which came together in this way," plant council member Hermann Mahler observed, "the colleagues grew weak in rows."

As it is, the company had not given the Turks much time for reflection. Six weeks after official submission of the offer at the latest, the workers as far as possible were to have made their decision. Mahler: "Out of fear that the train might leave without them, many signed quickly."

Only few Turks had considered what serious consequences a sudden move from

Huettenheim has--especially for their children. To be sure, the law grants the family members of the applicants the right to delay their departure until September. Yet because many fathers did not want to return without their family, they abruptly yanked their sons and daughters out of their education in the middle of the school year.

In the secondary school at the Heinrich-Bierwes-Street meanwhile, meanwhile half of the students in the 5th and 6th class no longer come to school. And, according to school director Bernd Mendorf, we are dealing only with "the first wave".

In a number of families it came to sharp altercations. The 15 and 16 year-olds, who for the most part have a command of German, but have a rough time with the Turkish language, did not want to emigrate to a country which many of them had visited only during summer vacation. In the families, according to Hans-Walter Schuster of the Duisburg Workers Social Aid, an specialist on the Turks, "dramatic scenes are taking place, including suicide threats."

Whether return migration is at least economically worthwhile, is "also still the big question" for Faruk Sen. "Only every 16th person makes the jump to successful independence." For a job as a worker "likewise hardly anyone can hope"--in Turkey the unemployment rate is a bit higher than 18 percent, about as high as in Duisburg with slightly under 17 percent.

While the first Mannesmen (Mannesmann employees) obligated to leave are already regretting their decision, the Duisburg Thyssen Company is carrying out a similar "adjustment measure" (company circular letter): In a few weeks, another 200 Turkish families will have to leave the city.

8970

CSO: 3620/202

INTEREST FOCUSES ON POLITICAL REFUGEE ISSUE

Discussion of Economic Compensation

Athens OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek No 1551, 26 Jan 84 pp 27-30

[Article by Kostas Latifis]

[Text] As part of our current research on the controversial subject which is of such vital significance, regarding Social Security and pension payments by East European countries to Greek political refugees, we publish today an interview with the chairman, for 30 years now, of the Central Committee of Greek Political Refugees (KEPPE).

In the interview Mr. T.Papadimitris gave our correspondent Kostas Latifis, he also spoke of some of the other difficulties and problems political refugees encounter (real estate confiscated and lost, jobs, German compensations, lack of material help from the UN etc.) that we do not publish in this issue which is confined to matters pertaining to retirement pensions, social insurance claims and bank deposits.

Question: Mr. Papadimitris, within the framework of the research the "OIKONOMIKOS" is carrying out regarding the significant and primary matter of the transfer of pensions and social insurance payments to political refugees in East European countries, we are addressing ourselves to you who have dealt with this problem for so many years and are familiar with all its aspects. And so what is the attitude of those countries and, first and foremost, that of the Soviet Union in the face of the refugees' legitimate claims?

Answer: Before I answer your question with regard to the matter you refer to, I would like to emphasize that the problems which confront the Greek political refugees here are numerous, enormous, complex and very harsh and vital. Very often they are faced with the specter of hunger, of elementary needs. There is the problem of occupation for all those who have not reached an advanced age because, unfortunately, even those who have reached retirement age are looking for work since they do not receive a pension yet. There is the problem of their confiscated property, of their lost belongings, of the resettlement of their children with its myriad problems of adjustment to a new environment and so many more which it is not possible to list briefly. But the matter of pensions of insurance rights and of bank deposits is a pressing and vital problem which plagues them daily and destroys them from many angles and standpoints. Let us

come to your question.

We must confess with bitterness that no one expected the negative stance adopted by the socialist countries to which Greek political refugees went and gave their all (they did receive hospitality, of course, etc., which we acknowledge) throwing themselves from the first day into work and laboring with more enthusiasm than the locals to help overcome the huge and numerous difficulties which faced those nations after the war. The refugees suffered hardships, made sacrifices, worked overtime, the health of many was affected by intensive work, a different climate etc. Consequently we are now asking for [a return on] our contributions there. And independently from considerations of international solidarity, there is also the elementary human aspect. All Western nations accept and transfer faithfully such retirement claims to the workers' countries of origin. Since the political change, when the repatriation of refugees essentially began, socialist countries have persisted in a negative and inadmissible attitude regarding their retirement problem. We say this bitterly because, right from the start, they should have made at least a declaration, saying that: "We will give the money" and they should have opened an account with a view to making a settlement. Instead we get contradictory declarations, as when for example the Soviet Premier Kosyguin told our representatives here in Athens that the matter of the petition for a transfer of pensions would be settled but soon after the Soviet embassy let it be known, through its first secretary, that the question of the transfer of pensions would be raised while the Soviet Union reserves the right to answer later the other 2 questions we had asked in our memorandum to Premier Kosyguin (regarding the transfer of Social Insurance payments and of the sums of money deposited in Soviet banks by refugees). Meaning that, with regard to our first request that is the transfer of pensions for those who had already been pensioned off in the Soviet Union and received their pension there, the first secretary of the Soviet embassy told us that the matter was settled and transfer to Greece would begin. A few days later we met in Faliron with the Soviet representatives here and we were told that a 40% allowance had been granted on the basis of the pension they received there. We protested again and at that point they changed it and made it into 60%, that is to say a pension "allowance" out of a 100 ruble pension. No answer concerning the other questions. This allowance is given out every month to the refugees by the Soviet Union, that is to say on a 60 to 70% basis in relation to the pension they received in the Soviet Union and on a ruble/dollar/drachma parity (that is, around 6,000 to 8,000 drachmas). It is handed out by the Soviet embassy here on the basis of retirement books and registers. We, of course, asked for the transfer of the full amount of the pensions as also for full Social Security retirement rights as well as for bank deposits (which are both personal and common accounts, originating from dozens of fund drives which represent huge amounts). We also added that solving those problems would have a strong effect on the other East European countries, in view of the Soviet influence there which would spur them to solve the same problem in imitation, perforce, of the Soviet example. So much about the position of the Soviet Union.

Question: How are things going with Bulgaria?

Answer: According to the Greco-Bulgarian Agreement of April 1978, signed by both countries, the transfer of the pensions of Greek political refugees has also been

agreed upon among other things. But while it is said in the first article of this agreement that all pensions will be transferred integrally (so many levas for so many drachmas), in article 3 however (and here is the contradiction that fails to solve the matter) there is a stipulation that only those pensions that have been completed are justified and will be transferred, meaning that those who have not completed the required period and have not been pensioned off will have to wait 3,4,5 years or even more until they reach retirement age in order to be included in the agreement so that everyone can receive a pension, instead of transferring pension payments to Greece to be drawn here in due time. With the result that while up to last year Bulgaria had 1,700 retirees, hardly 80 to 100 refugees have come to Greece. And that because the problem is not dealt with globally but individually which makes this agreement lose any value it might have had. We of course voiced our protests at the time to the Bulgarian side. We even went to see the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. G. Rallis, to submit to him the question of the contradiction in the agreement upon which he immediately got in touch with the then Speaker of the House Mr. Papaspyrou, as the agreement was being subjected to legislative approval, to instruct him to halt its promotion in Parliament and, as far as I know or can guess, this agreement has not received legal confirmation from the Greek side even though it was signed by the Greek government. So much for Bulgaria.

Question: What is happening at present with East Germany?

Answer: East Germany is giving out a 300 mark allowance against pensions. That is, to those who received a pension there and were repatriated. There are not many political refugees in Germany, there were only around 2000 people there because at the time they were sent they were children and so this has no serious bearing on the matter. But neither can the allowance of 300 marks it gives be viewed as a solution to the problem of pensions.

Question: What has happened so far with Czechoslovakia?

Answer: In the wake of all the foregoing developments, Czechoslovakia, following also all the pressures from the political refugees themselves through "Political Refugee Committees" etc., made a declaration in 1978 that it agreed to transfer the pensions of political refugees. In fact, in a letter which the embassy sent out and published after the steps we took at the time, all refugees who lived there were asked to draw up a petition and submit particulars to ask for the transfer here of their pension in foreign currency. And to include at the same time 600 drachmas worth of stamps. And so all the retired refugees went into action and submitted their papers. Since then no solution whatever. Recently (last year) at a meeting of the KKE which took place in Thessaloniki and in which many refugees participated, Tsolakis, a member of the KKE Political Bureau, said or rather admitted that the Czechs send pensions to only 90 people and he confessed (with an ingenuousness which must have surely brought criticism on him) that the others should not receive anything since they opposed the party line. He said this openly. In fact it was also published in the "MAKEDONIA" etc. Naturally, the refugees who were there opposed this stance. But the question remains and it is a moral one for Czechoslovakia as it not only asked the refugees to submit petitions and to include stamps but it now sends pension allowances to only 90 people (I have learnt lately that those

are 108 individuals) who are of course those who abide by and obey the Czech Communist Party and the KKE. Consequently Czechoslovakia did not offer a solution either.

Question: Can you tell me now about Poland?

Answer: Nothing from Poland. No action or anything else. On the contrary, now that Jaruzelski has come to power he has been encouraged to a certain extent by the fact that contacts have been cut off, newspapers except for the "RIZOS-PASTIS" have been banned, there is now a kind of ghetto isolation there for the refugees. That is to say the Poles refuse to discuss the matter.

Question: How about Hungary?

Answer: Another kind of situation developed there after Hungary took an inadmissible stance, claiming that Greek political refugees should change their nationality. This is an unacceptable measure which we denounced as inhuman, similar to a sultanlike concept that forced one to change one's nationality. Naturally the refugees reacted also, except for a small number which accepted silently ("even the gods bow to necessity"). It has been implemented for a few since January 1983 but most of the refugees are protesting and there is an ongoing conflict between them and the Hungarian government. Essentially this decree says: if you do not become Hungarian citizens, get up and go, otherwise you will be viewed as aliens. We have experienced this kind of legislation concerning foreigners, as it was applied to Jews and in various other cases and it is a very harsh legislation, unfree and unfair. The same thing was done in Romania and the Soviet Union and all the socialist countries, with a number of variations in their relations with foreign subjects and particularly with those they wish to expel or keep under special control. And a characteristic thing in this case is that, according to recent information, there were 10 deaths resulting from shock, specifically of people with heart conditions who were getting ready to be repatriated and were anxiously waiting to leave. 4 or 5 of those came from the village of Beloyanni which it is worth noting, was resurrected by the relentless toil of Greek refugees and is now chiefly in Hungarian hands. This question is a daily psychological tragedy which wears out peoples' nerves. Those who remain and have declared that they will not become Hungarian citizens are all in a state of suspense regarding work and the party authorities. Those who declared they would leave and became Hungarians cannot obtain passports to come to Greece, but even if they leave they will come here penniless. It must also be noted that if there were 5,000 refugees in Hungary, half of them had acquired houses, that is they had bought them. This is the only country to present such a phenomenon and it can be explained by the fact that refugees had behaved very well during the 1956 counterrevolution, they took part in the armed struggle to which they gave their support; they won medals; and they bought apartments. But now they are losing those apartments entirely. If for instance the cost of an apartment is 500,000 forints, they are offered 50,000 forints as a "compensation," that is to say nothing! The same thing happened in Romania and the other countries. Those refugees find themselves in a tragic situation. There is a tragic silence on the subject of refugees in Hungary, we do not have any light or hope from there.

Question: Does the refusal of the Greek political refugees to adopt Hungarian

nationality influence the granting of pensions?

Answer: Of course. They have not discontinued them yet, after we protested and following an intervention of the Greek government, and I believe that Mr. Skoularikis on his recent visit there or Mr. Papoulias also touched on this subject. At any rate, Mr. Rallis too had raised this question of nationality with the Hungarians when he was prime minister and in an answering letter to us he wrote that the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had said it would deal with this problem in a spirit of understanding.

Question: And finally we have to see what the Romaninas' stance is on this subject?

Answer: The Romanians too answer: "We shall see." We are making no progress on this question. It should be noted that beside Romania, in the case of all the other countries as well joint bilateral international commissions were formed to deal with refugees' pensions and various other problems. Mr. Ceausescu also said he would form such a commission. We had also submitted this matter (in 1981) to Mr. Lazaris who was then Minister of Coordination and who, after meeting with Messrs. Ceausescu, Andrei, Minister of Foreign Affairs et al. when they came on an official visit to our country, informed us that the Romanians were rather tough but that they had finally agreed because it must be added here that there was an anomaly working against Romania, namely that while Romania cashes at least \$20 million annually from Greece in foreign currency from students (there are there 4 to 5,000 students who pay \$300 and over monthly in school fees) it will not set aside even as little as \$1 million in foreign currency for the payment or transfer of those pensions and social security claims. But Romania does not only cash in on educational fees (at least \$20 million and over annually). It derives equivalent additional amounts from the comings and going of the students and their relatives, from other secret "remittances" and illegal foreign currency transactions for their everyday needs there. We have calculated that Romania cashes at least over \$20 million annually from Greece without making any investment (except for maybe a minimal one in education: the odd additional teacher or classroom etc. since, as you know, all this is run by the State) and Romania has thus established one of the most profitable enterprises; and yet Romania never agreed to say that for even one year only we are setting aside \$1 million to transfer Social Security payments for political refugees. We, of course, underlined this and we said that it was inadmissible for Romania to persist in this negative attitude, in view of the fact that there is also this "other" consideration, aside from the usual exchanges between 2 nations. Greek students study in other socialist countries also (Bulgaria, the Soviet Union etc.) but their numbers are limited.

Question: Considering such an "inadmissible" attitude, as you qualify it, what is one to think about the outcome of this very serious problem? What conclusions have you reached yourself?

Answer: It appears, and this is what made an impression on the Greek delegation which discussed the matter recently with Romanian and Soviet officials, that the Greek side submitted the question very courteously putting only some special emphasis on it. Mr. Papandreou submitted it personally to Mr. Ceausescu, the way it also happened recently with the Soviet Premier Tikhonov. We, the

political refugees, sent a letter to both Mr. Papandreou and Mr. Fotilas who deals with the question of Greek emigrants as well as one to Mr. Tikhonov and to the deputies who made up the delegation and from what we learned unofficially, Mr. Papandreou discussed the question with Mr. Tikhonov who agreed to form some sort of committee. In other words the same kind of thing that has been going on for years. Unfortunately my own general conclusion is that those nations are not making any move to solve the problem. This is precisely where the KKE and the "RIZOSPASTIS", which repeatedly attack me when I speak of the refugees' pension rights, bear some responsibility: because, to begin with, the KKE never raised this question and it subsequently began its very sharp attacks against us on the grounds that those countries had given us hospitality and for other equally well known arguments; then it advanced various theories, to the effect that this is a difficult question, that it is difficult to cover this question (those being, moreover, the very same views as those of the Soviets), that it is a question to which we must apply the principle of proportionality or the territorial principle, that is to say some pseudo-scientific "theories."

Question: What do they mean by the principle of proportionality?

Answer: Proportionality means that both nations/sides have to pay according to the share which falls to each side; that is, if someone worked 10 years here and 20 years there, each country would have to make corresponding Social Security payments. This is the view we support too, as it is also supported at an international level. The other theory is that of the territorial, the geographic criterion, which the Soviets and with them the KKE and the "RIZOSPASTIS," support, that is to say that people should receive their pensions from the country in which they live. Which in practice establishes and justifies the argument of Florakis' and of others' propaganda in Tashkent or that of Farakos or Kaloudis in Parliament, namely that Karamanlis and now Papandreou should pay the pensions because, to put it crudely, Greece is responsible for all that happened. And so they claim that, from a theoretical standpoint, the "territorial principle" should be applied. But this does not stand up either to logic or to any moral principle, not even from the standpoint of the Constitution nor even that of the Soviet Constitution itself, which says in its article 12 that the workers' old age must be insured without any stipulation. And as the Constitutions of all the other socialist countries were drafted on the basis of the Soviet Constitution, they too say the same thing. There are also other views which have been supported from time to time by the "RIZOSPASTIS", which published them in the form of articles of its own to the effect that while the Soviet Union gives out pensions their "exit" or transfer abroad is forbidden. But this is not only anticonstitutional from the standpoint of their own Constitution it also conflicts with facts since all the pensions of the Slavo-Macedonians who had fled to the Soviet Union have been transferred to Yugoslavia (and there were about 50,000 people on the whole, a sizable number of whom were pensioners.) How then could those pensions be transferred there and they cannot be transferred here to Greece?

Question: Does the joint Greco-Soviet commission Soviet Premier Tikhonov approved during his recent meeting with government delegates give any hope that this controversial question will make some progress or will it be left until the Greek Kalends?

Answer: I too have serious reservations about it because in my opinion Tikhonov should have offered a solution. The "commission" was not necessary. Matters are clear. The deposits are those of the Greek workers and retirees. He could have given instructions to his services to deposit into a general account each one's share. And that is why I have reservations. Just as I do about the commission Mr. Ceaurescu proposed. Besides such commission have been formed with almost all of the socialist countries, particularly on this question. They meet, they talk, they issue statements, there are heartfelt words, all the usual stuff and the question itself is left until the Greek Kalends. And that is why I fear that Tikhonov's commission will do the same. Apparently cynicism and heartlessness prevail.

Question: To what do you attribute this cynical attitude, as you call it, of the countries of Eastern Europe toward such a fundamental problem as that of the political refugees in spite of the fact that there is also a moral and political factor beside the clearly financial one? Why do they refuse to solve it? Does foreign currency constitute a difficulty and an obstacle or is it something else?

Answer: No, it is not a question of foreign currency, because for those 7 nations the amount is insignificant. The entire number of retired people a few years ago was 7500, now they may be as many as 12 to 15,000. What are 15,000 pensions to those countries or an average of 2,000 for each one? We have also suggested that those nations give us merchandise which can be turned into drachmas here. How hard can it be for those countries to give us goods or anything else that could be evaluated in terms of currency and converted into drachmas which would be given out as pensions or Social Security payments for the refugees? I must tell you that the political refugees refuse to accept pensions etc. at the expense of their Greek compatriots' and colleagues' funds because this would be unethical. Those countries' denial is something difficult to explain. They are dominated by a negative perception. And, above all, they do not wish to solve the problem for political reasons. Because every refugee who comes here is a living story and testimony. This is one of the factors which has, however, very serious repercussions for the KKE and the other KK [Communist Parties] of those countries, since they all contributed to the distortion of the laws, to the hardships and to the tragedies which all those people have suffered there during the years of their political exile. Then there is the stance of the KKE which is negative. This reaction is due to the fact that it can see that none of those who return to Greece, as Mr. Loules who is a member of the KKE Political Bureau himself said in Tashkent, no one comes to us, to our offices. And thirdly, it is because the KKE wants to have a basis there, in those countries and many say that this is for financial reasons as well because it milks its members there, donations are compulsory and a great deal of money is involved. I confine myself chiefly to the political reasons which supersede both on the side of the socialist countries' KK and on the side of the KKE. And that is why the leaders of the KKE adopted a negative stance a long time ago. They supported the view that those countries had given us hospitality and that we had no right to ask for more...

When in the past we raised the question of a transfer of the pensions, the KKE subjected us to dishonest attacks. But there was pressure from the refugees who said that it was madness to give up our money and our claims since against

in exchange of the hospitality those countries offered us we too offered our sweat, our blood and our lives to work and to build up those countries during a difficult period of recovery after the war. That is why there is no justification for this kind of view which the KKE supports, a view which has gone through many phases. And when they realized they could no longer speak openly about the hospitality theory and suchlike, they opted for an attitude which said that they supported the territorial theory about which the "RIZOSPASTIS" published frequent articles. This position was made clearer by Farakas' (a member of the KKE Political Bureau) talk in Parliament, 2 years ago, when he said openly that each refugee that came back would have to manage on his own. This is inadmissible. Kaloudis said in Hungary that we as a party do not take charge of the question of repatriation and that this is the problem of anyone who wishes to return and who must solve it according to his own lights!

Question: Many refugees say that beside settling the matter of pensions, social insurance claims etc. those countries, from a humanistic and ethical viewpoint, should have given them some financial aid to help them when they departed with the first difficulties of their resettlement. What is your opinion?

Answer: Of course yes. But this is the least, since they are not even allowed to take their small or large savings, collected after so many years of hard work, with the dream of using them to help with the numerous difficulties of their return to the motherland. But refugees are not permitted to transfer here those deposits in foreign currency. If they take them in the form of the local currency, they have no value here. And so with the money from their savings the refugees are obliged to buy there various articles with the aim of selling them here for whatever they can get in order to obtain drachmas. A refugee who came recently from Czechoslovakia brought 3 pianos and various other things. How much value can they have?

Besides those goods are taxed both there and here because, for example, they are not entitled to more than 1 piano and so on.

So the refugees also lose in actual fact a large part of those deposits. A short time ago Florakis was telling them in Tashkent: "Why would you want to come to Greece where a dish of dried beans costs 45 drachmas? Where will you find work? You are doing well where you are," etc. That is their patriotic notion regarding repatriation. Even during the latest KKE Congress, somewhere in the minutes of the discussions it was written that there is no reason for some to complain against socialist countries because of "those things," And we say: "socialist countries owe us," or "do we owe them?..." In fact when Chernenko came to the previous KKE Congress as a representative of the KKSE [CPSU] he gave the "NEA" an interview and to a question relative to what was happening about the refugees' pensions, he crudely answered that "We have no problem, this is a Greek problem." I replied to him in an article of mine that this was a Greek problem, a Soviet problem, a worldwide problem because the refugees had worked in those places and should get their money from there. And I added that the KKSE Soviet representative had said so, since Soviet politicians are not free of responsibility for the civil war in Greece, which I supported with a series of facts. And after all this the KKE now tells a man: "Come to Greece but do as you think best." 9 people have committed suicide up to now, through despair over the impasses (moral financial) which faced them

when they came to Greece. This is indeed a lack of sensitivity on the part of those who speak thus.

Question: Approximately what deductions do they make from the workers' salaries in the countries of Eastern Europe? Because views are also circulating from countries of Eastern Europe, saying that Social Securities, pensions etc. are provided for by the Constitution and that in fact no deductions are made from salaries.

Answer: Not at all. Because deductions are made. Not only in monetary economies where there are salaries but also in socialist countries where the cost of production is burdened by salaries to which other expenses are added which are reflected in the value of the product, such as health care, social security, pensions etc. This 5, 10, 15% which burdens salaries for social security expenses is included in the final cost of the product and, naturally, is tacked on to the final cost (retail price) of the product. Besides, where else could this money come from? But even on our salary receipts there was always a difference because of deductions which represented the cost of Social Security. And if it were only that! Many more deductions are made in favor of trade unions, for disasters, for the completion of the annual production plan et al. Those views are false.

Those claims they make are inadmissible and dishonest.

Question: What is your evaluation of the latest proposal the Premier Mr. Papandreou made to convert into drachmas the claims of the refugees by importing materiel and goods from those countries?

Answer: This is a very intelligent and daring proposal which would enable both sides to meet halfway, since those countries refuse to make an agreement which would solve globally the entire question of the refugees' legal claims. The Premier proposed therefore to undertake the obligation to pay the pensions and other social security claims here, reserving the right to take products from them in order to cover this account. In some sort of way he has indirectly adopted an old proposal of ours to get out of the impasse, in view of the socialist countries' negative stance and because this has been dragging for a long time so that our refugees die of old age in increasing numbers. We had offered to let the Greek government take up our claims and take the necessary measures to solve the problem. This offer to the socialist countries facilitates the solution of the problem. It is now up to those countries to accept this proposal of the Greek government which is so compliant and makes the problem so much easier to solve.

Question: And if in spite of all this the socialist countries refuse in the end to solve properly, in accordance with ethics and the law, this fundamental problem for the refugees, what else is there left to be done?

Answer: I do not know whether the Premier had any illusions about the socialist countries being touched by his offer. At least he took a big step. But if we accept as a fact that socialist countries have adopted a negative stance and refuse to give the money, then it is only through pressure, persistence and particularly through us political refugees and by the people at large that this problem can be dealt with.

Interview With Markos Vafiadis

Athens OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek No 1552, 2 Feb 84 p 49

[Article by Kostas Latifis]

[Text] The interview our correspondent Kostas Latifis obtained from the acting commander in chief of the so-called "Democratic Army" during the Civil War, Markos Vafiadis, on the day following his repatriation after spending 36 years in the Soviet Union, belongs within the framework of the research we are carrying out about the transfer of the pensions and social security payments of Greek political refugees.

Question: The "OIKONOMIKOS" which is carrying out preliminary research on the major and controversial question of the transfer of the pensions and social security payments of Greek political refugees who lived in the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe, at the same time that it wishes you "welcome" would also like to have your opinion on this problem which has remained unsolved to this day.

Answer: First of all, I thank you for your interest and for your "welcome" wishes which constitute an additional reason for me to be touched by everything that you are doing for me. As for your question, I believe that this is a very serious problem indeed because the needs of our refugees are many from every standpoint and, above all, it should be stressed that many of them lack the most elementary means of survival and health care in order to meet their own immediate needs and those of their families. That is why I believe also that solving this problem will help ease the hardships of their new life in their motherland, after their return from the socialist countries where they lived and worked for many years. There is no doubt that the question of the transfer of pensions and social security payments is a serious and fundamental one for our refugees who came back to their motherland after 30 years or more. It is only fair to provide a solution as quickly as possible.

Question: To what do you attribute the reluctance of those countries of Eastern Europe to solve this problem, despite the fact that by its nature it is an urgent one and its solution should have been hastened? Do you consider that the reasons for the delay are political, economic or other?

Answer: I am not in a position to have an objective and categorical direct understanding. But I believe that one of the reasons is the absence of a legal settlement of this problem with those countries. This problem is also compounded by a currency factor (that is of the transfer to a foreign country) as well as by other reasons. Those must be the basic reasons. But with good will these difficulties can be overcome. The claim is a just and necessary one.

Question: Those countries should have offered, of course, a careful settlement in an agreement with Greece. But could there be also other considerations, beside those of currency, which stand in the way of the settlement of the entire question of pensions etc.?

Answer: I do not believe that the reasons are solely economic because we are not talking of poor countries which have such a bad need of the sums they would devote to satisfying those claims which, financially, do not represent serious amounts for socialist countries. Whereas those amounts are significant for meeting the immediate needs of a category of militants who suffered so many hardships and who found themselves in those countries which offered them hospitality and where they lived and worked. The political refugees' wish to live in the motherland they left is legitimate and that is why they should be given proper support.

Question: Could there also be other reasons, such a political or technical ones, namely that those countries may not want those refugees who are specialized in various jobs and skills to leave?

Answer: There is a possibility that this too may play a part up to a point. But it is not possible to say that this is the only reason, because a category of specialists such as engineers, doctors etc. has decreased in a significant proportion in the last few years as many of them were repatriated and consequently those who remained behind cannot play a serious role in the field of production and science in those countries. The meaning of this potential is limited today and minor for those countries. Before they came back, they did play a part of course.

Question: Do you consider that those who remained in those countries (and they are still half of the total number) are prevented from returning chiefly by the pension problem?

Answer: Naturally, this is in fact what stops them.

Question: I would like to ask you finally if you consider that the recent declaration of the Premier and his proposal to convert pensions and other social security payments from those countries into drachmas will have a favorable impact on the so far negative stance of those East European countries?

Answer: I think it should help. It is a start, a prerequisite which will lead to a positive solution of the problem. And I also believe that the socialist countries will respond in the same spirit to Mr. Papandreou's proposal. I at least believe this. And even that it will lead to a quick solution of this problem.

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CSO: 3521/195

LALLOTIS DISCUSSES STATE'S RESPONSIBILITIES ON SCHOOLS, YOUTH

Athens TA NEA in Greek 30, 31 Jan 84

/Interview with Youth Affairs Deputy Minister Kostas Lallotis with TA NEA Editor Aris Tolios/

/30 Jan 84/

/Text/ We can easily characterize as a document today's interview with the deputy minister on youth affairs.

Kostas Lallotis, with his familiar, thoughtful but also bold disposition, speaks about today's students, his relations with politics and organizations, the course of his joining society.

He refers to today's schools, the new institutions, and their developments.

He interprets phenomena and behavior; he defines the extent of the responsibility of the state and of the political organizations toward the new generation.

For the first time he refers to developments in the area of the Youth Organization of the New Democracy /ONNED/, pointing out the danger of extreme-rightist orientations in ONNED.

It appears that the conditions of a suis generis fascist development are now in evidence. "Openly, one section of ONNED, by words and deeds, has entered into a vicious cycle of fanatic and totalitarian orientations," he said, comparing the present conflict with the pre-dictatorial conflict between the National Social Organization of Students /EKOF/ and the National Radical Union of Youth /EREN/.

Lallotis also talks about today's new generation, its unique aspects, its searches, its anxieties. A generation which is "looking at the realities of the new century with hope and trepidation. This is a generation with which the state must open a genuine dialogue; to show courage, inspiration, and offer radical proposals." The full text of the interview follows:

/Question/ In the pamphlet, "A Life Proposal for the New Generation," which was published by the Under Ministry for Youth, we read the following quotation: "Politics is the necessary way, the timely way." Does this way go through the schools?

/Answer/ This necessary and timely road does not simply pass through the schools and the educational institutions, but it is there where it all starts and where the determining stations are. At school one has his first awakening, the first sensitivity and awareness. It is there where one is filled with the early conventional wisdom which determines his future understanding, character and conscience.

To remove any misunderstanding, however, it is necessary to clear up some confusion. This is possible only if the meaning of certain terms and words is defined, such as "politicization" and "partisanship".

Unbroken Course

In my opinion, the politicization as a phenomenon and practice is an essential element of the course of the organic induction of a young man--and naturally of the adolescent and student--into society. This induction is similar to the processes which form the values, beliefs and life's purposes, and they form his free and critical conscience.

The course and induction of the young man into society and by extension his politicization, the maturing of his thought and development of his personality are not broken up into fragmented periods.

No one can cut off the flow of events saying that this year I allow you to do this and next year something else.

No one can cage in and exorcise "from above" with autocratic restrictions the special and many-sided development and awareness of the child, of the adolescent, of the young man. There is for the young an unavoidable reality which determines the continuing quantitative and qualitative accumulation and completion of knowledge, stimulants, experiences, and visions. For this reason the politicization is not merely synonymous with a formal party affiliation and a temporary collaboration and action. On the contrary, the politicization must be considered as a broader and composite intellectual and educational experience which opens up new horizons in the cultural, social, ideological and aesthetic search of the young. For this reason, politicization in its completed version is a constant resistance to the amputation and disintegration of a young person's personality. It rises as an unbeatable barrier against efforts to impose on men a one-dimensional and alienated model.

An Act of Truth

The politicization in conditions of freedom and pluralism is written down as an act of self-definition, advancement, and completion of man as a "social being." It is an act of truth and emancipation. At the same time, it is the means which establishes the citizen as the solid, complete, creative and thoughtful unit-person which is the capable and necessary condition for a progressive, radical and open "society of citizens."

After the above references, certainly politics is the necessary and timely way for the dialectic approach, search and understanding of history, society, the institutions, culture, science, and life.

/Question/ Does this mean that one must judge today the reactions, behavior of the student with a "modern sensitivity?"

/Answer/ I thought I should give you in detail the meaning of politicization. I want to advocate openly and without reservations its utility. Yes. I think that the time has come to get away from the sterile slogans of either the unthinking rejection or the one-sided and vulgar acceptance of politicization. The conditions are ripe for overcoming the unfounded fears, the manufactured myths, and the traumatic references to the past, which cloud the horizons of both past and present.

Neutrality is Self-deception

We should keep in mind that the student does not move in a "waterproof and sterilized" area. The school, the family, the free time is penetrated by the contemporary conflicts and contradictions and challenges of life and society. We should also keep in mind that the neutrality, the non-politicization, and the non-ideologization of the problems, the demands, the quests and the proposals of the youth is an illusion and a deliberate error which serves the development of citizens with amputated, vulnerable, appeased and dominated consciences.

On the contrary, our views on the politicization define, I believe, a citizen who is made sensitive, active, fighting, critical, free, democratic, and participating. They define the model of a man who knows who he is, with goals for his personal development and transformation.

/Question/ Do you believe we have the institutions which will safeguard the gradual, voluntary politicization of the student, of the young person today?

/Answer/ No doubt they exist today in and out of the educational process. At every educational level there is an effort to help the child, the adolescent, the young man to get to know, to become familiar with society, the people, the history, the institutions, the world, and with life. The democratic pedagogy and teaching methods offer knowledge while exciting the thinking and imagination. Knowledge, together with the experience, shape the criteria and the principle which in turn define the options, behavior, and the conscience of the young. Without doubt, the basic course of the

"socialization" gives birth and reproduces its complement, that is, the "politicization".

Safeguarding Equal Status

This is the objective of a teaching and studying program covering extensive areas of historical, social, and free lessons in the primary, secondary, the lyceum, the universities, the technical schools.

The efforts of the municipalities and communities are designed to safeguard the voice and dynamism of the young through participatory channels such as student councils, youth communities, committees and clubs of culture and free time, development initiatives, etc.

The capstone of all these innovations is the recognition of the struggles and the maturity of the youth through the extension of the vote to those of 18 years of age which symbolically sanctifies the equal status of the young in all the political and social processes.

All in all, this unprecedented, open and radical policy for the young generation is inseparably tied to the trust PASOK has expressed with words and deeds and to its thinking for the most radical force of criticism, questioning, renewal and transformation of our society.

Yes to the Camps

/Question/ We hear a lot about the inroads of partisanship in the schools. What is your view on this?

/Answer/ It is a mistake to turn the schools into a chosen field for sterile partisan antagonisms. From what I said previously, it is clear that the one-sided, formalistic partisan affiliation is not automatically a mature and politicized choice. Many times the partisan fanaticism and the blindfolded insulation condemns politics to poverty, to a sportsman's misery and to cretinism.

/Question/ Does this mean that you are against the activities of the political camps in the schools?

/Answer/ On the contrary. I believe that the political camps of students as broader aggregates must function democratically and freely with political orientations, with intellectual and educational goals, with cultural horizons, with institutional and syndicalist demands. In this way, currents, questions, explorations and proposals will develop in the schools where they will confront each other, conflict with each other, and thus enrich, inform, inspire and mobilize the young. These student movements and currents with the wider educational, cultural, social, institutional and syndicalist aspects are deeply political, unifying and effective.

These movements and currents leave open the opportunities for a dialogue, communication, comparison, mutual influence, and constructive criticism among the students. They cultivate the productive confrontation of ideas outside and beyond the sterile conflict of the partisan symbols, colors and emblems.

/Question/ What do you think should be the orientation of the student movement?

/Answer/ The student movement should be determined by internal processes, positively in the daily challenge of developing participatory institutions, of the educational subject matter, the broader learning process, the creative process, through a critical contribution for the full development of these institutions, through the movement of cultural products and events.

This necessary self determination of the student movement does not mean and does not chart a lonely, monotonous, quixotic course. On the contrary, this course is necessary to be charted through relations of cooperation, respect and joint action with other elements of the educational community (teachers and parents) as well as of the local society (municipality, community, clubs)--without bargaining away its autonomy. I emphasize again that the open and harsh partisan orientation of the student movement is a social provocation and a political error. It is a social provocation because it objectively aims at the plunder and oppression of the unformed young consciences. It is a political error because it destroys its autonomy and unity since it does not respect the uniqueness of a crucial and sensitive social sector.

/Question/ And the youth organizations of the parties...

/Answer/ To avert certain impressions and comments, I must give an additional explanation which clarifies but does not negate my preceding views. I do not oppose and I do not reject the existence and the unhindered functioning and actions of the political-partisan organizations as institutions. On the contrary, I feel each organization must safeguard its special features and physiognomy through its autonomous existence. But this autonomy does not entitle the party youth organizations to act in the name of students, to give orders, to chart the course.

The youth as a social sector and its particular movements are not a "fief" of any party organization, especially for the student sector we must, in our declarations and deeds, reject the temptation of an arbitrary replacement of society by politics and of politics by the party. Society, politics, the parties and the youth organizations have among them a dialectic relationship and mutual influence and a dynamic balance. For this reason it is necessary, through the internal processes of critical comparison and composition, for the student movements in the schools to search for and conquer their autonomy, unity, and prospects. In these internal processes, fermentations and crystalizations, the party youth organizations can exist and act as catalysts, because the induction of a young person to a party youth organization is an inalienable right. It is his own personal choice and conquest. But the

partisan induction must be the product of a voluntary and mature choice which can be safeguarded by a correct and many-sided politicization.

/31 Jan 84 p 107

/Text/ "The New Democracy Youth Organization /ONNED/, with its cadre dehydration, tends to become an organization with the stigma of ideological anemia and with tendencies toward totalitarian views," said the Deputy Minister of Youth, Kostas Laliotis.

We today publish the second part of his interview. Laliotis refers to the conflict taking place today in the ranks of ONNED, the talk about the "rightist current" among the youth, and the responsibilities of the ND leadership to the developments with its organization.

At the same time he presents his views on today's youth, today's student, and the responsibility of the state toward them.

Here are the replies of Laliotis to the questions of TA NEA:

/Question/ The results of the recent student elections were used by the Right. There was talk about a rightist trend. Is this assessment valid? Also, what is your conclusion from the recent developments in ONNED?

/Answer/ It is difficult to overturn the allegations and myths presented by the ND party concerning the elections in the student communities and the results which come from an alchemy of the percentages, because the allegations and myths make up a picture designed to serve the expediency of reviving the morale and to inspire a suis generis partisan chauvinism in the camp of the Right.

The Same Lie...

It is not accidental that the inflated results were given as a "gift" to the staggering ND leadership. One should not be surprised by the use of the old propaganda doctrine of using "the same lie many times" for in-party and extra-party consumption.

ND's wishful thinking about "getting rid of the Change" found satisfaction through a change of the data and the real correlations. They resorted to the "prosperity" of numbers and percentages. They fished in muddy waters using front organizations with various names, added the representatives of the communities, including the independents with cadres or members of ONNED and the Student Independent Movement /MAKI/. The alleged victory is fictional. The MAKI numbers include a deliberate falsehood.

But beyond the revelation of this "magic picture" in the dedicated victory, it is proper for me to note a significant event. ONNED acquired for the first time a Pan-hellenic structure, presence, and intervention in the schools and the universities.

This means that it tries to formulate the organizational conditions to register and safeguard its influence in the mass areas. At a time of defeat, ND and ONNED understood that they need to create their organization as a mechanism if not as an institution for a long period of regrouping their forces to fight for power. This is something positive. The camp of the Right is changing, forced by developments to change from the "termite-like" model it used for decades--a model which finds its full description in the identification of party and state and the reproduction of an electoral clientele.

The Correct Dimensions

/Question/ They also talk about a rightist trend...

/Answer/ The talk about a rightist trend is connected to the political delineation and registration of existing as well as inactive forces which have not expressed themselves so far but also with the mobilization of all reserves from the "silent majority." It appears to come from the confluence and inter-relationship of social, political, and organizational reasons.

This phenomenon with whatever dynamic, even if it is incorporated in the perspective of a bigotted and blind "revanchism", must be interpreted calmly, without complacency but also without excess. The presence of the Right, whatever it is, must be viewed in its correct dimensions.

I am sure it has predetermined limits. I am sure it will act as a catalyst to help the redefinition of the profile, the thought and the practice of the progressive organizations, as well as the complacency of certain myths, taboos and assumptions which preserve the division between the "political" and the "social" youth.

/Question/ How do you interpret the developments in the ONNED leadership today? Is it the result of a more general crisis?

/Answer/ The developments taking place in the ONNED ranks are shocking and revealing. From what I said above, we must be worried even more about the character, profile, theses, but also the practice of ONNED.

A Suis Generis Fascist Trend

Behind the feuds and street fights and beyond the phenomena of decay, the conditions of a suis generis fascist trend appear to be already shaping openly.

Without reservations, a section of ONNED has already entered, in words and deeds, into a vicious circle of fanatical and totalitarian explorations. The internal fight in ONNED may be compared to the pre-dictatorship fight between EKOF and EREN. The political and historical similarities are obvious and are reproduced in their contemporary version. ONNED, through the continuing dehydration of its cadres, tends to be solidified as an organization with the stigma of ideological anemia and the totalitarian tendency.

/Question/ What are the responsibilities of the ND leadership for the present course of ONNED and the developments you noted?

/Answer/ First of all, serious responsibilities for these painful developments are borne by the ONNED leadership which was absent from the democratic struggles. But it appears that the ND leadership has even greater responsibilities, because for the sake of intraparty games and balances, it closes its eyes to the political trends in ONNED.

The composition of the Supervision Committee for ONNED (a *suis generis* body composed of ND deputies) reveals the responsibility of the leadership. One cannot but wonder after studying the background and political orientation of most of the members of the Supervision Committee. I don't know, it may be that such a background is a necessary standard for the ideals and models of the ONNED members. In the past, expediency covered the reality in ND. Now the strong crisis of decay in ND deprives its leader of the necessary alibi for certain critical actions.

The New Generation

/Question/ Today's students are the generation which will play a leading role tomorrow in the political developments. What does this new generation want? What are its special features? Its anxieties, its demands from life? How much is it affected by today's political thought? Is it the generation of crisis or the generation of hope? Angry or essential?

/Answer/ In the course of the personal development of every young man there is a critical moment when he comes face to face with the institutions and with society. This encounter has the characteristics of approach, knowledge, and confrontation. It starts with the first sensitization of the child, the adolescent, and the young man with the family, the school, the educational system at every level, the church, society, the army, the culture, and the parties.

At every stage, questions sometimes naive and simplistic, sometimes critical and complex, are raised about life, education, culture, relationships, society and work. Insistent questions are raised which are centered on the words: Why, how, for whom, from whom? The replies cannot be impersonal and neutral but pressing since they focus on the purposes, meaning, value of education, of work, life and of our culture, since these are questions about the structure and functioning of the social system, the international

complexities, the wars, the armaments, etc.

Every doubt and rejection by the young holds a denunciation as well as a promise. This may appear somewhat strange because the angry "No" as a rejection shines or sounds more strongly. Yet through the "No" comes an unformed "Yes" as a positive expression.

The "No" of the young is not the result of some difference due to age. It is not a declaratory act which is exhausted in the famous "generation gap." The "No" as a word and action is a broader and more complex rejection which goes beyond a superficial vendetta between generations and persons. Youth as a force of questioning and critical action and vision incorporated in a general context of political, social, and ideological conflict. Many times the "transitional" youth plays a role of the vanguard and catalyst in cooperation and alliance with other "lined up" social forces in a continuing struggle for peace, democracy, independence and socialism; in a constant struggle which moves from the marginal transition to the radical democratization, from overcoming the principle of neutrality to the acceptance of politicization, the science and functioning of the state. In a constant struggle which deals with the social structures, the institutions, the ideological and political references, the consciences, values, and culture.

Its Behavior

This attitude and behavior of youth is connected with the fact that youth is one if not the most mobile, sensitive and radical social category with the least degree of alienation and the fewer compromises. The structures, institutions, ideas, cultural expressions and the aesthetics of the past decades--which constitute a given situation--in certain cases limit and retard the smooth development of the young. In such cases, their explorations--announcing something new--are undermined by the inertia and immobility of inherited givens from a distant past.

The recent generations and especially today's young generation is growing in an era of unimaginable discoveries and conquests; in an era of anxiety and fear for national independence and for the international peaceful development; in an era when our country, giving the battle for economic development, is passing into the consumer society.

Our era is marginal and corresponds to an unrepeatable historical water's edge.

We live in a world of contradictions and surprises. We are passing through a critical turn. The international order is in a state of continuing and increasing fluidity. Socio-economic structures are being shaken, political systems are being questioned, myths are being destroyed, classical theories are being revised.

In an era when the UN decides and votes, wars are raging. Genocide is

launched. The provocations, invasions, occupations increase. The cold war climate is being revived. Armaments escalate. Peace is at the point of a gun.

In the era of technological revolution, everything ends up opposite of what it is. Abundance is accompanied by hunger, the revolution of speed with the lack of communication among people. In an era when the statistics and the econometric curves prosper the simple people merely subsist.

With Hope and Fear

Every day life reminds us and shows us that the alphabet no longer has 24 letters. Radio, TV, movies, periodicals, printed and electronic media, newspapers, create an immediacy and instant internationalization of news and events, of research, of intellectual and culture creativity. A myriad of data, memories, configurations, concepts, and predictions reflect the unprecedented revolution of knowledge and imagination and the dawn of a different civilization. The present new generation receives and formulates the modern possibilities and contradictions on its way to the year 2,000 as it touches the elements of a New Century with hope and with fear. An adolescent today has knowledge, experiences, sensitivities, questions and impasses equal, if not many times over, to those of his parents, teachers, and instructors.

To prevent a permanent gap and rejection in the relations between the young and society the state must start a genuine dialogue; must show inspiration, boldness; it must offer radical proposals. It is certain that the child, the adolescent, the young person is not impressed by a school which does not correspond to his needs, his sensitivities, his maturity. He is not impressed by certain institutions which are relics of other eras and which deprive the youth of the possibility of expression, participation, and action; by certain parties whose ideas, structures, functions and practices impose through poor and amputated references a one-dimensional human model; by certain frozen habits and prohibitions which tie down the search and the spirit; by certain civilizational currents and orientations which incarcerate and distort the sensitivity, the creativity, the aesthetics.

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KKE-INT SECRETARIAT'S KYRKOS INTERVIEWED ON EURO ELECTIONS

Athens 1 AVGI in Greek 5, 7 Feb 84

/Interview with Giorgos Savvidis/

/5 Feb 84 p 5/

/Text/ Our purpose was to have a warm, lively, brief, but also Informative interview on the June Euro elections with the Euro-deputy and member of the KKE-Int. Secretariat, Leonidas Kyrkos. With this intention we went to his house, but in the end we spent over 2 hours. How can one stop him, the way he talks so eloquently and convincingly? And then what can one delete? Everything is appropriate, necessary for what follows. Truths that are difficult to cut or shorten. So we decided to present the interview in two installments, in spite of his suggestion to cut it down.

The discussion on the meaning of the Euro elections and the attitude of KKE-Int. and of all the other parties and groups of the traditional Left and of the entire political spectrum of our country is as follows:

/Question/ Leonidas, I have a question concerning the decision of the Central Committee about the Euro elections. Why so many words about something so many people say briefly--namely, that a vote for KKE-Int. is a return to the road for change? Or is it not so?

/Answer/ First, being communists, we talk too much. Second, because we wanted to make certain points related to the current developments. I don't know if it would have been simpler to say: "Come, let us increase our votes and our seats. We know a strong wind fills our sails. If we all make it stronger, we'll do something very positive for the Change." The truth is that many questions have been raised. One question, for example, is: "Why should we vote for you? Why will this promote the Change?" It is because we believe that in this election we must avoid the dilemmas of a plebiscite. Our effort is to pose before the public the essential problem.

It is obvious that the New Democracy will run with the slogan: "All those

who are dissatisfied with PASOK's government in the last 2 years should vote for the ND." Now what is the meaning of the Euro elections, their essential aspects, the issues of peace--missiles, etc.; all that is difficult for the ND and they will try to ignore it.

/Question/ Is this what the party resolution means when it says that the other parties lower the meaning of the Euro elections?

/Answer/ That, too. But this is the basic thought. The opposite simplification is done by PASOK: "Those who want Change, those who do not want to encourage the hopes of the Right are voting for PASOK." They wipe out in this way the existing problems, namely, what is the essence of the Euro elections? Why do we go to the polls? What are the big questions we must answer? What are the answers given by PASOK? Why did PASOK say in the recent past: "Out of the EEC--plebiscite?" Why does it not say the same thing now, why does it say something different? It is obvious, to concentrate on the two parties, that to serve temporary expedencies they try to give the election the character of a plebiscite. To push our votes in the party enclaves. In our view this is a mistake. At long last, the people must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves. But before they can decide they must be informed. They must know the question they are going to answer. This is what we provide with the resolution of the Central Committee.

With a Double Target

/Question/ The targets of the KKE-Int. for the Euro elections are two, in other words. First, to make the party's voice in the Europarlament stronger; second, to show that its sails are full as you said and that it can play a decisive role in our political developments. Is that so?

/Answer/ Yes, these are our two targets. To strengthen our presence...but "a strong presence" does not make our views better known. If we succeed in electing two Eurodeputies or in getting more votes, this will support the logic and solutions proposed by KKE-Int. in our domestic life. We ask for votes for all the simple men. We ask for the votes of the communists, the socialists, the conservative simple men. For each category we have a reason why.

Why should the communist or the leftist vote for us? Because the policy of the other KKE is a simplistic policy which cuts Greece, the Greek labor movement off the European movement. It cuts Greece off with its slogan: "Out of the EEC," of the great developments occurring in the European area. It is as though the train is running and they want to disconnect the last car. But the train runs and if we cut off the last car, the car will be left in the wilderness. After that the passengers will have to continue on foot. We have terrible problems that a country cannot solve alone. Of course, the train has its own problems. It goes slow. Then, let's get more steam to make it go faster. It is not orderly. Let us bring some order. It has its problems. But we shall cope with them from the inside--not by

disconnecting the car.

Why should the PASOK follower vote for us? Because this party is standing on two...boats. It said: "Out of the EEC--Plebiscite." We used to say then: "You do not believe in this policy, but you advocate it. You think it is to your benefit. Say it. But you do harm because at the same time you neutralize the masses." But PASOK came to power. Did they hold a plebiscite? It is known that it was not going to happen. Just as it was known that KKE-Ext. did not believe its slogan: "Plebiscite for the Bases." The plebiscite was demagogery.

Yesterday I read in the RIZOSPASTIS. (They devoted one column in which the readers comment on the Omondia speech. They insult. Simple men, good natured, old comrades who lived with us in exile, in prison, who now find delight insulting the "reformists".) One letter writer said: "In Omondia you forgot to mention the bases. You forgot to mention EEC." I forgot? Why don't they ask Florakis? He spoke the other day in Salonica. Did he say anything about the bases? Did he say anything about the plebiscite? You present a slogan to last for a period of time. You don't present it to deceive people and they forget it the next day. This has a name in everyday life, but I don't want to use it.

/Question/ But we are talking about the PASOK followers...

/Answer/ Yes. They forgot the talk about a plebiscite because they came to power and now make policy. Andreas, during a lecture to a serious audience, a well-prepared and significant text (but also in official statements on the termination of the presidency), said, "From inside EEC we will fight for a Europe of people." (Who cannot see the analogy with our position: "From inside EEC we'll fight for the EEC of the working people!") Now, ask, please, the PASOK people: "What is your line on the EEC?" Half of them will reply, "Let us get out of the EEC." And the other half will say, "Don't listen to them, we'll work through the EEC." When you step on two boats your destiny is to fall in between. The left movement knows this.

When I was talking about the train earlier I was taking a wide view: Europe must face its crucial problems. One of them is the technological challenge. Go any place in Greece. Go to a grocery store and ask for sugar, coffee or onions. The storekeeper will say: Fine. They cost so much. You think he will use paper and pencil? No. He will use a pocket calculator! And you know what? Nine out of 10 times it's going to be Japanese. European grants like Philips or Grundig produce pocket calculators. But the European market is flooded with Japanese products. In every house you will find stereo sets. In their majority, they are Japanese and American. Now the European market has been flooded with microcomputers which are toys, tools, etc. Soon you will not be able to do anything without these tools. They, too, are American made. Soon it will be impossible to give your daughter a doll because she will want an electronic toy. It is American made. Well, the European industry loses ground constantly on the key sectors. And if you want

to talk about the Greek industry...it is non-existent.

/Question/ What has PASOK to do with this?

/Answer/ If PASOK cannot see that Greece's destiny is tied to the European technological development and its problems, and stays with its campaign rhetoric, "let us see a little," and "out of EEC," does not alienate its followers who are fed up with "out of EEC" and keeps them from being swallowed by KKE--and if it says carefully "let's stay in," to prevent KKE-Int. from taking away some followers...if in short, PASOK does not form its own position--since it is also in power--Greece will lose opportunities while our credibility will come into question. If we are going to have a close friendship I'll see you differently. But if we are going to have a friendship in which you look at my billfold and I look at yours, and we both know we will soon part, our relationship will be different on every problem. Through the problems of the Euro elections we can get insights as to how this country is moving. When we say, "stop this nonsense that in EEC we'll lose our independence," it is not because we prefer the European to the American dependence. We don't want any. Simply, rejecting any dependence does not mean they don't see the real existing relationships and the source of the threat.

Why should an ND follower vote for us? Because the ND continues the same... tune. It is happy and unconcerned. In America there is Reagan, in Europe there is Thatcher! It is tied to the logic: "Squeeze the working people. Strengthen the so-called free economy. Strengthen the arms race to frighten the people and get more easily what you want." ND will go to the campaign with this simplified logic: "After two and a half years with PASOK in government, those of you who are displeased for any reason, we promise you, etc., etc."

Only for KKE-Int. a Vote is Not Lost

/Question/ Leonidas, the way you talk you give the impression that only a vote given to KKE-Int. is good for Greece. Is this so?

/Answer/ Precisely. That's exactly what I say. I want to say it very clearly. Communists, vote to KKE-Int. to strengthen the voice which on the Greek and European level fights to bring together the widest forces of working people against the American and Thatcherite storm. And to bring together all those forces which, starting from any political or religious origins, march together in the struggle against the missiles, against the arms race, against the threat of war. Only KKE-Int. can do this. It has ties with communists, socialists, radicals, everybody. The other communist party has ties only to those forces in the European areas which have a one-sided orientation. To the PASOK followers we say: We call the comrades who believe in socialism, who found--in their view--the ballot as a way to overthrow the Right and who feel that PASOK today follows erroneous orientations, to vote for KKE-Int. because by so doing they do not only strengthen KKE-Int. they also strengthen

the demand for a new policy and new dynamics in the area of Change.

We turn to the simple voter of the Right and say: For years we called for conciliation with you. For years--against the attacks from both PASOK and KKE--we demanded that there must be a political area for you, too. We did not use against you the humiliating label of fascist. We asked that your presence be respected because we saw in you a social factor. The rightist worker, we said, is above all a worker. We extend our hand to his conscience. If you are a rightist it is your business, but in the social struggle you will see we are right. Our hand is extended to you.

In the European area, as you know, we supported your interests as well, and we honored the mandate you gave us because in the 5.3 percent were voters from the Right. Never did we humiliate any of those who voted for us, and in every case expressed the views of the simple people of our country, knowing that we expressed a wider spectrum of forces. With the same logic we ask for your vote again.

/Question/ Are you saying that the Greek voter can keep his convictions for the national election but for the Euro elections voting for KKE-Int. is as though he gives a lesson to the leadership of his party?

/Answer/ We believe that one person who wants to stay in the political area where he belongs can give a very clear mandate to the leadership of the party. We will talk again from the Euro elections to the national elections. I repeat, we are not going to fool anyone. We'll talk again. We'll appeal to his conscience, to think again. Now in this particular election, when we say "vote for KKE-Int." we give double meaning to his vote. For many it will be a positive vote for a party which steadfastly supports a way to democracy and socialism through freedom; for others it will be a protest vote and a message to the leaders.

/Question/ If, in other words, a rightist votes for KKE-Int. it is as though he sends a message to the /Right/ leadership to stop, for instance, flirting and forging alliances with the extreme Right.

/Answer/ Yes, but also to stop flirting with the missiles. Voting for KKE-Int., the voter knows that he does not approve of some missiles while condemning others. He knows very well that he condemns all missiles. In short, he gives a mandate for a policy of true detente which will not defend certain interests while ignoring legitimate and logical questions which may be raised by the other side. It will be a message signifying that security today in the world is a broader phenomenon. Your security is my security, too. We may compete, we may fight each other on ideological and social fronts, but on the question of war and peace we must be very, very careful not to step on the legitimate and logical questions of security which exist for others as well.

/Question/ And the PASOK follower, what kind of message is he going to send

to his leadership by voting for KKE-Int.?

/Answer/ It's obvious. I vote for my comrades of KKE-Int. first because they have a crystal-clear line and I like it. (Yes, from inside the EEC we shall fight against the monopolies; against the American intervention in Europe.) I like it because these people were saying this for years, and secondly, because I don't like your one-party ideas. I don't like hegemonism, I don't like that you don't pay any attention to the simple people, I don't like this easy game of words.

The Readiness of the Party

/Question/ If things are as you say, is your party ready to wage this battle? Is it ready to board this train?

/Answer/ No, it is not ready. But it would be a difficult fight even if it were ready. You understand, we are now at the...prewarming stage. Like a high jumper with a two meter, five centimeters record. We cannot jump suddenly to two meters and thirty centimeters. But to reach even 2.5 he must warm up, he must start from lower levels. The same way we must warm up.

/Question/ But we have only 120 days to election day...

/Answer/ Yes, but we were first to enter the homestretch. We gave the draft program which is now being discussed in tens of organizations, by thousands of people. I don't say it is a brilliant text. Far from it. It was a simple text which had, however, five ideas and was looking for another five to be added. We are the only ones who put our ideas to discussion, because we wanted to have the contribution of other people. Fine. I have the day after tomorrow the meeting of the Central Committee which will work on the fruits of this discussion and then submit it to the National Council. After the National Council (which will convene in the first week of March) we are off and running. Then we have March, April, May and half of June.

/Question/ Would it not be important for the people to know the composition of the ticket? Who are the 24 candidates of KKE-Int.?

/Answer/ It would be good. I repeat, everything will be finished early in March. But we need this period, until the fever starts to rise. Why didn't the other parties start yet?

/Question/ This is the moment of KKE-Int. The other parties, as you said, will simply use the Euroelection.

/Answer/ Agreed, but it is also true that as we come closer to the date, the fires will spread. No, I think there is time. But we also have what happened before. On the occasion of the AVGI festival, more than 100 gatherings took place throughout Greece. The slogans and the discussions dealt also with the EEC.

/Question/ But here the question is the psychology of the party members. In the previous national election we were...at the bottom. Now we go into another election with good prospects and the entire party must respond, using a different face and methodology.

/Answer/ This is true. I see a new climate being formed. We have here the abilities of the Central Committee; of the leadership. To inspire. I see it in the rank and file of the party. I can see the desire to fight. We are ready to exceed ourselves. Of course, we should not underestimate the difficulties we face.

/Question/ Should the party enter the fight differently? I remember, for instance, the United Democratic Left /EDA/ in the 1958 election. It performed differently and won 25 percent. There were new possibilities and it fought using new forms of struggle. New forms. Should we find now new ways to bring the views of KKE-Int. to the followers of the Right, PASOK, etc.?

/Answer/ The other day at the organizational meeting some such ideas were discussed. A party like ours, without strong organizational foundations, must understand that those forms are not enough. Here we must show ability, imagination, all the initiative of our cadres and members so that, though few, but with a sound course and in contrast with many we'll be able to develop a strong current, such as our work during the 3-day demonstrations on education. In any event, we are searching for these new forms and we'll find them. We trust the initiative and imagination of our organizations. We have some good illustrations. But we also have negative aspects: the routine, the fatigue, etc. We know about them, but at this moment we talk about the illustrations which give a general push forward, from the party and from /youth organizations/ RIGAS.

EDA and the "Leftists"

/Question/ What do you think about the possibility of EDA or other groups entering the electoral contest?

/Answer/ No one can prevent anyone from running in an election. Taking part in public life is a personal choice. With regard to EDA, I personally would not like it for a number of reasons. In the previous election EDA cooperated with PASOK. PASOK is going now through a somewhat difficult moment. Should EDA desert it now, at the difficult moment when it cooperated in the good times?

/Question/ This is a matter for EDA...

/Answer/ You ask my opinion and I give you my opinion. If you ask me what is in the interest of EDA you should ask its leadership. This is my opinion. KKE-Int. will wage a battle and everyone knows it is going to be a difficult one. What do you have to say, you friends of EDA? So we can hear you! If you had something different to say you would not have gone with PASOK. If

you have nothing different to say then stay with PASOK. What are you going to say in the election? I repeat, it's your choice. But it is also my right to have an opinion. Like every citizen. And something else. I say this with the respect, affection, and comradely love I have for Elias Iliou. I would prefer that he does not enter this fight. He made a beautiful, clear statement (no one pressed him for this) and said that the time had come to end his active political life. For us this was a point of reference. His views are respected. The Euroelection, however, is a tough contest and Iliou knows it. I think those who love and respect him (and I love and respect him very much) should tell him with affection, but clearly, their opinion.

/Question/ How about the other groups?

/Answer/ Look, if the leftist groups enter the contest it will set in motion the sound judgment of public opinion. I repeat, each of us has the right to support his views. Fine. But all these years since 1974 we got to know each other very well in this country. For this reason I believe our people will not encourage the fragmentation in the name of some specific difference, when those groups do not add up into something substantial. You may say, but why then do you insist? Because we have "set" deep roots. The cause of the renewal of the Communist Movement is not a matter of whim. Besides, we can say that many of the ideas we promoted were borne out and were embraced by the programs of others and by the vocabulary of other people.

Who else spoke as forcefully as we did on the unity of the Left and progressive forces? Who? Who fought against the party hegemonism that left no room for anyone else? Who spoke about the principle of equal status? Who was the first to say in this country that "whoever wants to exclude someone else, he excludes himself?" Who opened the door for cooperation which is indispensable for the solution of the problems emerging on the course toward the Change? Now they talk again about unity. Fine. We applaud this, but we also ask the people not to forget who started it.

They should also tell us how they understand this unity. Is it possible that it is only a word on their lips, but behind this they think in terms that make unity impossible? In any event, I am of the impression that our people will guard against fragmentation of the /leftist/ forces. They will let blooms come out only where there are deep roots...

/Question/ The way you talk I have the impression that the hour of KKE-Int. has come. But how will this reasoning reach the wide public? What should be done by AVGI, radio, TV?

/Answer/ Let's first explain what we mean by "the hour of KKE-Int." The KKE-Int. exists to illuminate certain ideas, to serve the enlightened vanguard of the working class, its goals, its ideals, the cause of socialism. "Certain people" saw our failures and added their savage criticism. We were to blame for many of our failures, but the conditions of competition were also

difficult.

As you know, we kept our cool, our ideological and emotional calm, inspired by our ideas. We told them: Listen friends. Join the party. Or don't join this party for a thousand reasons of your own. Fine. Let us cooperate; to search with open eyes for the most productive arrangements, keeping in mind that this body known as the organized force of renewal is a pole. I personally reject the anarchist notion which holds that social developments are spontaneous. No. Whoever places all his hopes on spontaneity is doomed to destruction.

An organized force is indispensable. Not a stupid, reactionary, retrogressive organization, but an organized force which is forward looking, capable of assimilating, developing, moving. The tip of an arrow that says we are going forward. Friends and comrades, do you want to go together in this direction? Come. Do you want to make things difficult and have personal mistrust and any other damn thing? If you think you are better, fine, come and show samples of your work, of your contribution. Do we have to recognize your role, just like that? Once I laughed heartily, but I didn't just laugh.

When my time comes I will reply to the cartoonist who showed me sitting on an EEC armchair and refusing to get off. It was a cartoon with a series of ideas. When my time comes I will tell him that I was not a dismal chair holder. But to get back, I repeat that we are ready to help all the fresh forces, but let them first come out. The broader unity of the area of the renewed Left does not mean acceptance of every nonsense offered in the name of renewal.

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/Text7 The second part of the interview with Leonidas Kyrkos on the Euroelections is as follows:

/Question7 Leonidas, how will you spread the ideas of KKE-Int. to the public? What can be done by AVGI, by TV?

/Answer7 How will these ideas reach further? Only if we all decide to overcome everything that exists within us in the form of stagnation, inertia: "What can be do; that's all we can do." No. AVGI is not a very good newspaper. We'll make it a very good newspaper. But this requires the effort of all of us. "Listen, George, your story isn't good. You can write it 10 times better. Take it and bring it back 10 times better. And you'll bring it back so." "Come here friend. We need to do this, but I can't do it. No, you will do it. But I don't have time to do it. You will find time; you will not sleep; you'll die."

We must have this determination, all of us, in all directions. From our friends and comrades in AVGI and from the members and cadres of the party and of the youth organization. In this way our party will be made to sparkle.

But we are only a few. Excellent. Few but active and brilliant. We'll not sink in the swamp of partisan inactivity but we will constantly move the waters. This, of course, means confrontations, maybe painful. We should not be afraid, precisely because it must constantly shine in the conscience of all of us. We have in us great potential but we must activate it.

/Question/ The election will be held on the same day in all the EEC countries. How committed is the government to treat equally the parties on TV?

/Answer/ It has no commitment, but it has a very great responsibility because the issue is political. What can the others say? Open up the TV channel? The Europarlament will campaign with a few paid announcements. These are dead things. They will present the work of the Europarlament. Nonsense. The government must see this as a political issue, but it cannot because it is afraid of TV.

The New Democracy was also afraid of TV, although its work was not bad. What ND did was not entirely negative. There were things it did which were useful because it had to face matters correctly. Make no mistake. The Right of 1974, 1976, 1978, and 1980 was not the Right of 1950. The Right, too, has undergone change.

I remind you of the time when G. Rallis went on TV and turned to 'dust' the journalists of the Ministry of Education. Or had you forgotten that? The only newsmen who dared whisper a couple of words were those from AVGI and RIZOSPASTIS. The others were turned to dust by Rallis. The same is true about the present government. It has done some good work, but it will not be convincing when it presents it in a monologue. The man on the street will say: 'Why don't you let the other side judge you?' So, friends, open up the TV which means apply pluralism. You only uphold the theory you use now with words, not deeds.

/Question/ What do you have to say to Sakis Peponis?

/Answer/ Dear Sakis Peponis, you are making an effort but I want you to make this effort with me. You must change the TV and say: Come here KKE-Int., ND, KKE and KODISO /Party of Democratic Socialism/. What do you think about the open TV?

/Question/ But if in spite of all this the government gives the same treatment, is KKE-Int. entitled to do, for instance, what ANDI tried to do, i.e., set up a radio station and start broadcasting its theses?

/Answer/ I think yes! This is not a threat. Today it is ridiculous to deny freedoms. When Mitterand set up his radio station and there was a raid, who was right from the standpoint of history? It was Mitterand, one hundred thousand times, even against one hundred thousand laws banning his station. These laws were thrown into the wastebasket of history.

The government must open up the TV and I hope it will listen carefully to what I am about to say: Mature people are only the informed people. The Change cannot be based on the explosion of spontaneity. Today we are travelling on the old boat of PASOK. Tomorrow we'll be on someone else's boat, and instead of going toward Change we'll get somewhere else.

But informed people do not get on an old boat. They can cross the ocean on a surfing board. Therefore, open up the TV. Let people learn about EEC... If you have ideas defend them. Sharpen your ideological swords and come out to cross swords. Let's fight against the reactionary and simplistic "No". Let's fight against the "Yes" to American domination. Let us give those battles openly. Invite the best spokesmen of these ideas to set down around the table so the people can learn that today the farmers go and bury their products with sorrow but they get paid. They buried their products in the past, too, but they did not get paid.

And let the advocates of "let us get out of the EEC of the devils" explain to us where we are going to be if we leave. Where are we going to sell our products and where are we going to get the technology we need? And how can we get on the "train" of those tremendous developments, on which we must claim not the position of a passenger in the caboose, but as a fellow driver.

You'll say, little Greece is in the position of a fellow driver! Yes, this small Greece! The advocates of "out" have no place in our popular movement. No matter how much they swear allegiance to the working class they don't trust it. All this must be said openly so the people can learn that by voting for the policies of KKE-Int. they vote so Greece can become a fellow driver in this train. Then its course will not be the course that leads to the logic of the monopolies but to the line of the workers.

/Question/ In the previous election you were elected a Eurodeputy with the 500,000 ballots cast for the party. Do you think you lived up to this confidence? Do you consider yourself a successful Eurodeputy?

/Answer/ I did all I could. I was not absent, I did not get tired, I did not hesitate. Beyond that I think we achieved a few things (we did this together as a party, in a collective effort). Inside the Europarlament, the KKE-Int. was a force at the forefront of the problems on peace, Europe's autonomy, the problems of workers, farmers, women. When KKE asks for the people's vote, the people will ask "why". Is it because on every occasion you began and finished with the phrase, "we must get out of the EEC of the monopolies," ignoring and turning your back on the millions of working people who join forces for a better future? Where did you find the theory that the EEC of monopolies cannot become the EEC of the working people? What is this view which is defeatist, stupid, irrational and, in fact, destructive for the workers' movement? Which Marxist analysis led you there?

You left out of EEC the soul of Marxism, the dialectic. You are not capable of analyzing the forces which are clashing today in the area of Europe, to

see the tremendous possibilities that exist to reconcile the workers and progressive forces in one axis, one direction, one point. When you see with terror the stranglehold of the monopolies on Europe, do you think that Greece is...free of monopolies? So, we'll get out of the EEC to go where? To the road of dependence from the United States?

/Question/ What do you think of Florakis' recent speech?

/Answer/ In his interview Florakis made a positive opening and correctly our comrade secretary Giannis Baniyas found it a positive step. Yes! But in his speech K. Florakis dared to utter a phrase which should be weighed carefully by the Greek working class. He said: "Isolate the Right and the KKE-Int." Comrade Kharilaos, you will pay for this mistake. You started this feud. We criticized you but we did not utter such a phrase. Now we can say it. And we'll call on the enlightened working class of our country, all the progressive people in our country to isolate the policies of the dogmatic KKE. In other words, to isolate a voice which ostensibly defends the interests of the workers and yet cuts off Greece from a dynamic course.

We call instead on the working class and the people to vote for the policies of KKE-Int., so we can escape the isolation, the deprivation and delay, and a condition of poverty (which is where the brilliant and resounding, ostensibly revolutionary slogans lead us) and to become fellow drivers on the EEC train when the driver will no longer be the power of monopolies. We know that to reach the driver's seat we'll have to fight and to become fellow drivers to throw out the drivers of the monopolies. But it's one thing to be inside and to fight and another to be on the outside and...to curse.

The future of Europe is difficult. The problems are tremendous. The Community is undergoing a serious crisis. For us the first dimension we'll give to the Euroelection is the battle for peace and autonomy. We'll orient the people to fight in every way against the policy of the conservative circles in Europe. We'll fight against their anti-communist hysteria. We'll call on our people to vote against the policies of Thatcher and Kohl; against the policy of the ND so that from Greece a message will emerge: "We in Greece are defeating the Right. Do the same in Kohl's Germany, in Thatcher's England. Then come to meet at the Parliament, communists, socialists, democrats, radicals, to change the course of Europe."

/Question/ Although only 120 days separate us from the election, can you risk some prediction for the results, for each party?

/Answer/ It's not a question of risk. It's too early. Much is at stake. The situation is in flux. Still...

I believe the ND will lose ground in the Euroelection because the only thing it gives is its fanaticism against the Change. More specifically against PASOK. But the "anti" movements seldom express the hopes of millions of people. What could the ND offer? It has the responsibility for accepting

accepting negative terms for the induction. And it is responsible for embracing the policies of Thatcher and Kohl when Averof came out on the question of the missiles 'more royalist than the king.' What could it offer as a vision to the people? Whenever the interests of workers or women came up, ND voted against. Therefore, I see that it will come out reduced and this will be a positive development.

With regard to PASOK, the result will depend on the kind of battle it is going to wage. If it continues with its present imprecision it will lose a great deal. But the question is where the votes will go. If they go to ND we'll have a problem. But according to what I said, it cannot lose in that direction. But if it loses in our direction? The true PASOK partisans should applaud something like this, however illogical it may seem, because they should know that because KKE-Int. is a force promoting the Change, its strengthening will also strengthen at the same time the drive for Change. This would be beneficial. But if it loses in the direction of KKE the result will be negative because it will strengthen a pole with negative aspects on basic political views.

My fundamental conclusion: If all goes well and KKE-Int. comes out of the election as strong as possible, this will have a very beneficial effect on the overall course of our internal affairs. Of course, it is difficult to make predictions in an election. I weigh what I say because I trust the good sense of our people. It is certain that our presence has given rise to hope, and I hope our people will support us. This is something more than a mere prediction that can be made months ahead. What is certain is that this is a battle which if the party wants to win, it must mobilize every single fiber...

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POLL SHOWS GAINS FOR ALL THREE COALITION PARTNERS

Conservatives Toward New Record

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 3 Mar 84 p 3

[Article by Egil Sundar]

[Text] The Conservative Party is making new gains in the Gallup poll--this time by as much as 2 percent--and has thus reached approximately the same high level as before the setback it suffered last summer. This appears from the February opinion poll undertaken by the Norwegian Public Opinion Institute on behalf of AFTENPOSTEN. The most recent poll on the Conservative Party, 29.4 percent, was made during the period 10-27 February and thus reflects the reactions to the sensational news that Jo Benkow will have to surrender the chairmanship to Erling Norvik. In other words, a promising come-back for Norvik.

Simultaneously with the clear advance of the Conservative Party, the Labor Party is suffering a further setback and is now at 38.6 percent as against 39.8 percent last January. As far as Gro Harlem Brundtland's party is concerned, there has been a steady setback since last October, for which there probably are several reasons. First of all, the setback is an indication that the unrestrained attacks of the Labor Party on the economic policy pursued by the government have not had the beneficial effect on the party that they obviously had expected at Youngstorvet. Another contributory cause may be the uneasiness and uncertainty created in wide circles by the vacillating and opportunistic conduct on the part of the Labor Party in security policy matters. To this come the reactions to the exposure of Arne Treholt as a KGB agent, and the possibility may at least not be ruled out that some people may have associated this with the more recent debate on our security policy in general.

A Turning Point

As for the balance of power between the two power blocs in Norwegian politics, the most recent public opinion poll shows a clear turning point in relation to the trend we have been able to register since the elections to the municipal and county boards last summer. For the first time since August, the three

government parties have together had greater support than the Labor Party and the Socialist Left Party. According to the February poll, the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party have 45.7 percent of the voter support, as against 44.1 percent for the Labor Party and the Socialist Left Party. By way of comparison, it may be mentioned that the support of the three government parties was 42.1 percent in January and as low as 38.3 percent in October.

Non-Socialist Trend

The February poll of the Norwegian Public Opinion Poll Institute and AFTENPOSTEN thus indicates that there is again a non-socialist trend in Norway. This is primarily reflected in a steadily increasing support of the Conservative Party, which after a record-low level of 23.9 percent in October has now reached the level of 29.4 percent. However, it is interesting and important to bear in mind that the two other government parties, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party, also seem to have strengthened their positions. Especially remarkable is the level of the Center Party of 7.4 percent in February as against 6 percent the previous month. However, also the Christian People's Party is in relatively good shape with a support of 8.9 percent in February as against 8.7 percent the previous month.

Advantage to All Three Parties

In other words, the conclusion clearly is: All three government parties benefit from the cooperation. This important recognition ought to form the basis for new constructive efforts to meet the demands and solve the problems of our time with the very policy that the country needs. This will further clarify the political alternatives in next year's elections to the Storting.

Setback for Progressive Party

The advance of the Conservative Party is, to a large extent, associated with the lack of support of the Progressive Party, which, according to the poll taken in February, has a support of 6 percent as against 7.2 percent in January, 8.2 percent in December and November and as much as 9.5 percent in October. Conservatives who switched to the Progressive Party in the last election are clearly on their way back to their old party. Incidentally, it was an interesting aspect of the most recent opinion poll that the voter loyalty for the Conservative Party in February was at its highest level since June, which confirms the fact that we are back to more normal conditions. As far as non-socialist voters are concerned, it is a question of uniting in the big trial of strength in the elections to the Storting in 1985.

Brighter Prospects

Based on an evaluation of the situation today, the chances that the non-socialist parties will retain the government power after the coming elections are upwards of 50 percent. The prospects thus are considerably brighter than they were merely a few months ago. However, as is well-known, political life is extremely changeable. and at the present time it is, of course, difficult

to predict the factors which will determine the outcome when the Norwegian people will be returning to the ballot boxes. For the time being, we must content ourselves with ascertaining that the three government parties are strengthening their position, while the Labor Party is not receiving the response which would have been natural for the largest opposition party under the prevailing conditions.

Question: If you were to vote in the elections to the Storting tomorrow, which party would you vote for?


	Storting Election 1981 %	1983 Aug %	Oct %	Dec %	1984 Jan %	Feb %
Labor Party	37.1	37.9	41.0	40.1	39.8	38.6
Liberal People's Party	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.1
Progressive Party	4.5	6.5	9.5	8.2	7.2	6.0
Conservative Party	31.8	30.5	23.9	25.2	27.4	29.4
Christian People's Party	9.4	7.2	7.6	8.7	8.7	8.9
Norwegian Communist Party	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Radical Liberal Party	0.7	0.6	1.0	1.1	0.7	0.6
Center Party	6.6	6.6	6.8	6.5	6.0	7.4
Socialist Left Party	5.0	5.2	5.7	5.2	5.7	5.5
Liberal Party	3.9	4.0	3.5	4.3	3.5	3.0
Others	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.1
Total:	100.1	99.9	100.0	100.2	100.1	100.0
Labor party plus Socialist Left Party	42.1	43.1	46.7	45.3	45.5	44.1
Conservative Party plus Christian People's Party plus Center Party.....	47.8	44.3	38.3	40.4	42.1	45.7
Labor Party plus Socialist Left Party plus Radical Liberal Party plus Communist Party	43.1	44.2	48.1	46.8	46.6	45.1
Conservative Party plus Christian People's Party plus Center Party plus the Liberal People's Party plus the Liberal Party plus the Progressive Party	56.8	55.6	51.9	53.3	53.1	54.8

The figures indicate the number of votes cast in a Storting election tomorrow, if any, by voters who would be certain to vote. The question was also asked which party the voter voted for in the election to the Storting in 1981. The differences between the support of the individual parties on this question and the actual election results in 1981 were used as weighted factors.

The results are based on interviews with 951 people entitled to vote during the period 10 - 25 February 1984.

Oslo, 2 March 1984

The Norwegian Institute of Public Opinion, Inc.



POLITICAL BAROMETER, WEIGHTED ON BASIS OF VOTING FIGURES IN 1981

- Key: 1. Labor Party plus Socialist Left Party 3. Conservative Party plus Christian People's Party
 2. Labor Party 4. Conservative Party

Progressives' Chairman on Setback

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 6 Mar 84 p 3

[Article by Terje Svabø]

[Text] "The setback is bigger than expected. The Progressive Party will have to increase its external activities. The aggression toward the Conservative Party on account of the national budget and the automobile tax has subsided. The Conservative Party is getting voters back from us." These were the comments by the leader of the Progressive Party, Carl I. Hagen, on the downward trend which the party is now experiencing in the opinion polls. Hagen nevertheless believes that the Progressive Party will become larger than the Center Party in the election in 1985.

The most recent opinion polls seem to indicate that the Progressive Party at the moment has problems holding on to its voters. In the election last year, the party received the support of 6.3 percent of the electorate. However, it seems to have difficulty keeping its support at that level. During the first few months after the election, there was an upward trend in the opinion polls, a November poll even gave the party 9.5 percent. Carl I. Hagen, however, reacted quickly, saying that this very figure probably was too high.

In answer to the question why the Progressive Party now seems to be experiencing a downward trend, Carl I. Hagen says that the opinion polls are lower than what he had expected. He points out that he had expected a stabilization at around 7 percent, whereas the figures now are somewhat higher than 6 percent.

"What may be the cause of the setback?"

"After the presentation of the national budget and the proposal to increase the automobile tax, the Conservative Party became subject to a spontaneous outburst of rage. Obviously, we benefit from this. The situation has now calmed down, and a few members of the Conservative Party who left their party have now returned to their old party. Moreover, attempts are made to create the impression that the Conservative Party's line will become stronger by furthering purely Conservative standpoints. Such a line will be adopted by voters whose viewpoints lie between those of the Conservative Party and the Progressive Party.

The trend in the public opinion polls also shows our influence on Norwegian politics. When the Progressive Party grows stronger, we will be pulling the Conservative Party toward the right. Dissatisfied Conservative voters will then return to the Conservative Party, thanks to the influence of the Progressive Party on Norwegian politics," Hagen says.

"What kind of strategy will be needed to reverse the downward trend of the Progressive Party?"

"Our strategy remains the same, but it is quite clear that we shall again have to increase our external activities. There is reason to point out that while before Christmas we were ahead of our planned schedule, we are now on a level with it. I still believe that the Progressive Party will become larger than the Center Party in the 1985 election and larger than the Christian People's Party in the 1987 election."

"Is the party's own gravity strong enough?"

"No, it is not. The party organization is still in the process of being built up. We still have no nationwide party organization and are only at present in the process of developing a central membership file. Whereas other parties base themselves on paid work, we in the Progressive Party rely on voluntary and unpaid work," Carl I. Hagen points out.

Poll Measures Voter Loyalty

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Mar 84 p 3

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen]

[Text] The voter stability is largest in the Labor Party. Eighty-seven percent of those who voted for that party in 1981 would certainly do the same thing should an election to the Storting take place tomorrow. Also the Socialist Left Party has a faithful voter support of 84 percent. The Christian People's Party has a voter loyalty of 78 percent. The Liberal Party is at the lowest level with 61 percent. Nor may the Conservative Party or the Progressive Party be said to be happy about a voter loyalty of 67 and 66 percent, respectively.

This appears from the opinion poll taken for the month of January of this year by the Norwegian Institute of Public Opinion and AFTENPOSTEN. Compared to a corresponding poll taken in April of last year, only the Labor Party, the Socialist Left Party and the Liberal Party have experienced improvements in voter loyalty. This improvement has amounted to 6 percentage points in the case of the Labor Party and to as much as 12 percentage points in the case of both the Socialist Left Party and the Liberal Party.

The voter loyalty of the Conservative Party has deteriorated the most during the said period. Compared to April of last year, the number of voters who voted for the Conservative Party in the last election to the Storting and who state that they would do the same thing if there were an election tomorrow has dropped by 12 percentage points. As far as the Center Party is concerned, the setback amounts to 7 percentage points. The Liberal Party shows the biggest variations in voter loyalty: 49 percent in January of last year, 39 percent in August, 77 percent in December and 61 percent in the January poll of this year.

It is interesting to note that as many as 23 percent who voted in the last elections to the Storting are uncertain which party they would vote for if an election to the Storting were to take place tomorrow. This uncertainty is largest among the voters of the Progressive Party, viz. 17 percent. As far as

the other parties are concerned, the numbers of uncertain voters are distributed as follows: The Liberal Party 14 percent, the Center Party 11 percent, the Conservative Party 8 percent, the Labor Party 7 percent, the Christian People's Party 5 percent, while only 1 percent of the voters of the Socialist Left Party state that they are uncertain on their choice of party.

The Conservative Party and the Liberal Party score the highest figures when it comes to the number of voters who know for certain that they do not want to vote for these parties as they did in the last elections to the Storting. The figure for both parties is 7 percent.

Also when it comes to voters who might have chosen another party if an election to the Storting would take place tomorrow, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party take up the unenviable first places. This answer is given by 17 percent of Conservative voters and 18 percent of those who 3 years ago voted for the Liberal Party. The Labor Party clearly shows the best result in this connection, viz. 3 percent. As far as the other parties are concerned, those who are uncertain about their choice of party are distributed as follows: Christian People's Party 5 percent, Center Party 11 percent, Socialist Left Party 10 percent, and the Progressive Party 12 percent.

Question: Did you vote in the elections to the Storting in 1981. In the affirmative, if an election to the Storting were to take place tomorrow, would you then be absolutely certain to vote for the same party as last time, or would you consider voting for a different party, or would you be absolutely certain to vote for a different party, or might you perhaps not vote, or are you uncertain as to what to do?

The number of party supporters from 1981 in terms of percentages who in an election to the Storting tomorrow would be absolutely certain to vote for the same party:

	1983								1984
	Apr %	May %	June %	Aug %	Sept %	Oct %	Nov %	Dec %	Jan %
Labor Party	81	81	82	81	86	88	91	84	87
Progressive Party	70	63	56	59	65	59	78	66	66
Conservative Party	79	74	79	72	75	62	70	70	67
Christian People's Party	86	69	80	70	81	84	87	76	78
Center Party	79	71	79	73	83	88	66	76	72
Socialist Left Party	72	71	75	68	69	83	69	75	84
Liberal Party	49	57	54	39	63	56	58	77	61

The number of persons interviewed in the individual monthly polls lies between 30 and 50 for all parties other than the Labor Party and the Conservative Party. The margins of error to be taken into account, therefore, are considerable.

The figures thus apply to elections to the Storting.

The Norwegian Institute of Public Opinion, Inc.

ALVARO CUNHAL ON COMMUNIST PARTY GAINS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish No 5 3 Feb 84 pp 61-63

[Exclusive interview with Portuguese Communist Party Secretary General Alvaro Cunhal by Pedro Rioseco Lopez-Trigo; date and place not specified]

[Text] The bushy black and white eyebrows and the totally white hair would perhaps be the physical traits that would most attract the attention of someone sketching his first impression of Alvaro Cunhal. Possibly appearing far more important to a politician would be the beautiful career marked by struggle of one who has several times suffered the rigors of fascist prisons (including 8 years in complete isolation until he recovered his freedom after a spectacular escape in 1960), and who has proven capable of leading the Portuguese Communist Party during the past 22 years, both under conditions based on legal existence and those of clandestine status.

According to our Alejo Carpentier, to a reporter who, as a feature writer in his time, has the opportunity to meet leading political personages from the various latitudes of the planet, the first thing that would impress him is the ease with which he can establish communication with the outstanding Portuguese leader, and the contagious vitality of this youth 70 years of age who, when discussing his country's situation, lashes out at the enemies inside and outside, with the same force and conviction with which he emotionally describes the conquests made by the working masses that the government has been unable to snatch from them. A great deal could be said about Alvaro Cunhal in his 52 years of political militancy. However, it would be unnecessary after learning about the resolution by the Council of State of Cuba, granting him the Order of Giron Beach, wherein it describes him, rightfully, as "an indefatigable revolutionary fighter in the battle against fascism and the reactionary forces of Portugal." Hence, let us allow Cunhal himself, with his direct, concise style, to explain to us in an understandable Spanish the essential features of his party's policy, and to offer us his assessments of the key issues in the present international situation; in a candid manner, as in the conversation among friends.

[Question] What remains of the social conquests made by the so-called Revolution of the Carnations?

[Answer] A great deal still remains, despite 8 years of brutal counterrevolutionary offensives. The workers' liberties and fundamental rights, established in

the Constitution, still remain. The nationalization of the banks and of the basic sectors of our economy still remains, and all the business firms that were directly nationalized by the revolution are still nationalized. There are 350 Collective Production Units (UCP) still remaining, with over 500,000 hectares of land. The democratic local government still remains, making it possible for scores of large municipalities to be managed in accordance with the people's interests. The conquests made by the Revolution of the Carnations have been and are being attacked, damaged and reduced by a constant, violent offensive led by consecutive governments since 1976. This offensive is being continued by the current government (of which the secretary general of the Socialist Party [PS], Mario Soares, is prime minister); and with it, it has succeeded in stealing the agrarian reform and turning over to the landholders half of the expropriated land, and thousands upon thousands of head of livestock and farm machines. It has succeeded in disorganizing and causing serious difficulties for the nationalized business firms; but it has not attained its fundamental goal: to destroy them and to restore the monopolies and large estates eliminated by the revolution. This represents a great political victory for the Portuguese people and Portuguese democracy.

[Question] To what factors do you attribute the Portuguese Governments' inability to eliminate the revolution's conquests completely?

[Answer] The fundamental factor has been the people's resistance and struggle. The labor and popular movement is very strong; it has a high degree of organization and unity. The working class and broad popular masses, who have played a decisive role in the revolutionary conquests, have not capitulated when faced with the counterrevolutionary offensives. They have resisted staunchly, defending their interests and rights, agrarian reform and the nationalizations, one by one, in magnificent mass struggles that have raised the popular struggle in recent years to one of the high points in the history of the labor and popular movement in Portugal. The people, with the working class as their vanguard, have not succeeded in defeating the counterrevolutionary process definitively, and achieving a democratic alternative; but they have managed to thwart and stop that process many times, causing the resignation of consecutive governments with their struggle.

The government of the Social Democratic Center (CDS) parties and the Popular Democratic Party/Social Democratic Party (PPD/PSD) was overthrown at the end of 1982, despite the fact that it had the majority of deputies in the Assembly of the Republic.

The present government of PPD/PSD and the Socialist Party, continuing the policy of the previous reactionary government, is doomed to the same fate.

[Question] Is the party stronger now than when the fascist dictatorship was overthrown 10 years ago?

[Answer] There is no doubt that it is. The increase in the number of party members is in itself conclusive. In July 1974, 3 months after the overthrow of the dictatorship, the party had 15,000 members. In March 1975, at the

peak of the revolutionary movement, we reached 100,000 members. Since then, the number of members has continued to rise constantly.

At the 10th Congress, held in December 1983, the membership exceeded 200,000.

Also, in connection with the reinforcement of the party's organization, its mass influence and electoral support have increased; although the mass influence has not yet had a corresponding reflection in the electoral plan.

[Question] What are the electoral prospects in your country, and what position will the Communist Party assume toward these presidential elections?

[Answer] The closest elections that are institutionally compulsory are the 1985 presidential elections. Meanwhile, it cannot be precluded that, as a result of a possible dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic, early legislative elections might be held before 1985.

It is likely that Mario Soares will offer his candidacy for the presidential elections. It will be a right wing candidacy, backed by the right. Our position is clear. Soares cannot have either the support or the votes of the Communists.

The task of the democrats is to offer a candidate who will guarantee the defense of democracy and of its conquests, and to achieve his election.

With regard to the early legislative elections, so that a democratic alternative may result from them, one of these two things would be required: either PS (currently allied with the reactionaries in the government) must adopt a democratic policy (and we consider that impossible with Soares), or one or more new democratic parties must be created, which will capitalize on the indignation that the PS/PSD government policy has aroused among many of those who voted for PS or PSD.

The government, subjecting its policy to the intention of restoring the power of the monopolies, is dragging Portugal into a real national disaster. It must be avoided by overthrowing the government. The seriousness of the situation demands the formation of a genuine democratic government of national salvation in which the Communist Party of Portugal (PCP) is prepared to participate.

[Question] Do you think that the roots of Salazarist fascism have been eradicated from Portuguese society, or that it still has underlying potential, influencing the government's foreign policy?

[Answer] The economic roots of Salazarist fascism (the monopolistic groups and the control of agriculture by the landholders) were eradicated by the April Revolution. For the past 8 years, consecutive governments have been attempting to reimplant them.

On the other hand, the political roots of fascism have not been eradicated. They have been allowed to maintain their presence and intervention in the

nation's political life, through the creation of reactionary parties (CDS, PPD/PSD and others), their continuation in the state apparatus, and their intense activity in the press, TV and other news media.

The present government, both in its domestic policy and its foreign policy, is experiencing the direct influence of the pressure from the political, social and economic forces which comprised the roots of Salazarist fascism.

There are in the government itself elements which are direct tools for the restoration of the past. There is a right wing, reactionary policy. We shall do everything to defeat it.

[Question] How do you assess the potential consequences of the United States' provocative, arms-oriented policy in the current international situation, which has Europe as one of its main theaters of confrontation?

[Answer] The arms-oriented policy of provocation and war of the American imperialists and, concretely, of the Reagan administration, represents a direct threat to the independence, sovereignty and security of peoples and to world peace.

We do not think that this policy is a result of the strengthening of imperialism, but rather of its attempt to impede the victorious progress of the great, irreversible, struggle for emancipation on the part of the workers and peoples.

The forces of peace, liberty, national independence, social progress and socialism are equipped to check and finally defeat the American imperialists' arms-oriented policy of intervention, aggression and war.

What is essential is the unity and the common or converging action of socialist countries, progressive countries, labor movements in the capitalist countries, national liberation movements and all the forces of social progress and peace.

Everything must be done to create that unity in the struggle against imperialism and in the defense of peace.

[Question] What forms have been assumed by your party's militant solidarity with the progressive governments of the former Portuguese colonies in Africa, subjected to South African aggression, with the support of the imperialists and of the Portuguese reactionaries themselves?

[Answer] PCP maintains relations based on fraternal friendship and cooperation, which are reflected in highly diversified, concrete forms, with MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] (Angola) and FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front] (Mozambique). One of the most urgent concrete tasks is to prevent the free activity in Portugal of the counterrevolutionary puppets, such as UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], from being allowed to continue with the government's aid.

[Question] What role is the Church playing in the current sociopolitical situation in Portugal?

[Answer] In the first place, it must be stressed that the positions of the Church are one thing and the position of Catholics is something else. The Portuguese are not divided on the basis of their religion, but rather on the basis of their class interests and their political consciousness and option. Many Catholics are struggling together with the Communists in the defense of the conquests made by the April Revolution and on behalf of a democratic change. The Church is dutybound to take this into consideration.

Concretely, there are many members of the clergy overtly backing the reactionaries, particularly during election periods. Another portion of them maintains a more reserved position.

[Question] You have just returned from Nicaragua. What is your assessment of the present Central American conflict and its prospects for solution, as well as of the Nicaraguan revolutionary process?

[Answer] In Nicaragua, we had an opportunity to talk at length with the leaders and other responsible cadres of the FSLN [Sandinist National Liberation Front], who gave us extensive, very valuable information on the country's situation, problems and policy, as well as on the attacks and threats from abroad. This visit to Nicaragua left a very deep, positive impression on us. The Sandinist revolution is an historic event and a great national reality. We have no doubt that it is totally in keeping with the interests and aspirations of the people and the country.

The danger is coming from abroad, whether through the direct aid to the counter-revolutionary groups or through interference, intervention and threats on the part of the American imperialists.

The victory of the Nicaraguan revolution, as well as the heroic struggle of the people of El Salvador, constitute convincing evidence of the determination of the Latin American peoples to attain national liberation and social progress. It involves an irreversible course of history.

In the concrete situation that has been created, the revolutionary struggle and strong determination, and diplomatic flexibility and negotiation, are inseparable.

[Question] Based on the experience in Grenada and Lebanon, do you consider it possible, in the present situation, that the Reagan government may attempt to intervene directly in Central America?

[Answer] The important thing is to heighten, develop and intensify all over the world the peoples' struggle, political action and diplomatic action, so as to prevent the Reagan government from repeating a criminal military aggression such as the one in Grenada, to force it to withdraw its troops from Lebanon and to prevent it from carrying out its threats of direct intervention in Central America.

[Question] What have the main results of this visit of yours to our country been, and what prospects are there for the development of the relations between our two parties?

[Answer] Our delegation's visit to Cuba has enabled us to have direct contact, and to become more thoroughly familiar with the accomplishments of the Cuban people in the construction of the socialist society, as well as a more precise evaluation of the situation in Latin America, primarily in Central America.

The exchange of views with Fidel and other leaders of the Communist Party of Cuba regarding key issues in the international situation has also been extremely useful to us.

The visit has unquestionably been a new, important step toward the reinforcement of the relations of friendship and fraternal cooperation between our two parties and our two peoples.

[Question] What has the Order of Giron Beach conferred upon you by the Cuban Council of State meant to you personally?

[Answer] The great honor of being the representative of the policy and the patriotic, internationalist action of the Portuguese Communist Party, which socialist, revolutionary Cuba has marked by this award.

2909

CSO: 3548/198

IRANIAN EFFORTS TO OPEN LISBON EMBASSY

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 2 Mar 84 p 3

[Text] Iran has just received permission from the Portuguese Government to open an embassy in Lisbon, according to the future charge d'affaires from that country in an interview with the Portuguese News Agency.

Explaining the reasons that lead Iran to open a diplomatic representation on the ambassadorial level in the Portuguese capital, Jahanbakhsh Mozaffari noted that after the Islamic Revolution his country had decided to "severe relations with the superpowers and strengthen ties with friendly, developing countries."

The diplomat also said that Portugal and Iran "share common interests" and that bilateral relations "had always been normal."

The future Iranian ambassador to Lisbon will be named shortly, stated Mozaffari, confident that there will be "great understanding and much progress" in relations between the two countries.

Meanwhile, an official source contacted by DIARIO DE NOTICIAS did not confirm or deny the Portuguese Government's decision to authorize the opening of an Iranian embassy in the capital. He did say, "One can't see any obstacle in the way."

It is to be recalled that, in fact, the Portuguese Embassy in Tehran had been conducted at the charge d'affaires level until recently when Ambassador Fernando Pinto do Santos was appointed as our diplomatic representative to the Iranian capital.

Mozaffari, as a member of a delegation made up of 3 Iranian diplomats, has been in Lisbon for more than two months carrying on talks with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the opening of an Iranian Embassy in our country.

CSO: 3542/30

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SEEN AS 'GREAT OPPORTUNITY'

Madrid ABC in Spanish 21 Feb 84 p 15

[Text] A serious information slip-up yesterday allowed official Spanish media to announce the definitive entry of our country into the Common Market on 1 January 1986. This spectacular faux pas hid the complete but modest truth: the president of the Council of Ten, Mr Cheysson, announced that the EEC was waiting to conclude negotiations with Madrid on 30 September 1984 in an effort to have Spain's entry take place in January 1986.

Be that as it may, it appears as if the mistakes by official communications media and breakdowns in translation were not completely innocent: it is as if it involved creating sudden false euphoria whose thawing would serve to pressure--serious naivete--EEC negotiators. In any case, the small-minded electoral politics starts boiling at a critical moment in which the lack of results forces the government to seek a broad diplomatic asset to offer public opinion.

Let us recall, however, some previous questions of major importance: the link-up of Spain to the EEC is its linkup to the West. Our entry into the Common Market cannot be understood in the context of our full commitment to the industrial democracies assembled in the Atlantic Community. Entry into the EEC will mean Spain staying in NATO, and further, its incorporation into the alliance's integrated military command. That will mean a sharp turn in socialist policy.

The second long-range question is national in scope. Spain cannot be integrated into the EEC at any price. Socialist greed for electoral assets cannot reduce a decision of historical scope and put it at the level of small-change politics. Negotiation not only has not ended, it is at its most difficult point: Spanish businessmen have repeated the risks of a slump which interference by party politics in the Brussels negotiations would cause on very diverse sectors. For the time being the three basic aspects for the economic interests of our country have yet to be resolved: the rate of Spain's industrial tariff reduction; the transitional system for agriculture (with very grave doubts where our wines, dairy products, fruits, oils and vegetables are concerned) and the inclusion of the Spanish fishing fleet in fishing policy. Along historical lines, what Spain is risking is even more: with its integration into the EEC our country can gain or lose

the unique opportunity to put together a social housecleaning bringing about its actual but not verbal modernization.

For Spain, Europe is the great opportunity to create the legal framework and the economic order to assure our businesses the possibility to compete in Europe.

9436

CSO: 3548/196

BILL SEEN THREAT TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, IMPARTIALITY

Madrid ABC in Spanish 1 Mar 84 p 15

[News commentary: "Nonpoliticized Justice"]

[Text] If the bill dealing with the judicial branch is approved without significant changes in its text, it could damage two of the fundamental bases of this branch as provided by the Constitution: its independence and its nonpolitical character.

For example, "jurists of acknowledged capability" could enter the judicial system without going through the traditional competitive procedures. And the competitive procedures would be used for only certain categories of judges. Therefore, even though the procedures for the direct appointment of judges with accredited experience has precedents in the organization of the English judicial system, in the present situation in the Spanish judicial system there is reason to believe that the political affiliation or background of these judges will be the decisive factor in their appointments.

The bill also makes provision for the appointment of justices of the peace from a list of candidates selected by the city councils. Since these appointments will be made within 3 months after the effective date of the new organic law, since they will have a 4-year term and since they will be made, in principle by politicians active in the municipal sector, the foreseeable result under socialist control of the municipalities is that the vast majority of the justices of the peace appointed in that way will belong to this political party.

What is more, the bill provides for the strengthening of the powers of the Ministry of Justice, with the consequent diminution in authority of the General Council of the judicial branch, which will be relieved of control over financial resources, something that is necessary for real self-government of the judicial system. Also, in this regard, an inevitable politicization of the administration of justice will be produced. And to reinforce the underlying politicization, the bill provides that the post of vice-president of the General Council be filled by a member-judge who will be appointed by parliament.

Finally, the decision to lower the retirement age through the application of criteria which do not appear to be appropriate for the specific functions of the judiciary is a somewhat questionable measure. Is the intent to effect a kind of chronological purge by applying to the judiciary a legal system which antedates the Constitution?

The serious impact which politicization of the judicial branch would have is obvious, not to mention unconstitutional. All citizens should be equal in the eyes of the judicial system, just as justice should be equal for everyone. But if the judicial system is affected to any degree by political decisions, to the same degree equality of justice will be impaired.

8143

CSO: 3548/202

LOCAL ELECTION PARTY MECHANISMS EXAMINED

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 21 Feb 84 p 6

[Text] Political parties completed the process of nominating their candidates for local elections yesterday. The parties (of which three are within and three outside the parliament) are involved in intense preparations for the upcoming local elections to be held on March 25. Parties have alternately complained of an excess and a lack of candidates during the nomination process. The most remarkable aspect of the nomination process was the prolonged suspense associated with the mayoral candidates of the big cities. Other parties were wary of the Motherland Party co-opting their candidates.

Turgut Ozal, the chairman of the Motherland Party engaged in his usual practice of appearing to heed the "voice of the grassroots" yet in actual fact being the "sole selector."

The internal squabbles within the main opposition party (the Populist Party) which have been there from the very beginning acquired a sharper edge during the nomination process. The "move to the right" which has allegedly surfaced during the nominations led to a certain amount of displeasure.

The Nationalist Democracy Party's (NDP) focus during the nomination process was the strengthening of the "upper echelons of the party."

There has been continual and intense activity at the Social Democracy Party (SODEP) where the candidates were nominated by means of a detailed investigation conducted by teams of party members. It is expected that the practices engaged during the nominations in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir will lead to an intra-party showdown during the party congress.

The strategy of the Right Way Party was largely informed by the notion of conducting aggressive propaganda during the campaign period.

According to the reports received from the RP circles, their main objective would be to publicize the party during the local elections.

During the nominations of the Motherland Party (MP), a system of multi-stage approval was put in operation. In the first stage the local party organisations nominated their own candidates. However, the parliamentarians of the region carried weight in these nominations. The parliamentarians were present during the second stage as well. Those members of parliament who had not been able to influence the local organisations tried to sway the party headquarters to their candidates. Some were not all that successful. The member of parliament from Van, Mirza Kursunluoglu, could not enter his candidate on the list despite threatening resignation.

Places where the parliamentarians could not influence the provincial party bosses were designated as "contentious areas". In such instances, the Central Decision and Executive Committee of the Motherland Party joined the proceedings. In this third stage, the deputy chairman Mehmet Kececiler played an effective role. Aided by Halil Sivgin and Mustafa Tasar, Kececiler tried to resolve all outstanding disagreements. He put his signature on over 50 thousand documents and referred the unresolved issues to Turgut Ozal.

Ozal constituted the final stage of the nomination process. No objections were raised to a candidate proposed by Ozal. For instance, the mayoral candidate for Gaziantep was determined by Ozal. While Mustafa Tasar supported his teacher Omer Arpacioğlu, Vehbi Dincerler, the minister of education, youth and sport, was for Kamil Gerekci, the business partner of his brother. When the problem was referred to him, Ozal called both candidates to Ankara and met them. In the end, Arpacioğlu who until two weeks ago was the provincial chairman of the Right Way Party was declared to be the candidate.

Ozal was once again in his role as sole selector while appearing to be heeding the 'voice of the grassroots'. He indicated this stance during the nomination of Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir candidates as well as by his choice of Osman Hizlan against the local party organisation candidate Ogun Altiparmak in Kadikoy.

It turned out in the end that while the Motherland Party's local organisations could not have been too pleased with the results, the parliamentarians emerged, on the whole, quite satisfied with the proceedings.

The Situation at SODEP

At SODEP, the nomination process before the local elections led to some discontentment as well as small-scale fragmentation. Nominations at the three big cities caused some ill-feeling. Some of the hopeful candidates engaged in quite harsh criticism.

However, SODEP officials pointed out that in the nomination of big city mayoral candidates similar methods are implemented by all parties everywhere. Democracy meant certain customs which attain the status of tradition through repeated use as much as it meant written rules. In their response to criticism, SODEP officials stated:

Criticisms concerning the 'sole selector' and related issues are not really justified. It is not as if somebody had been brought in from outside to be appointed as the 'sole selector'. It is inevitable that in certain provinces the decision of the party chairman would carry weight. This is a case of the chairman, who is elected by the organisation, owning up to his responsibility. Style is important indeed. However, it should not alter substance.

In the SODEP headquarters the prevalent view is that everything accords with the rules, the party remains true to its conception of being the most democratic of parties and that during the nomination of mayoral candidates, particularly in big cities, a lot of feedback was received from researchers, surveys, questionnaires conducted by various organisations and from several information channels.

Populist Party: Political Preferences Revealed

In the Populist Party (PP) the nomination process revealed the political preferences of the party leadership. The revelation of this preference led to the falling-out of many a party member who have previously seen the PP as a beacon of hope. Since its founding the party has gone through a number of interesting adventures. The vetos implemented in its founding and during the nomination of parliamentary candidates have reduced the number of people who would have tried to place the party squarely upon social democratic foundations, while strengthening the hand of those wishing to move the party to the right. This became apparent during the nomination process. There were those party bosses and parliamentaries from the provinces who came to the party headquarters to obtain approval for their candidates, but instead of supporting the powerful, admired, respected individuals who subscribe to the party program, they proposed just the opposite sort of candidates. There were even extreme rightists among the proposed candidates. In certain provinces, the provincial party boss nominated his close relatives, friends, and even his houseporter or the teaboy at his office. In other provinces there were not enough candidates to be found.

During the nomination process, the observation that right-oriented people are 'in demand' led to resignations one after another.

A former party member who had been vetoed from the party and has not returned since, summarised the developments as follows:

The longstanding struggle to steer the party to the left or the right has been concluded. Those who wanted to steer to the left have been defeated. The party expressed its preference by veering towards a position to the right of where it has stood so far. Discontent should be expected to increase progressively until the results of local elections are known and to wither away after that.

Silence at the Nationalist Democracy Party

At the NDP, there were no major disagreements among the party headquarters and provincial and county organisations. The party headquarters approved the candidates nominated by the party organisation in line with the principle adopted last month by the Central Decision and Executive Committee to the effect that "the party headquarters will exert no influence whatsoever over the nomination process". None of the candidates were changed.

As Ahmet Turan Guler, NDP provincial party leader in Sivas, resigned protesting his being treated "like an orderly", Dogan Kasaroglu, the secretary-general, announced that the Sivas party organisation had already been disbanded.

12466

CSO: 3554/160

VIGNETTE OF NEW PARLIAMENT'S INNER WORKINGS

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 21 Feb 84 p 7

[Report by Betül Uncular]

[Text] There is hardly any resemblance between the new parliament and the previous ones. There are times when a whole fortnight is whittled away with motions, yet at other times three or four bills are crammed into one sitting. The working hours which normally ends at 7 p.m. is prolonged to 11 p.m. or midnight by the votes of the government party to see to it that the bills are passed. Draft proposals which have been discussed barely the day before are rushed to parliamentary proceedings with "despatch and priority" and without due regard to the statutory 48 hours interval. People wonder whether this is a different mode of conducting business or some sort of tactic ...

The discussions on the student amnesty proposal, long-awaited by large numbers of students, have been concluded at the National Education Commission on February 2. However, as the report of the commission had not been prepared a bill was proposed instead. But the proposal could not make the agenda of the parliament. When the amnesty proposal prepared by Populist Party member Enver Özcan was found to be technically defective it was joined with the proposal of Motherland Party member Halil Sivgin. And when Sivgin's proposal was deemed inadequate by Ercument Konukman, the Motherland Party parliamentary group deputy leader, the latter announced that he would submit an expanded amnesty proposal during the parliamentary sitting.

The inaction, the lack of vitality at the parliament has the effect of bringing the executive branch to the fore. While the number of draft proposals submitted at the parliament is few and far between, it is observed that the affairs of government are carried on by large numbers of directives issued by the council of ministers ...

With the absence of a serious opposition, or a main opposition party to speak of, the party in government manipulates the parliament as it pleases. The parliamentary proceedings are conducted in accordance with the wishes of the government and the MP parliamentary groups. This becomes blatantly clear dur-

ing the parliamentary sessions when the already-weak opposition parties are overwhelmed by a show of 211 hands.

The Inexperience of the Parliamentarians

Meanwhile the inexperience of the parliamentarians are manifested in various ways. On the day when the draft proposals on housing amnesty and cooperative housing are to be discussed, Ibrahim Ozdemir (MP), chairman of public works, housing, transportation and tourism commission, announces that the commission meeting will be held open to the press. When we arrive at the commission meeting in the morning all we do is listen to Ozdemir's brief talk in front of the TV cameras with the ministers of state and housing present. Then the commission meeting is closed to the press. Ozdemir seems totally at ease when he says that "we are in agreement with draft proposals submitted by the government" without feeling any need to consult the members of other parties in the commission. Yet no reaction is forthcoming from commission members belonging to PP and NDP.

The next day Ozdemir comes to the press room and makes an announcement concerning the housing amnesty proposal which had passed the deliberations at the commission. The journalists ask what kind of changes had been made in the proposals. Ozdemir replies that he had not brought the changes with him and starts reciting from memory. While expressing doubt whether it is procedurally proper for him to talk about the changes, he nevertheless continues talking about some of them. The journalists could never understand why Ozdemir came to the press room in the first place. Although he announces that the cooperative housing proposal would be discussed in the afternoon, news arrives half an hour after he leaves that the proposal has been accepted by the commission. When we ask Ozdemir "why didn't you announce this at the meeting?", he answers: "The members of the commission were all agreed on the proposal. It didn't take too long for it to pass." While the seasoned parliamentarian Ferit Melen has a slip of the tongue speaking from the rostrum, addressing the other members as "my fellow townsmen", Mukerrem Hic (NDP) addresses them as "honorable parliamentary candidates." Halil Sivgin, (deputy chairman of the MP who has attracted considerable reaction from his own group) starts speaking from the rostrum as if he were addressing a local association meeting: "Honorable president, honorable ministers, honorable deputies". On hearing this, the sessional speaker Ege issues a warning: "You happen to be at the parliament. One does not address like this." Sivgin shapes up somewhat.

There are members working on the parliamentary administration panel who cannot properly read even typewritten motions. When an opposition members saunters rather slowly towards the rostrum, he is jocularly warned by the deputy speaker (also from the opposition): "Let us keep pace with the government." These scenes are recorded in the minutes as instances of impropriety under the roof of the parliament.

12466

CSO: 3554/160

PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL DEMOCRATS VERSUS CONSERVATIVES

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 29 Feb 84 p 2

["7 Days, 7 Writers" column by Erdogan Alkin: "What Can the Social Democrats Do?"]

[Text] Last week, it was remarked in this column that the social democrats have a more difficult task before them than the conservatives. As you recall, before the latest world economic crisis, conservative parties constantly charged that increased investments and production would automatically solve the problems of unemployment and unequitable income distribution. Social democratic parties, on the other hand, did not give credence to these automatic solutions and maintained that these problems needed special attention.

When the world economic crisis halted production and investment growth and boosted inflation, conservative governments set aside their goal of economic growth and decided to combat price increases. This was because they were worried that their efforts to revitalize production and investments would fuel inflation in the short run.

The social democrats, meanwhile, were forced to emphasize economic growth because they knew that unemployment could not be reduced and a more even income distribution could not be achieved at times of stagnant production and investments. But the state of the world economy prevented them from realizing their plans.

We all know that conditions have not changed much since then. The main problem for the social democrats of rich countries is still embedded in the difficulty of revitalizing the economy without spurring inflation. The high likelihood that boosting investments and production in order to reduce unemployment can cause sharp price increases as a result of a growth in expenditures and can thus take the economy to where it was or even worse is making the social democrats think hard and deep.

The social democrats of poorer countries are in a more difficult position. Because, in these countries, there is a resource problem in addition to the spending-inflation spiral that has been afflicting the richer countries. Since real resources that can fuel investments are scarce in these countries, it is first necessary to find a solution to the resource problem in order to curb growing unemployment and to rectify income disparity.

Consequently, in countries where resources are in short supply, but where people have high expectations, the social democrats must stop generating empty words and making promises that are impossible to fulfill and must prove that they can solve the resource shortage problem more effectively than the conservatives. Do they have any chance on this issue?

Yes, they do, and this is the true alternative to conservative policies. Because in poor countries, the scarce resources are neither well-managed nor properly allocated nor efficiently utilized.

Approaching this issue with cheap formulas such as planned economy and etatism cannot be of much use. Many socialist countries that are experiencing economic crises have not been able to solve the resource problem by decisions coming from the top despite their mastery of central planning. In that case, what can the social democrats do?

They can look for remedies that can boost private and public savings to the maximum level permitted by per capita income. For example, they can propose a wage policy different from that of the conservatives by showing--not by words but through scientific research--that in countries like ours when the income disparity problem is rectified savings and not consumption can grow. They can remedy the resource allocation problem by introducing a genuine rationality in the banking sector without touching the positive real interest rate policy and by encouraging private savings through the capital market.

Through a genuine tax reform, they can relieve resource shortages in the public sector and they can use fiscal policy to reinforce monetary policy, which appears to be losing its effectiveness in the battle against inflation.

In order to end waste in resource utilization and to promote a more even resource allocation, they can permit market rules to function and prevent the public sector from using resources for free.

However, neither the preparation nor the implementation of these measures is easy. There is need for serious, detailed and time-consuming work. Those who cannot grasp the meaning and the importance of such work cannot have a chance to govern the country. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that conservatives can act faster and can do the same work to find effective solutions to the resource problem.

9588.
CSO: 3554/171

OZAL OPENS POLITICAL FIRE ON SODEP'S INONU

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 29 Feb 84 pp 1,11

[Excerpt] Ankara--Describing SODEP [Social Democracy Party] leader Erdal Inonu as "naive", Prime Minister Turgut Ozal said in response to Inonu's remarks on agricultural floor prices: "This is what happens when people who do not know the business become party leaders."

Ozal also announced that the new minimum wage will go into effect on 1 May and that the issue of extending the term of martial law will be taken up at the 1 March meeting of the National Security Council.

Ozal, who returned to Ankara at 1:00 am yesterday morning from Yozgat--the last stop of his 2-day tour of the country--had a 20-minute meeting with President Kenan Evren yesterday.

In an address to the people in the Sorgun district of Yozgat, Ozal scolded Inonu at one point and said:

"Today, I read in the paper that a political party leader has said that the farmer is not happy with the Motherland Party's [MP] floor prices for wheat and sunflower seeds. May he be blessed. Was it us who announced those prices? We have been in the government for only 2 months. But these remarks are not important. What is important is that we will see how everybody measures up in the upcoming local elections. They will know very well how they measure up. The unity brought by the MP government will continue. I know, there many who are trying to break up that unity. There are a number of writers and columnists who have been writing prolifically. Let them write and paint; they cannot influence anything. They cannot influence this nation. All of them will be finished by these elections."

After this speech, the Prime Minister also addressed the people in Yozgat. Before his speech, a party member presented to Ozal a copy of the Holy Kuran wrapped in the Turkish flag. Ozal kissed the Kuran and touched it with his forehead. Referring to the issue of the sale of the Bosphorus Bridge in his speech, Ozal said: "We presented the accounts to the nation. We will see if we can sell it or not. They have been shuffling around like phony wrestlers." The Prime Minister charged that the three parties which could not participate in the 6 November elections know themselves that they will not win any votes in the local elections and that that is why they have asked the Constitutional Court to

abrogate the Local Elections Law. He said: "Supposedly, they will win more votes than us and they will prove their strength. They are only dreaming."

The MP leader later responded to journalists' questions over dinner. In response to questions on workers' problems, Ozal said: "Enough. We talked too much about those issues." However, when journalists insisted, Ozal answered those questions as well. Stating that the new minimum wage will go into effect on 1 May, Ozal said: "One does not know before the elections. We will not make minimum wage an election issue." Ozal stated he has not attached too high a priority to the issues of seniority compensation and minimum wage. When told that "the leader of Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor] says that you do not want to have strong unionism in Turkey", Ozal replied: "We have no such ideas. We are not contemplating changes in union laws. We did not enact those laws. These are important laws. They must be tried for a while."

In response to a question on changing the Contract Awards Law, Ozal said that the request for the changes came from investment management firms. Stating that changes will be made in the Contract Awards Law on the issues of the determination of the least bid and advance fees, Ozal said that flexibility will be introduced in contracts offered by large public corporations such as the State Hydraulic Affairs Directorate General and the Highways Directorate General.

In response to a question on early elections, the Prime Minister said: "This nation does not want early elections; it wants work."

Referring to SODEP leader Inonu's remarks to the effect that "they are not doing a favor by letting us participate in the elections", Ozal said: "If we had not permitted them, they could not participate in the elections. In fact, when he came to see me he naively said: 'I came to ask you to permit us to participate in the elections. Thank you for letting us participate in the elections.'" Addressing Inonu, Ozal said: "Let us see how he will be able to tackle the Populist Party."

9588

CSO: 3554/171

ROLE OF GENERATIONAL CHANGE IN SOCIAL INSTABILITY

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 6 Mar 84 pp 1,10

[Article by Nazli Ilıcak: "The Second Generation"]

[Text] It seems to me that one of Turkey's biggest problems-- perhaps even 'the' biggest problem-- is the exodus from the village to the city. Because of my feature articles published in BULVAR newspaper, I have had the opportunity to meet and speak with different people in cities and villages. I have been able to take a close look at the poverty and destitution of many who came from villages to live in the city. Despite their poverty, however, these people seem happy about their situation. This is because they have not yet lost their ties with the village. They recall the difficult conditions there and they make comparisons:

"In the village we did not have a piece of land to call our own. At least we have a home to live in there."

"When we had to eat there was a bit of bread. We worked from morning until night, and we wore ourselves to the bone. We rarely went into town. At least we live in the city now."

The danger in the exodus from the village to the city is going to begin with the second generation. Having grown distant from its roots and broken away from the customs and traditions of those roots, that generation is going to start comparing its conditions not with those of the villagers, but with those of the city dwellers-- even the most well-to-do city dwellers.

It is no mere coincidence that anarchy took root in the 'gecekondu' (squatters' settlements) neighborhoods prior to 12 September, and that 'liberated zones' where the police could not enter were established there. It is easy to make the seeds of rebellion grow in the damp rooms of the gecekondu, in stomachs whose hunger is fed by a piece of dry bread and some tea.

The second generation is not going to be willing to accept that it has a better life than the people in the villages. It is going to be fixing its gaze on Bebek, Nisantasi and Sisli in Istanbul, on Kizilay and Cankaya in Ankara, and on Alsancak and Kordon in Izmir. It is not going to resign itself to its fate as its parents have done. It is not going to be easily contented with 'a bite to eat and a shirt on its back,' and when it does not find anything better, it is going to let this pain build up inside. It is from this pain, this oppression, that envy and rebellion will come.

These people are strangers among us... They have come running to the big cities in hopes of experiencing a better life. They have taken shelter in the gecekondu shacks which have no sub-structure. There are many of them. They live right on top of one another. They eat out of one pot. It is just like in the village, but the surroundings have changed. Just 5-10 minutes away, people are driving around comfortably in their Mercedes. The money these people in the gecekondu neighborhoods live on in a month is the cost of a pair of shoes in the shop windows.

These people are no longer in any hurry to resign themselves to their fate saying, 'It is God's will.'

The basic goal of the government must be to keep the villager happy in the village. Developing tourism in suitable areas could enable people in the area to progress rapidly. There are many poor villages in eastern Turkey. If, for example, foreign capital were used to turn Palandoken into one of the ski centers of the world, this would mean bread for hundreds of thousands of people. Palandoken's 17 km ski trail has snow up until 15 June. This is very important to Europeans. Furthermore, if the Rize-Ispir highway is constructed as said, it will be possible to go from Erzurum to the Black Sea in two hours. A tourist could thus find snow and the sea all together. In addition, if activities like rug-making, weaving and knitting handmade sweaters were encouraged in villages which make a living from livestock, and if a serious effort were made to market these goods, the exodus from eastern Turkey to the big cities could be prevented.

Not just in eastern Turkey, but also in inner Anatolia, in the Aegean area and in many other places in Turkey, there are unhappy masses who cannot earn sufficient income from the barren land. These people are going to unfamiliar territory, but finding conditions there very difficult too.

Beware-- not of the first generation, but of the second one. That generation, like a pepper seed, has bitterness within it. Fires can start from such points...

12279

CSO: 3554/180

COUNTRY'S ROLE IN NATO DEFENSE PLANNING ATTACKED BY LEFT

Offensive Role for Denmark Claimed

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 24 Feb-1 Mar 84 pp 4-5

[Article by Ojvind Kyro and Anders Jerichow]

[Text] The military debate on giving NATO's defense doctrine a content corresponding to the challenges the alliance might encounter in the last half of the century is getting away from the politicians. The military planners in the alliance are already deeply involved in detailed discussions of an "offensive advanced defense" based on modern conventional, nuclear and chemical weapons and the new information technology, but apparently the politicians have taken off their blinders. The new concept is American-inspired and goes under the name of "Air-land Battle 2000" and Danish officers have also been involved in discussions concerning it for a long period of time. But both the Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry say they know nothing about it.

The new concept has several controversial aspects. In the first place the air force is assigned a decidedly offensive role, since the concept says that in the event of a conflict the air force will be used for "preventive strikes." In the second place, the very idea of an offensive advanced defense involves a risk that the Warsaw Pact bloc will view it as a cover for plans for a definitely offensive strategy. This criticism has been heard from West Germans, among others. In this article BERLINGSKE AFTEN reviews the issue and raises the questions on which the politicians must take a stand sooner or later.

Maverick is the name of a new missile that will roll off the assembly line of the Hughes factories in California this year. Maverick is one of the

first member of a whole new family of conventional weapons that will now be put into mass production.

While our western combat planes can return to their bases as much as 30 km [as published] away from targets in enemy countries, the Maverick missile can go on alone after it is fired until it reaches the tank columns, bridges or enemy air base runways where the cement can be blown up before the Warsaw Pact airplanes can even get off the ground.

Maverick is just one member of the family. The French Pegase is another. The French-German Apache is a third. Many other names are on the way. Common for all of them is the fact that on their own power and with the help of TV cameras, infrared sensors or radar they can navigate independently until they reach their target and neutralize it while the western planes are put in a safe place.

The new weapons make it possible to carry the fight deep into enemy territory, as far as 300 km. Because of the possibilities of the new weapons, but also because military experts foresee an entirely different world picture in the next few decades, the American Army's "think tank" in Fort Monroe, Virginia has prepared a proposal for new offensive operations in the event of war.

The proposal, which has been launched under the title of "Airland Battle 2000," does not change NATO's basic and spacious doctrine of a "flexible response," No MC 14/3 from 1967, but operates with concepts such as offensive advanced defense and talks openly of "pre-emptive strikes," which are also called "preventive attacks."

A Soldier Speaks Out

In a farewell salute in MILITAERT TIDSSKRIFT recently, Colonel Helge Kroon spoke his mind and referred to NATO's future strategy. The colonel will retire on 1 March and has worked in past years as an instructor at NATO's "Defense College" in Rome. Colonel Kroon told us that in "high-level briefings" at the Pentagon and elsewhere he had heard what is expected from Denmark and the rest of the alliance in a conflict.

A new defense doctrine will have the subtitle of the "Offensive Forward Defense," said Colonel Kroon. He wrote: "'One will no longer sit and wait for the Russians to attack. The means that will be used involve conventional weapons with full utilization of ET [Emerging Technology], or in technical language, a large-scale Counter-Air engagement as part of the modern land-air battle. For this to have any meaning, this Counter-Air Strike must be pre-emptive (in other words it must come before the enemy moves, Ed)."

A Minister Speaks

The colonel's eye-catching remarks led to a question in Folketing being addressed to the defense minister. On Friday Hans Engell (Conservative)

gave this reply: "At present there are no proposals in NATO to change the current strategy."

That is not entirely correct. Ever since November 1981 the Danish defense system has been participating in the development of the new concept, "Airland 2000," which will form the basis for the future NATO defense, we have learned. The work has been done by NATO's "tactical and logistical concept panel." Here they are planning to give new substance to the present strategy with the main emphasis on a more offensive conventional defense.

The reason for the minister's statement is undoubtedly that these discussions occur exclusively in NATO's military division, so that the minister will not be informed of them before a completed concept is ready to be approved by the politicians.

Thus the Defense Ministry on Slotholmsgade has no knowledge of the work on "Airland Battle 2000" that is going on in NATO with Danish participation nor does it have a copy of the American-West German document available to the public that also has the title, "Airland Battle 2000," which is signed by the chief of staff of the American Army and the inspector of the West German Army. During the past week, the weekend edition of BERLINGSKE AFTEN had to lend the ministry a copy of this document in order to get a comment on it.

From what we have learned, a group of high-ranking military experts in the defense system will determine the Danish stand on the development of the new NATO strategy. General Knud Jorgensen, chief of defense, would not talk to us about the matter.

Civil Servants Speak Out

"It is normal for this kind of thing to start in NATO's military division," said assistant secretary J. Wahl of the Defense Ministry. "And from there they are sent to the civilian side, so people in the capital cities can take a stand on the proposals. The defense command does not have to ask the minister about the Danish position when the matter is a purely military one. The defense command has a right to act on its own and it is allowed to express its own opinions."

People in the NATO section of the Foreign Ministry did not know that there was a copy of the American-West German "Airland Battle 2000" around either. A civil servant said: "The Foreign Ministry is not involved until a relatively late stage when proposals have reached the point where they gain official status and must be approved by the politicians."

Official Disapproval

This is the background of "Airland Battle 2000" (ALB) in a nutshell:

Since 1976 the U.S. Army's "Training and Doctrine Command" at Fort Monroe has worked with the army's general staff academy in Kansas on working out an operative doctrine that included the newest technical and organizational advances. The most essential ideas were presented in March 1961:

Wars should be won through rapid offensive operations.

The concept of an "expanded battlefield" should be realized by penetrating deep inside enemy formations.

"Deep strikes" with long-range weapons that have a range of 30-300 km should be used to cut off enemy communications and combat troops independent of supply lines (known as close combat forces) should be used deep in enemy territory to force enemy troops to withdraw.

"The integrated battlefield" should include various kinds of troops, both aerial and land-based, and various kinds of weapons, chemical, nuclear and conventional.

In 1982 the ALB (Airland Battle 2000) principles were included in the U.S. Army's "Field Manual FM 100-5" and thus achieved a status as official combat doctrine for all American forces.

According to the West German weekly, SPIEGEL, the West German army attache in Washington several times called Bonn's attention to the fact that the new American service rules deviated on important points from NATO strategy.

Therefore both generals and politicians in West Germany asked if one could expect that the American troops in West Europe would use nuclear weapons from the very beginning. Defense Minister Woerner assured them that training had not been conducted according to the American guidelines in any West European NATO exercises.

The political climate did not improve when it came out that the inspector of the West German Army, Lieutenant General M. Glanz had signed a concept in August 1982 which the West German Army had developed in close cooperation with the Americans, a concept also called "Airland Battle 2000." The defense minister then had to express his disapproval, saying that the document should be regarded as only a study, even though the preface said: "Airland Battle 2000 is a basis on which to develop more bilateral concepts for doctrine, armament and organization in order to achieve increased interoperability."

Danish Position

In Denmark around a dozen military experts have been working in NATO for almost 2 1/2 years now on the controversial American plan, which forms an umbrella over new NATO concepts for individual branches of defense.

The background for the new ideas--which assume a willingness to use both chemical and nuclear weapons--is an analysis of a changed balance of power between East and West in the year 2000. New industrial nations may have arisen, the Soviet Union will be importing oil and population trends alone will produce a shortage of soldiers in the West.

At the same time the plan notes carefully that the industrialized members of the NATO alliance depend heavily on minerals imported from countries south of the Sahara and on oil imported from the Middle East. Since the USSR is expected to start importing oil as early as 1990, the plan warns that the Russians could seek control of the oil sources in the Middle East both to cover its own needs and to deprive NATO countries of the vital energy source.

Two solid military forces confirmed independently to BERLINGSKE AFTEN that not only Danish defense people but also representatives of several other nations on the NATO panel have pointed out that "Airland Battle 2000" on this point is moving far outside NATO's geographical mandate. This also emerged from the first official Danish response to the plan, all the way back in March 1982, now 2 years ago.

Even so, both the analysis of conditions outside of NATO and other political evaluations could still be found in the second version of Airland Battle 2000 which the NATO panel had ready in October 1982. This version has already been through several multinational but purely military discussions in November 1982 and last June. During this whole time Danish military experts continued their discreet work on the umbrella concept--apparently without the knowledge of the Defense Ministry.

Threat Close to Denmark

At the very first multinational meeting of the NATO panel concerning the plan, several countries also expressed doubts about Airland Battle's offensive character.

The analysis behind the plan makes it clear that it would be too costly--but also militarily improable--for a confrontation between East and West to be allowed to continue over a long period of time. According to the analysis the Soviet Union would undoubtedly prefer to conduct a war with a surprise attack using its numerical superiority in conventional forces.

But part of eastern preparations is assumed to include the rapid introduction of nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union also has chemical weapons it is prepared to use.

Therefore Airland Battle 2000 argues that NATO should also be willing to resort quickly to both chemical and nuclear weapons.

The plan also points out specifically that on the northern flank, where Denmark lies, the USSR has had a sizable build-up of offensive air strength.

With this knowledge that a war would be decided in the earliest phase--and that international pressure alone would make it impossible to conduct a war over a longer period of time--the NATO concept recommends that the West immediately seize the initiative in the event of a conflict.

It is part of the plan that the NATO countries keep themselves better oriented on the enemy's positions at all times, that they keep ready to operate quickly and that they acquire the ability to strike deep inside enemy territory--with offensive actions that can destroy the enem's striking force and balance.

The Airland Battle 2000 concept leaves it to the Soviet Union to determine the time and the place. And NATO will continue to make use of deterrence with its combat-ready combination of conventional forces, small tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear forces.

But if the enemy does decide to go to war, Airland Battle 2000 is counting on an offensive defense. Here the air force is simply expected without any detailed specifications to make preventive attacks deep inside enemy territory.

The time factor is given the greatest weight. Therefore the goal is to destroy enemy platforms for military operations before hostile forces have come off the ground. In the same way the enemy's supply lines would be cut behind the front.

These offensive strikes deep inside enemy territory have led Danish participants on the NATO panel to criticize the new doctrine, we have learned.

But a determination to seize the initiative through the offensive attacks is a vital necessity, according to Airland Battle 2000, due to the overwhelming Warsaw Pact superior striking force on the conventional level. The NATO planners are also very concerned with the possibilities the new information technology provides for operating with very small and scattered combat units inside enemy territory. The technology makes it possible for the top command to direct the small units, assemble them for sudden massive surprise attacks and then split them up again and allow them to operate on their own. The local groups, on the other hand, have the advantage that with the proper equipment they can always obtain an overall view of the entire situation.

Other Opinions

But there are other opinions inside NATO about the balance of forces between combat troops on each side of the Iron Curtain. While ALB anticipates a great superiority on the eastern side, NATO's subcommittee on conventional defense in Europe, which was appointed by the Military Committee, arrived at a different conclusion last November.

The committee is presided over by West German Social Democrat Karsten Voigt, who is his party's spokesman for defense issues in the Federal Republic. The committee wrote a report which states:

"The ratio between combat divisions facing each other along the German borders if a war breaks out on the basis of the status quo would be about 1:1....A 1:1 ratio would not give the Warsaw Pact enough confidence in its ability to overcome front-line units and maintain an offensive force."

According to the report, the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority would first begin to show up 10-14 days after a mobilization and at that point, it could muster twice as many troops as NATO.

The idea behind Airland Battle 2000 is also criticized directly in the report, especially the idea of taking an offensive role and carrying the war into the Warsaw Pact's own territory. "This would not be militarily smart, because such 'deep strike forces' must be taken from the present committed reserves or counter-attack troops, which would leave the alliance forces in a very exposed position in the event that the deep strikes fail. It would not be appropriate as long as NATO is a defensive alliance....From the Soviet point of view, NATO's ability to seize territory well inside Eastern Europe constitutes a political tool for use in dealing with inadequate solidarity within the Warsaw Pact and could be regarded as part of a political and military offensive strategy on NATO's part."

In contrast to that is a remark made to BERLINGSKE AFTEN this week by a high-ranking Danish officer: "NATO will never fire the first shot."

Would Cost \$20 Billion

The NATO committee also noted that there is a growing realization in the alliance that strengthening conventional defense is desirable in order to avoid the necessity of quickly escalating a war to the nuclear level.

A study group on European security arrived at the same result. It was made up of 26 American and European high-ranking military people, analysts and politicians with government experience. In a report last May the group advised NATO to reduce its dependence on nuclear weapons to ward off a conventional Soviet attack. For a sum of around \$20 billion over the next 10 years NATO could with the help of new technology paralyze the Warsaw Pact bloc's military installations with around 900 conventional missiles.

Denmark in the Lead

Everywhere in important political and military circles where improvements in defense are discussed, they point unanimously--and they do so in Airland Battle 2000 also--to the need to improve the so-called C3 systems--control, command and communications.

Denmark will be in a leading position in this area next year. Along with Norway, the Danish defense system has ordered a system from the American Hughes Aircraft Company that will cost 800 million kroner in all. Since NATO is financing the lion's share, the direct Danish outlay will be 100 million kroner.

The CCIS [expansion unknown] system will be delivered next year and will serve the three branches with data, communication lines and command channels at all levels in the hierarchical structure. People at every step in the pyramid will have all the information on supplies, troop movements and the condition of advance routes as well as everything known about the enemy's situation from the alliance's aerial surveillance NADGE, or from the defense system's own report service.

Lieutenant Colonel O. P. . . . sen: "The CCIS system will improve weapons efficiency and thus raise : nuclear threshold by strengthening conventional weapons. The system gives both political and military decision makers more time in which to make decisions, since they receive the necessary information right away."

The system will be permeated by previously undreamed of quantities of information and as project leader Ernst Sondergaard of the Air Materiel Command said: "One could also have problems with a superabundance of information." Another problem is the so-called EMP effect, for electromagnetic pulse. If there is a nuclear explosion, the technology in the Danish system will be paralyzed unless it has EMP protection. According to Ernst Sondergaard it would cost around 7 percent of the purchase price to protect it against EMP.

A high-ranking officer pointed to another critical point with regard to the new system: "It could easily tempt decision makers to interfere in matters of detail at lower levels." Another officer, Major Jens Jorn Graabaek of the Defense Staff put his finger on a third sensitive point: "As long as we are alone in having such a system it gives a better overall view and better control, so that one can utilize the expensive weapons more rationally. But when the other side also gets one, the side that makes the first decision will take the lead and that will reduce the time in which to make decisions and produce stress."

Two Possibilities for Pershing II

Major Graabaek of the Defense Staff warned against installing the CCIS main facility in a central bunker: "We are past the days when bunkers were useful, as they were in World War II. They are simply too vulnerable--and directly contrary to the decentralization ideas that are otherwise gaining ground."

The major pointed out that communications facilities could just as well be located "on the back of a truck to avoid an inflexible vulnerable position." Otherwise he felt that the C3 facility provides a more rational use of

weapons. There is a need for this in a time when the cost of weapons rises 10-20 percent each year. The insurmountable price increases--and the steadily rising need to protect the weapons themselves against attack--are the reason why there are fewer and fewer weapons today to direct against the enemy.

Norwegian conflict researcher, Professor Johan J. Holst--who values the modern C3 systems for giving politicians more time in which to reconsider--warns against another aspect of the new offensive conventional weapons. He points out that forward defense will to a large extent use the same missiles and airplanes to transport conventional and nuclear weapons. This is true, for example, of the controversial Pershing II missiles, which will also carry conventional weapons to targets behind enemy lines.

This creates the risk of an ambiguity that will blur the previously clear dividing line between conventional and nuclear weapons, Holst warned in reports from the Norwegian foreign policy institute.

Quite contrary to its intent, forward defense could actually lead to a lowering of the nuclear threshold.

Once a Pershing II missile has been sent in over Soviet territory, the Russian defense system does not have time to wait and see if it is carrying a conventional charge or a nuclear one.

And then there will be the devil to pay.

Defense Minister Replies in Parliament

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Mar 84 p 13

[Text] "There are no current plans to change NATO's defensive strategy, even if political decisions may have to be made at some point about changes in strategic planning against the background of such factors as new technology."

Defense Minister Hans Engell wrote that in a reply to VS [Left-Socialist] Folketing member Kjeld Albrechtsen, as the next step in the minister's current debate with the left wing on NATO strategy and the participation of Danish officers in military deliberations on strategic planning.

'Spiritual Wave of Aggression'

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 6 Mar 84 p 14

[Text] Defense Minister Hans Engell (Conservative Party) is again rejecting charges that NATO has plans for introducing a new and more offensive strategy. In a reply in the Folketing to Left-Socialist Keld Albrechtsen, the defense minister said that what has been discussed in the press as strategy matters are actually contemplations regarding NATO planning, especially within the area of materiel developments. These involve, among other aspects, studying on the military level possibilities for combatting "the enemy's spiritual wave of aggression."

VALTANEN INTRODUCES NEW SECURITY POLICY CONCEPTS IN SPEECH

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 5 Feb 84 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson: "New Concept in Defense Issues"]

[Text] Jan-Magnus Jansson says that the commanding general of the Armed Forces injected new elements into the defense debate a few days ago when he brought up the mission of the Armed Forces in the event of a "twilight situation" between war and peace and discussed the preparedness for "crisis management" that will be incumbent on the Armed Forces in such a situation as an instrument of the political leadership.

At the Paasikivi Society's meeting on Tuesday, Gen Jaakko Valtanen, the new commanding general of the Armed Forces, gave a talk which, in addition to its more traditional elements, also included so much that was new that one could easily call it a policy speech. The new element consisted in particular of the definition of the military role in a crisis situation.

Generally speaking, the debate over our defense forces is based on relatively rigid classifications. As General Valtanen himself pointed out, it often follows a "vertical" division of the Armed Forces into different fighting services and branches responsible for specific duties. Among other things, the division into air, sea, and ground forces has dominated the debate over the allocation of funds.

The discussion concerning the mission of the Armed Forces is also usually based on a strict division between peacetime and wartime. In peacetime, it is up to the Armed Forces to watch over the territory and repel violations of our territorial integrity. In wartime, they defend the territory from attack. As one example, that division dominates the Armed Forces Law of 1974.

The new feature in the defense concept was the fact that Valtanen concentrated on the mission of the Armed Forces in a situation on the borderline between war and peace. There are many suggestive names in the literature for such a situation: for example, it is called a "gray zone" or a "twilight situation" between complete peace and actual war.

As far as we know, the first time such an intermediate stage was discussed at any length in a public document in Finland was when the second parliamentary defense committee submitted its report in 1976. In that report, it was strongly emphasized that the transition from peace to war could easily occur in stages, a process that naturally increases the dangers of the situation. The report said, for example: "A situation in which peace is being disturbed but relations between the parties have not been pushed to the point of war is more probable in our part of the world than open war. Finland's security policy should include special preparations for such a situation." That statement was included almost unchanged in the report by the third defense committee in 1981.

A classic example of such an extremely dangerous situation, and one that is still remembered by an older generation, was the situation in Europe in 1938 and 1939. In non-European regions, similar situations have often occurred since World War II. Fortunately, such a situation does not exist at present in Europe, or, as Valtanen emphasized, there are no signs of an approaching really serious military conflict. But, he continued, even if the restraints preventing open war exist, that does not reduce the possibility of such a development, "in which military measures would escalate ever closer to the dangerous limit."

No one can deny, of course, that that is a realistic assessment of the situation in which we find ourselves. Naturally enough, the commanding general did not give any specific examples of what could conceivably happen within our borders. But he did point out that military activity in the Nordic region is increasing and, along with it, the inclination of the big powers to react with touchiness to steps by the opposite party.

The key concept in the picture presented by Valtanen was "crisis management," an expression that has not yet gained a firm position in our terminology, although it is used a great deal in international discussions of security policy. Crisis management can perhaps best be described as a kind of preventive activity in a situation which is tense but which has not degenerated into open war. A close synthesis of diplomacy and military measures is typical of crisis management, although the military forces are obviously subordinate to the government in the pursuit of the latter's goals.

General Valtanen pointed out, for example, that in a prolonged crisis, the armed forces of the various countries come closer to being a crisis control mechanism than an actual instrument for the conduct of war. And the role of Finland's defense forces, which of course consists primarily of trying to keep war away from our borders, must be seen in that light.

That circumstance requires pronounced flexibility on the part of both the political and the military leadership. The transition from pure surveillance activities to defense missions is not a linear process: forces must be rearranged as the threat fluctuates and so on. The conventional division into fighting services gives way to a "horizontal" approach based on the closest possible cooperation among various branches for limited missions.

Greater demands are also placed on the ability of our defense apparatus to obtain and analyze facts about events inside and outside our area, including our airspace, and to keep the channels open between the commanders and the field. Our territorial defense system, with its relatively decentralized decision-making powers, can make the situation easier in a crisis. General Valtanen even emphasized command and communications functions so strongly that one could conclude that it is precisely that sector which must be beefed up in particular, either by increasing the total appropriation or by rearranging priorities in the current plans.

The picture of crisis management in a "twilight situation" naturally does not involve anything entirely new. The need for emergency preparedness in dangerous times has always existed. But it introduces an element into our security debate that is worth considering. In our opinion, the more flexible approach now being glimpsed also increases Armed Forces credibility in the eyes of the citizens. The tasks required by alert emergency preparedness certainly involve many demanding elements--just think of the preparedness involved in detecting and confronting cruise missiles, which Valtanen touched on in passing--but that is not an insurmountable task for our country. Neither is it possible, unfortunately, to dismiss as improbable the prospects that are opening up.

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CSO: 3650/130

MILITARY DEMILITARIZATION MOVEMENT PLATFORM

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 31 Jan 84 p 7

/Text/ The Movement for the Democratization of the Armed Forces /KEED/ announced the positions of the Panhellenic Council for the first KEED conference which will take place next March. The aim is to have the uniformed men discuss them broadly, to enrich such positions with their experience and to arrive at a more comprehensive resolution for the democratization of the Armed Forces.

KEED appeals to every leader or agency for unity in the common effort to satisfy the demand for the democratization of the military. In order for democracy to prevail in the army camps, it is necessary to orient our defensive system to the existing danger from Evren's American-supported junta and to reduce and restructure our military expenditures for the benefit of the men in uniform. Specific adjustments must be made to free our army from the dogmas of the non-existent "danger from the north" and of the so-called "internal enemy." The first section of the KEED positions stresses strongly the need to free the armed forces from the "allied centers."

KEED supports the 16-month military service because it is just and realistic and claims that despite the few positive steps taken, discrimination and the filing of personal records still continues.

For the permanent cadres the regime needs a deep democratic change. The education and training continue to be dictated to a large extent by the autocracy and the fear of penalties. The living conditions still do not meet the elementary needs of those serving.

It proposed: An increase of the monthly salary of those serving to 2,500 drachmas. In addition, the service should provide them with certain items of daily uses; the development of infrastructure for athletic and cultural activity; the recognition of the right of the service men to express their opinion on questions concerning living conditions, education and recreation. KEED supports the right of the military (career and reserve) to form unions.

7520

CSO: 3521/184

NAVAL DIVER OFFICER: INTRUDING SUBS MAINLY FOR RECONNAISSANCE

Map Shows Weapons Employed

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 5 Mar 84 p 5

[Article by Ingemar Lofgren]

[Text] The armed actions taken during the past 24 days of the submarine hunt consisted of the following:

Tuesday, 14 February: An impact charge was dropped at 1500 hours at the Hassl Island Bridge between Alm and Hassl Islands. An hour later, 14 depth charges were dropped immediately south of the Godnatt Lighthouse. At 2300 hours, eight depth charges were dropped at Verkohammen.

Friday, 24 February: At 1530 hours, a mine was detonated manually between Hassl and Tjurk Islands.

Sunday, 26 February: An impact charge was dropped at 2200 hours between Asp and Tjurk Islands.

Monday, 27 February: A hand grenade was thrown from the Hassl Island Bridge at 0750 hours. At 1400 hours, military personnel fired a round of ammunition from their automatic weapons into the water east of Asp Island. And 1.5 hours later, a hand grenade was thrown from the bridge over the Djupa Channel between Sturk and Tjurk Islands. At 2100 hours, military personnel fired their weapons into the waters of Herrgard Bay on Tjurk Island.

Tuesday, 28 February: A hand grenade was thrown into the water west of Tjurk Island at 0100 hours. Half an hour later, another hand grenade was thrown at the same spot. At 0530 hours, a third hand grenade was thrown into the waters of the Boll Island Channel.

Two hours later, military personnel on Asp Island fired their weapons into the waters of the Boll Island Channel.

Wednesday, 29 February: At 2200 hours, a hand grenade was thrown from the Hassl Island Bridge. A frogman emerged on the east side of Alm Island and disappeared into the sea on the other side.

Key to map on preceding pages:

-  Heavy depth charges
-  Lighter depth charges
-  30-kg impact charges
-  Seabed mines
-  Hand grenade
-  Automatic weapons
-  Diver

- 1. Hassl Island Bridge
- 2. West Bay
- 3. Boll Island Channel
- 4. Godnatt Lighthouse
- 5. Kobekus
- 6. Djupa Channel
- "febr" = February
- "mars" = March
- [In place names on the map, the ending "o" indicates "island"; Aspo = Asp Island.]

Thursday, 1 March: At 1000 hours, an impact charge was dropped in the Djupa Channel between Asp and Tjurk Islands. At 2100 hours that evening, a hand grenade was thrown into the waters of the Boll Island Channel.

Friday, 2 March: Just after midnight, a hand grenade was thrown on Kobekus outside the port of Karlskrona. Military personnel fired their weapons at the same spot.

Four hours later, a hand grenade was thrown into the Boll Island Channel.

Saturday, 3 March: A depth charge was dropped in Swedish territorial waters following five warning detonations.

At 2300 hours, a total of seven impact charges were dropped between Alm and Tromt Islands. A number of hand grenades were also thrown from the Hassl Island Bridge into the water east of Aln Island.

Sunday, 4 March: At 1130 hours, six impact charges were dropped north of Sturk Island.

Attack Divers' Mission Discussed

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 5 Mar 84 p 5

[Article by Bengt Lindstrom]

[Text] "The main mission of attack divers is reconnaissance. Not sabotage, as has often been claimed. We constitute the intelligence unit that works both above and below the surface of the water."

That is what DAGENS NYHETER was told by Lt Michael Gustafson, an instructor of attack divers at the Commando School in Vaxholm.

"The job of attack divers is to locate units, unit movements, vessels, or fixed installations."

As a rule, divers are taken by submarine to a spot in the vicinity of their objective. The submarine stops at a safe distance and lets the divers out.

Swedish attack divers carry equipment which resembles in general that used by an ordinary sports diver: a dry suit of rubber over thermal underwear and a uniform, as well as a depth gage, an ordinary watch, a compass, and a diver's knife.

The thing that most distinguishes an attack diver from other divers is his breathing apparatus, which uses a closed system. The diver breathes oxygen and does not release any telltale bubbles. He is also armed with a submachine-gun.

With that equipment, he can stay underwater for a couple of hours. It all depends on how cold it is, how many supplies he must take with him, and how big a job he has to do.

"The cold in wintertime is stressful," says Michael Gustafson. "Even if you keep moving, it is cold. And if you are forced to stay hunched up, it becomes extremely cold."

A trained attack diver swims about 1 kilometer per hour if he does not run into strong current or if he does not have too big a pack to carry. The deepest he can swim is 8 meters.

If he has to go quite a distance, he can use an underwater moped. The smallest type is one that he hangs on to, while he can "ride" larger ones, and in the very largest--a kind of minisub--he sits inside. In that way, he and his pack can move along at 3 or 4 knots. He moves faster and conserves his own energy.

And energy is what he may need when he gets to land, because then it becomes a matter of getting away from the beach as quickly as possible and finding a safe hiding place for his diving equipment and dry suit.

Michael Gustafson says: "With his suit on, a diver is terribly clumsy and limited in his movements. The suit weighs about 15 kilograms, and added to that are 6-kilogram lead weights."

Gustafson thereby refutes newspaper reports that the diver reportedly seen running across Aln Island last Thursday vaulted over a 1.5-meter-high fence.

The next thing our diver does is take out his map and compass to find his way to his objective.

"This is a matter of simple orienteering. The divers are incredibly well prepared for their missions. They have studied maps and terrain models before starting out."

When his job is done, the diver must get back to his submarine without being seen. He finds his way back by orienteering or by following the rope he laid down earlier. He may also receive help from radio signals.

Lt Michael Gustafson says: "An attack diver must find his way back. If he does not, he is in serious trouble."

Other Likely Motives Outlined

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 5 Mar 84 p 5

[Article by Harald Hamrin]

[Text] So far no one has been able to give any generally accepted explanation for the many serious submarine intrusions to which Sweden has been subjected since the summer of 1980. A number of different theories have been advanced. But one thing is clear: Sweden has become a strategically "interesting" area militarily and one that is of great importance not only to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact but also to the United States and NATO.

The time is definitely past when Sweden--and the Nordic region in general--could be considered only the "northern flank" of a possible Central European theater of operations. Few people today--if any--talk any longer about the Nordic region as a "quiet corner" of Europe.

The change in the Nordic region's strategic military situation is the result of developments which began during the 1960's and which have continued with undiminished intensity during the 1970's and 1980's. Here is some of what has happened:

First, the Soviet Union has built the Murmansk area on the Kola Peninsula into the world's largest naval base. About 40 (two-thirds) of the Soviet Union's nuclear-armed strategic submarines have their home base in Murmansk.

Second, Murmansk is also home port for a large number of attack submarines and surface vessels belonging to the Soviet Northern Fleet. Their mission is twofold: to defend the Kola Peninsula and the strategic submarines and to strike at NATO's vital lines of communication across the North Atlantic between the United States and West Europe.

Third, NATO's interest in the Nordic region is a sort of mirror image of the Soviet interest. For one thing, in the event of a major war, NATO must be able to threaten the strategic submarine base on the Kola Peninsula. For another, NATO must be able to protect its own lines of communication across the North Atlantic by stopping the Soviet Northern Fleet as far north in the Norwegian Sea as possible.

That is why the United States and NATO have built up a network of onshore and offshore listening stations from northern Norway in the northeast to the so-called GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom) gap in the west. It also explains why NATO has taken steps to strengthen its forces in Norway (the advance

storage of heavy materiel for a U.S. Marine Corps brigade in Trondelag and servicing equipment for U.S. aircraft at Norwegian air bases).

The result of these developments is that military strategists and security policy experts now talk about a separate Northern European "theater of war" that is just as important as the Central European theater. That Northern European "theater" comprises not only the Scandinavian Peninsula and the Arctic area of Scandinavia and the Kola Peninsula, but also the Norwegian Sea, the outlet from the Baltic Sea (including the Danish islands, the Skagerrak, and the Kattegatt), and the Baltic Sea itself.

It is within that context that one must view the dramatic increase in military activity in the Baltic area and along Sweden's coast in recent years. Included in that activity are large Soviet and Warsaw Pact exercises with naval and landing forces, NATO's corresponding (though less extensive) naval exercises in the southern Baltic, U.S. spy flights (the "airbus") over the Baltic Sea, and submarine intrusions along Sweden's coast.

The fact that submarine intrusions occurred at Sweden's two big naval bases on Musk Island and in Karlskrona is hardly surprising. One can also see another interesting pattern. The probable or verified intrusions mentioned by the Defense Staff and Per Rudberg, navy commander in chief, occurred in Tore, Sundsvall, and the Stockholm, Ostergotland, and Blekinge archipelagos. In all those cases, the areas in question have deep bays that extend far inland. They also have good ports and well-developed land connections with Sweden's interior:

1. Just beyond Tore lies the Kalix Line and, therefore, the key to Norrland's defenses.
2. Sundsvall is the starting point for Highway E-77, which runs through Ostersund to Trondheim and Norway's Atlantic coast.
3. Behind the Stockholm and Ostergotland archipelagos (through the Braviken waterway) lies the Swedish "heartland" and, in addition, a strategically important road system linking the Baltic Sea to the west coast.
4. The Karlskrona archipelago is naturally important to anyone who wants to control the outlet from the Baltic Sea.

So it is scarcely surprising that "foreign powers" (and in the case of Karlskrona in 1981 and Hars Bay in 1982, that is synonymous with the Soviet Union) have been showing a great interest in Sweden's Baltic coast. It also explains why the Submarine Committee of 1982 could talk about "the Baltic Sea as part of a larger strategic military area."

Book on U 137 Incident Published

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Mar 84 p 6

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] It was a number of young researchers at the Defense Research Institute who took the initiative of determining whether the Russian U 137 submarine was armed with nuclear weapons. This is clear from a dramatized account of the grounding of the submarine in Gase Bay in October 1981 that has now appeared in book form. The authors are two reporters, Anders Helleberg and Anders Jorle, and they base their statements on about 50 anonymous interviews with parties who were involved.

The grounding occurred on 27 October but did not become known until Wednesday 28 October.

On the afternoon of the day on which the grounding became known, Bengt Odin, head of the intelligence division at the Defense Research Institute, brought up the question of whether the submarine had nuclear weapons on board.

Odin first went to see Division Chief Anders Froman, and the two of them then contacted Section Chief Lars Beckman. A number of additional researchers were then called in.

By Thursday 29 October, they were on their way to Karlskrona, where the first measurement indicated gamma radiation from the torpedo hatches. The discovery was sensational, and at once it changed the security situation in the Baltic Sea. The data aroused some doubts, and the measurements had to be repeated several times with improved equipment.

It was Lennart Ljung, commander in chief of the Armed Forces, who informed Minister of Foreign Affairs Ola Ullsten of the measurements on Friday 30 October. Ljung then informed Prime Minister Falldin of what had happened. The news was not made public until 5 November, when Thorbjorn Falldin held a press conference in the big party meeting hall in the Parliament Building.

The government was scared stiff that the big news would leak out ahead of time. That explains why Minister of Defense Torsten Gustafsson, who was on his way to a press conference in Karlskrona, was called back to Stockholm by Falldin.

The measurements were not conducted by the military on orders from the political leaders--the military conducted the investigation on their own initiative, according to what Ola Ullsten told DAGENS NYHETER. Personally, Ullster finds it hard to believe that the military would not think of determining whether nuclear weapons were on board at an early stage.

Ullsten feels that the book's description of the diplomatic actions is well done.

Difficult Balancing Act

Ullsten says: "If we compare it with today's submarine hunt in Karlskrona, we see that in 1981, we wound up in the middle of a political process, and today that political process is still with us."

The grounding of the submarine came like a bolt from the blue, and it was necessary to handle the Russians with all the firmness required by the situation without at the same time going so far that we would be forced to back down from some of our demands.

Naturally, a difficult balancing act was involved, but then on top of it, there came the surprise of learning that nuclear weapons were on board. The final result of the deliberations was that we came out and asked the Russians whether there were nuclear weapons on board. When the answer was "why, yes," there was no longer any hesitation.

Made its Own Decision

The actual effect of the very first decision reached by the government was that the government itself decided how much immunity the grounded submarine was going to have.

The general opinion was that the submarine had immunity as a government vessel, but that it had forfeited that immunity by entering areas where it was not supposed to be, says Ullsten. It was Hans Blix, an expert in international law, who had come up with that "magic formula." The meaning of the decision was that we as a government had a right to do anything we wanted to--including seizing the submarine.

We did not do so, but neither did we accept the authority of civil law, emphasizes Ullsten. The government had an exchange of views with both the chief public prosecutor and the local prosecutor on this question.

That is the only point on which there is similarity between the situation in 1981 and the current situation, says Ullsten. The government can follow that precedent, meaning that it is in command of the situation and does not need to be guided by any other authority.

11798

CSO: 3650/140

LACK OF READINESS IN CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 30 Jan 84 p 120-122

[Article: "Procreation in the Bunker"]

[Text] Most Swiss hope they will survive a future war in a civil defense bunker. But now there also is resistance to the security doctrine of that neutral state.

Introductory courses in Swiss civil defense had been jocular affairs for years. Jokes would entertain the attendants--50 years and over, ex-army or army rejects, a few female volunteers too.

"You know the difference between animal shelter and civil shelter?" That is how a genial instructor would start out questioning his future "multi-purpose pioneers" and "shelter chiefs." The answer: "An animal shelter is for all animals, a civil shelter isn't worth a hound's tooth."

The joke is not so funny any more to the bunker custodians who in their basic courses must learn to make triple-decker beds out of boards and nails and internalize stick-to-itiveness slogans like "to guard, to save, to cure."

The Swiss increasingly realize nuclear fallout or poisonous vapors will not respect the borders of neutral Switzerland. Instead of loose witticism one now wants accurate information on survival--and no one has it.

What has rated worldwide as the model effort for the protection of the civilian population--the Swiss civil defense concept, "a protected spot for each inhabitant," in effect since 1971--is actually made only of concrete and paper.

For the circa 6.4 million inhabitants of Switzerland there are already, to be sure, some 5 million aerated bunker spots near their apartments, and 1.6 million more are scheduled to be built--mainly for the benefit of the building industry--till 2000. That is, as Heinrich Stelzer, civil defense chief of Zurich Canton, rightly states, the lonely peak worldwide.

The 12 billion franc investment (some DM 15 billion) makes sense only if the facilities can be used. But that precisely is highly doubtful according to expert Stelzer.

It was 2 years ago that the Zurich expert frightened the public with an implacable balance sheet: "Swiss civil defense, in contrast to the army, is neither operational nor functional."

The main trouble, Stelzer realized, was the federalist structure of civil defense, not under the army as an organization. It imposed the chief responsibility on the communities but left the authority in the hands of the cantons and the federation. In many communities civil defense was carried on at desks exclusively.

The training, humdrum, dilettantish and aimless, is terrible, according to Stelzer. The original concept of first instructing the citizens and then developing the cadre, instead of the other way around, had "not turned out correct in every respect," as even Hans Mumenthaler, director of the Swiss civil defense bureau, admits meanwhile.

Numerous experience reports, satirizing the "nail seminars" in recent years as a mix of out folklore and unintended variety shows make Stelzer's harsh critique still appear discreet:

In many places training includes, along with bunk building, the presentation of a bucket shower and the fill-in with crayons of bunker drawings, or watching movies.

The courses also are intended to recruit cadre: "You want to be a block chief or a quarters chief," as a volunteer instructor entices the civil defense novices, "then you have a good post in a safe bunker." Command posts can indeed stand a pressure up to three excess absolute atmospheres, a normal installation, only one.

As soon as the Swiss civil defense relates to reality, its exemplary validity is gone. The survival strategists are out of help. Of the 510,000 capable men 90,000 have to keep other facilities in the overall defense in operation. Women are supposed to take their places. But only 20,000 have volunteered thus far, instead of the 110,000 expected.

Of all the civil defense personnel, only circa 260,000 persons have thus far been trained, most of them in basics.

Water, food and fuel supplies are short everywhere, especially in smaller localities. Nor can one be sure of enough lumber and nails in the emergency for makeshift bunks, Stelzer observed. Many communities do not even have an alert siren.

A sufficient number of bunkers is virtually found only where much building has been going on in the last 20 years--in larger localities and new settlements. Many of these highly subsidized bunkers, however, serve as depots or workshops today, as hobby rooms or garages.

In Basel, for instance, before the conversion, 25,000 cars had to be taken out of underground garages and--because of shortage of space--be parked outside the narrow canton boundaries. Setting up protective tunnels for a war emergency would take roughly 4 weeks more.

The least attention the civil defense people have paid thus far to the problems arising after the evacuation of hundreds of thousands underground. Nothing is known of the attitude of masses of people in narrow subterranean concrete caves where each only gets a square meter to lie on, 2.5 cubic meter of space, and 2.5 liters of water daily.

To the Basel civil defense professional Bruno Leuenberger the transfer of the population into basements yet is no vision of horror: "Our ancestors once lived together in tight space, and also in the bunker, we shall have procreation, birth and death."

Very few Swiss know what to expect, should the government ever send them underground as a precaution, so that the survival technocrats have made arrangements and printed in all Swiss telephone directories on two pages the needed instructions for "getting into the bunker."

Many communities that have enough bunkers have long set down who will be with whom in which bunker. But no one wants to publish the "allocation plans." It might lead to trouble--for instance with house owners in fear of riots among their tenants.

When last summer the Basel civil defense invited its population for testing one of its comfortable bunkers, the matter turned into a fiasco. Twice the sleeping test for lack of attendants, and for the third test only 12 sleepers spread themselves over the 150 available cots.

Civil defense thus has by no means become a popular movement as the professional protectors had dreamed all over the land. On the contrary, the doubters and critics in the establishment are joined by more and more people rejecting the whole security concept by political arguments.

Their criticism is that civil defense propaganda reinforces the popular illusion that nuclear war is survivable.

Like most followers of the peace movement, the "civil defense atheist" Hansjoerg Braunschweiger, Social Democratic parliamentarian, is not against support units in the case of a catastrophe, but he is against Swiss civil defense being part of the overall defense in the sense that the survival strategy for the civilian population would presumably keep the enemy from launching any costly attack.

To counter the growing skepticism toward the bunker mentality, the civil defense associations use all sorts of promotional gags to improve the image.

In their magazines, the protection activists offer all sorts of paper table-sets (1,000 pieces for 50 francs) and glasses (one franc per piece) with the yellow-black civil defense emblem.

Signet stamps are distributed among the school children. In Basel at a dance, the population was treated to a newly created survival meal: a soy granulate, starch-flour, vegetable fat, yeast, glutamate, wheat bran and herbs--turned into a thick broth or soup with water, which can even be eaten dry in an emergency.

5885

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PURCHASE OF LEOPARD 2, OTHER MATERIEL APPROVED

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 2 Mar 84 p 21

[Text] Bern, 29 Feb 84--On Wednesday, the Executive Federal Council passed the 1984 defense program, which calls for a total commitment credit of 2.788 billion Swiss francs, and the 1984 military construction statement with an investment sum of 279.2 million francs.

The major part of the 1984 defense program, that is, 2.41 billion francs, is for the procurement of the first lot of 210 battle tanks of the type Leopard 2, including replacement materiel, ammunition and facilities for training, operations and maintenance. The first 35 tanks are to be purchased directly from the manufacturer, Krauss Maffei AG in Munich, and be available to the troops in 1987. It is planned that the other 175 tanks will be produced under license in Switzerland under the management of the Contraves firm. These are to be delivered between 1988 and 1992. The production under license could provide Swiss industry--the consortium brings together 11 firms in addition to Contraves--with a backlog of 1.45 billion and employ about 1,000 people over 8 years.

Use in the Mechanized Divisions

Toward the end of the 1980's, the intention is to request procurement of a second lot of 210 Leopard 2 battle tanks. A new generation of tanks is being introduced into foreign armies, and they are far superior to those that we have. It is no longer possible to compensate for the difference in performance by increasing the combat utility of the existing tanks. Initially, the tank regiments of the mechanized divisions are to be equipped with the Leopard 2 and the now existing Swiss tanks are to be allocated to the counterstrike battalions of the field divisions. Thus the Centurions, whose service time is limited because of an increasing tendency to break down, can gradually be phased out.

Added Costs Through Licensed Construction

In a press conference, Representative Delamuraz explained the procurement decision by saying that the Leopard 2 fully meets our military requirements.

It is already procurement-ready and to a substantial degree Swiss industry can be directly involved in procurement by accepting justifiable added costs (400 million for the first lot). Total costs are more favorable than in the case of the competing U.S. product. Basis of the cost calculation is the price level at the end of 1984 and an exchange rate of 90 francs per DM100. Extra costs as a result of inflation or changes in exchange rates are not included in the commitment credit of 2.41 billion, so that an additional credit may be needed at a later time.

Low Rate of Delivery

Financial considerations led to the selection of the relatively low delivery rate of about three tanks per month, enough to equip one battalion annually. According to the head of the EMD (Federal Defense Ministry), the rate can be increased to six tanks per month if required. Even with an increased tempo, the procurement is in accordance with the overall scope provided for in the financial plan. For the tanks purchased directly in Germany as well as for the portion of the licensed production not performed in Switzerland and the ammunition purchased in Germany, a balance is to be attained through barter transactions.

Additional Credit for Rapier

The 1984 defense program includes--as a result of inflation--an additional credit of 120 million francs for the pilot-guided missile system Rapier, for which parliament had approved a commitment credit for a total of 1.192 billion francs in 1980. Thus far, production of the Rapier materiel has proceeded according to program. In addition, inflation is substantially under the original estimate of 400 to 600 million francs in extra costs. At the end of 1983, the effective accumulated inflation was 80 million. Delivery of the guided weapons is planned to begin at the end of this year and continue through 1987. Also, the 1984 defense program calls for an additional 178 million francs for the procurement of transmission devices.

Construction Projects

Of the 279.2 million requested in the construction statement, 32.8 million goes for armament plants, 223.9 million for structures and facilities, 8.9 million for land purchases and 13.5 million for additional credit demands for previously approved commitment credits. Included, among other things, is 29.3 million for the first stage of training buildings for the new Leopard 2 battle tank and 16 million for the second improvement phase of the Bernhardzell training area. As a result of the procurement of M 109 self-propelled howitzers, 33.4 million is requested for the construction of adjustment halls in Elgg. The credits for land purchases serve to keep open the fly-in and fly-out zones at various military airports (3.6 million) and to meet the needs of the war materiel administration (8.9 million). Included for the construction of terrain reinforcements alone is 64.9 million.

9746

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STRUCTURAL RIGIDITIES COMPLICATE UNIONS' FUTURE

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 17 Feb 84 pp 46-57

[Unattributed article: "Cemented Structures"]

[Text] The dispute over working hour cutback has deteriorated into a power issue. Yet even a victory could not spare the trade unions their adjusting to new technologies, structures and values.

The strategy came out of the daring of despair. Hurt and humiliated by more and more defeats in enterprises, rate negotiations and political disputes, the frustrated functionaries at the labor union conference of IG (industrial labor union) Metall in the fall last year kept reiterating the defiant slogan: "Not fighting means losing right there."

They are likely to fight in April when the tense negotiations about the 35-hour week will likely have failed for good. Through this battle IG Metall, spearhead of the German labor union movement, wants to repair its old strength and finally get the workers out of their defensive. "Against that background" Hans Janssen, rate expert on the Metall board, invokes the central significance of the coming conflict "for the preservation and development of the labor unions themselves." The 35-hour week, Franz Steinkuehler, deputy chairman of IG Metall, explains, "will curtail the power the entrepreneurs have captured because of the high unemployment."

Such wishful thinking has long meanwhile been overshadowed by the worry about the future. No sooner has the fight begun than functionaries are painting black on black, and the danger of a labor union crisis on the wall. To Franz Steinkuehler it even amounts to a "be or not to be" for the labor unions. That those of IG Metall will remain unscathed becomes less likely all the time, to be sure.

To be sure, the somber sounds have also tactical reasons. Because the economic arguments from the top do not grab the base and the solidarity with the unemployed, in view of the dubious employment effect of working hour reductions, seems senseless to some in the union, solidarity with their own organization is now supposed to mobilize the members. Dieter Kirchner, business manager of the roof organization of the workers' registered associations of the metal industry (Gesamtverband), logically rates apocalyptic rhetoric as an attempt "to shock the membership with the question of survival."

If not survival, at least the future course and future strength of the German labor unions are at stake since the quarrel about working hours deteriorated into an economic and social power issue. And the quarrel by no means runs only between the agents of the entrepreneurs and the workers any longer, they are also quarreling among each other and even within the various labor unions. The dispute about working hours opened the deep ditch between the militant labor unions around IG Metall and the cooperative ones like IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik (chemistry-paper-ceramics) and the NGG (food-beverages-restaurants)-- a ditch covered up in better times.

FRG Labor Minister Norbert Blum, himself a member of IG Metall, therefore ascribes to the threatening rate struggle a historic date for the German labor unions: 1984 would decide whether they embrace their function as a power for order or turn into a freewheeling counterforce. Entrepreneurs and government functionaries have suspected for some time that the labor hour cutbacks for certain people were "only a vehicle for conflicts of principle" (Blum). In reality, says Otto Esser, president of BDA (Confederation of German Employers Associations), they wanted to fight that way against the economic and social order.

The labor unions attribute the same motives to their opponents. Distrustful, they noted how middle class employers at the BDA membership meeting called for driving a wedge between the labor unions and their members. The employers' bottom line is an increasing inclination to engage in conflict without reservation and force the unloved workers organizations onto their knees.

The conflict has long developed its own dynamics leaving little elbow room for concessions to those with more discretion on either side. And whatever such compromise, if brought about at all, will look like, labor union power will by no means be enhanced thereby:

--Going for the 35-hour week, by some 39-hour arrangement, is not a thing -- even the best labor union propaganda will be able to sell as a success. Too often has IG Metall in the past stressed the senselessness of such a solution.

--More shameful still would be introducing a 35-hour week for some of the work force only, perhaps for senior workers. For such a solution IG Chemie was mocked as late as last year by its IG Metall colleagues.

----A more far-reaching solution seems conceivable if IG Metall is willing to pay the high price for it--such as greater flexibility, dismantling the rigid working hour scheme. Such a solution makes the consequences of reduced working time tolerable for the enterprises, to be sure, because it reduces the costs. But when the productivity goes up with it, it undermines the employment effect.

Particularly the employment effect has from the start been the declared goal of the labor unions involved--probably out of solidarity with the unemployed, but mainly for reasons of organizational policy. The point is that for years protracted unemployment has been "a millstone round our neck in all our issue-taking" (IG Chemie boss Hermann Rappe). In the "workers' worry about their subsistence" Janssen of IG Metall finds the "political operations base of the employers' regressive policy."

In three successive rounds of rate negotiations the labor unions had to find out how limited their opportunities are in the economic crisis. Three times they had to put up with cuts in the real wages for their clientele. More there was not in it because at a given point of the negotiations "we got the clear signal of the end of the flagpole for our chances to mobilize from all our district and organization groups" (Janssen).

The limits to labor union power opportunities showed up time and again. In plants--even in communal ones--social benefits were lopped off. When the steel and shipyard industries went down, IG Metall did organize impressive demonstrations and conferences--still exhibiting thereby nothing but their own helplessness. While the DGB (German Trade Union Federation) keeps trying to bring back to life its misconceived codetermination initiative that bypasses bottom line needs, the coal and steel community type of codetermination, the prestige model for the power of German workers organizations, is dying a creeping death. Just as helplessly IG Metall, once so powerful and still today the largest separate labor union in the western world, had to stand by and look how the FRG government made further subsidies for the decrepit Arbed Saarstahl GmbH dependent on sacrifices from the work force--and made it stick. With every defeat another bit of the once so shiny varnish peeled off, and the impotence of the labor unions in the crisis became also apparent to the members.

Since the change in Bonn, nothing is any longer running either--except backwards--on the second echelon of labor union representation, which Rolf Seitenzahl, department chief at GdED (Railroad Workers Labor Union of Germany) calls the "legalistic-lobbyist way." Then FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in the 35-hour week issue ("dumb and foolish") clearly sides with the employers. Then FRG Economics Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff threatens IG Druck und Papier (print and paper) with a trade union law for a not so very democratic change of statutes. Then FRG Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg grabs at what the workers put under their belt in social benefits, and FRG Labor Minister Norbert Blum cuts youth and labor safety provisions back to a minimum.

When experiences are this painful, looking across the borders provides little comfort. At all that, German workers organizations held up fairly well when compared with their international counterparts. Since the economic and structural crisis has driven up unemployment figures worldwide, labor unions are in retreat everywhere: In Britain, where the government used a favorable moment to discipline the especially radical workers organizations for once and for all; in the United States, where wage cuts, in our country exceptions in only small-size shops, became practically the instrument to deal with the crises in corporations and entire branches; in Italy, where strike-crazy labor unions in large-scale enterprises like Fiat lost their whole base. And so forth.

What the international labor unions, with all their diversities, all have in common initially is the perplexity with which they react to the structural change in the economy and the society. At the surface they can gather that from the trends in their memberships. Here too, the DGB is doing fairly well. In 1982, with a total membership of circa 8 million, it lost some 108,000 members. Last year the shrinkage continued. IG Metall alone lost nearly 50,000 members in 1983.

As the classical industrial labor union, IG Metall is going to be hardest hit by further change; with steel and shipbuilding, the branches with the toughest problems, after all, are organized in its ranks. Over the long haul, therefore, it is threatened not only with creeping decay, hence with losing its power in the confrontation with the employers, but also its predominance within the DGB. The mobilization for the 35-hour week, therefore, as rate expert Janssen demanded, is to be "simultaneously the starting point for labor union debates on further economic and social development in view of the changes all throughout the production process."

The consequences of that development were outlined by Frank Chappel, president of the British labor union roof organization TUC at that organization's most recent annual congress as follows: "Many of the new plants originate on green lawns, remote from traditional influx areas. Some have much less personnel than the old ones, people with less expertise and different social and political attitudes. New technologies not only threaten jobs but also change the relations between workers and unions."

How hard it is getting to gain a footing in the future-oriented branches is demonstrated by union experiences with employees. As a thus far unused membership reservoir, that group has been courted for years--but with modest success. At all that, 48 percent of the workers but only 17 percent of the employees are organized within DGB. The number of employees is growing year after year, though; last year it might already have surpassed that of the workers. Also in this development that looks threatening to the labor unions Siegfried Bleicher, in charge of the employees on the DGB national executive committee, finds a reason for this year's rate disputes. Says Bleicher: "We are still strong enough."

Again they now want to analyze why employees do not want to let themselves get organized. The hope that the crisis would sharpen their awareness and drive them into the arms of the labor unions turned out to be a fallacy. The reason might be obvious but is repressed for fear of the consequences: Those very traditions and values the industrial labor unions had to thank for their strength in the development of industrial society today are undoubtedly in the way to the change required for a conversion to an information and services society. Proletarian culture and uncouth rhetoric, the visible relics of that past, may once have united the workers. Today they turn out to be barriers for employees and achievers. Even labor union functionaries grant that the typical labor union selection of executive personnel, that tour de force, does not necessarily do much good to an intellectual quality on the executive echelons. A tentative change is suggesting itself, in any case, with Steinkuehler of IG Metall and Monika Wulf-Mathies, chairperson of OTV (Public Service, Transportation and Traffic). What the consequences are remains to be seen.

Warnfried Dettling, author of a study entitled, "Democracy in Labor Unions--Labor Unions in the Democracy---The Distribution of Power Between Members and Functionaries," finds in the same selection of functionaries a structural barrier for the change of the labor unions.* The functionaries, Dettling says, "thank their careers to successful adaptation."

*Warnfried Dettling, "Demokratie in Gewerkschaften--Gewerkschaften in der Demokratie. Die Verteilung der Macht zwischen Mitgliedern und Funktionaeren." Guenter Olzog Verlag, Munich, 1983, 150 pages, 24 marks.

Critical remarks and innovative suggestions are avoided because they might appear controversial and a weakening of labor union unity and thus hurt one's own career. Once one has internalized such standards, one is likely to behave no different outside.

In such a world of ideas that objects to any changes a general cutback in working hours--provided one truly believes in its employment effect--must virtually appear as a patent prescription: It renders an adaptation to a changed environment superfluous because it wants to turn that change back or at least cement it at its current status. What one overlooks or represses then, though, is that under prevailing conditions a success in the working time issue is bound to be a Pyrrhic victory. For if one does not succeed simultaneously in holding working conditions and labor structures at the current level, the cutback in working hours enforces the very change it was meant to stop. Speeded up rationalization and automation would be the consequence--which would imply an accelerated need for adaptation by the labor union side.

If then working conditions were in fact cemented--an objective still pursued by IG Druck though set aside by IG Metall as unenforceable and thus illusory--then one might see what labor union scholar Wolfgang Streeck, associate at the Berlin Science Center, regards as the actual motive for demanding a 35-hour week: an attempt to break the autonomy of the plant councils and regain access to the plants.

Still as recently as in the 1970's, the labor unions were able to dictate plant agreements by supra-plant rate contracts, for making jobs more humane, for instance. That is all gone. Today the negotiating partners have as little to say about it as the plant councils that would after all have to pay the consequences of such deals. Instead, in a crisis, management and plant councils move ever more closely together to ensure their joint survival. Labor union headquarters exercises very little control over such emergency associations.

Also Claus Offe, sociologist at Bielefeld University, in a research project on the development of industrial relations in the FRG, discovered such "syndicalistic tendencies." Having to choose between the plant and the labor unions, those who actually depend on the choice of the base opt for the plant. What dictates their attitudes are no longer their labor union leads, but the market conditions as well as the attitude of their colleagues in competitive enterprises.

In view of that development, Streeck warns of the danger of a "Japanization" of the German labor unions. In Japan, the workers merged into 70,000 enterprise unions. The four roof organizations play minor roles. That it will happen here is unlikely, unless the unified labor union system turned out to be actually so inflexible that it splits up under the impact of the crisis. Even so, an associate of DGB's WSI (Social Science Institute), discovered a virtually "panic Japanese fear" on the executive floors of the German labor unions. A greater federalization, a power shift away from the supra-plant to the plant level, appears possible at least.

That trend is accelerated by technological change and the change in labor organization that comes with it. While in the past the division of labor and technization and the emergence of large-scale enterprises in the course of industrialization favored collective arrangements and, hence, the power of the labor unions,

future new technologies seek a decoupling of the operational process in terms of space and time. In extreme cases, that would make ghostlike shifts in mass production as possible as some cottage industry before the screen. With that, however, so says a report by a commission for "future prospects for social developments," presented recently by a team of experts on orders from the Baden-Wuerttemberg government, "the question about the right job becomes entirely new. The industrial patterns of the 19th century can be dismissed at least in some sectors."

These experts' future perspectives that discovered "options for flexible working conditions and an individualization of working structures at a scope thus far inconceivable," must, euphoric as they are, appear to the labor unions as a danger to their organizational policy at a scope unknown thus far.

No wonder that the workers organizations want to block such a development from the outset: In a flexibilization of working hours they fear the "smashing of a uniformly grown contract rate law" (according to the former IG Metall boss Eugen Loderer); in work before the home computer, an attempt "to undermine, by shifting jobs from plants to the private sphere, the structures that have grown up for collective protective and labor laws" (according to DGB chairman Ernst Breit). Already a specter is haunting the labor unions: "electronically fully equipped and controlled jobs at home with individually shaped, flexible working time," as WSI associate Wolfgang Spieker remarked.

For fear that individual arrangements might undermine collective rights, the workers' functionaries are giving away the chance to tackle these new developments aggressively and ensure the workers' rights also under the new conditions through skeleton agreements with individual leeways. The defensive strategy in organizational policy in any event seems to be bypassing the needs of those affected. Surveys keep revealing the desire of at least many workers to decide when they want to work on their own. If the labor unions insist on tight working schedules to protect the workers and, above all, their own negotiation capacity, they might lose the favor of those they pretend to be protecting.

Labor unions are still holding on to ideas that might make sense in terms of their own experience but are no longer feasible and sensible in accordance with the workers' experience. The change of values in society passed them by without hardly making a dent. The labor unions, once the "most successful (old) social movement of industrial society" (Dettling), have long been supplanted by new movements. Tormented, they seek to meet the altered environmental awareness by a constantly reiterated demand for "qualitative growth." The train had long departed when they sought to catch the peace movement while giving the impression as if they were heading it.

Still more helpless they appear in their attitude toward labor. If work in the awareness of those who at least still have it assumes a dwindling place value, labor union influence also must sink, and the more they insist on old, no longer acceptable values, sink all the more. "If the labor unions remain what they are," Dettling commented, "they might become alien to more and more workers." Remaining what they are, they will have to go on and let themselves be called "the last conservative bastions in the country" (DIE ZEIT), and young members will rarely join.

New values must be accepted, new goals must be defined--above and beyond all institutional barriers. For all that, the delegates at the last IG Metall congress found a future perspective missing. It is meant to be found now and be written down in a "Report IG Metall 2000." Rate expert Janssen wants more talks with science, provided it is willing to accept "a possible defensive position or even a loss of significance in labor union organizations not uncritically as the result of the prevailing economic and employment situation" (Janssen).

Yet they do not have all that much time: The loss of significance continues, might even speed up after the next rate dispute. Future strategy will decide whether, to quote Dettling, "labor unions, a lead foil from a passed era, still reach into the postindustrial society." Or whether labor unions will participate as a driving force in future development.

On that, as labor union critic Dettling also grants, very much depends--not only for the labor unions.

Crack in the Crisis

Membership Trend in the DGB and Its Labor Unions (in thousands)

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1982
IG Building-Stones-Earth	405,5	425,8	498,9	533,0	531,0
IG Mining and Energy	580,7	535,3	403,0	367,7	367,8
IG Chemistry-Paper-Ceramics	410,0	519,8	552,8	660,9	643,1
IG Print and Paper	133,1	140,9	143,3	143,9	145,3
Railroad Workers	428,1	439,1	402,5	406,8	392,5
Education and Science	61,0	83,8	112,8	183,8	185,6
Horticulture, Agriculture, Forestry	103,4	89,8	49,1	42,2	42,6
Commerce, Banks and Insurances	63,6	131,0	148,5	351,3	360,3
Lumber and Plastics	189,7	160,8	129,8	157,1	158,4
Art	41,9	31,5	32,8	45,3	47,9
Leather	100,4	90,1	61,4	55,7	52,7
IG Metal	1352,0	1842,8	2071,0	2622,3	2576,5
Foods-Beverages-Restaurants	256,2	287,6	243,3	253,0	265,3
Public Service, Transportation and Traffic	726,0	983,1	969,8	1149,7	1179,6
German Postal Union	190,5	282,7	354,6	450,2	458,9
Textile-Clothing	409,9	355,3	311,0	293,8	276,2
Police	-	-	-	165,9	189,1
DGB Total	5450,0	6378,8	6482,4	7882,5	7849,0

5885

CSO: 3620/207

TRADE WITH SMALL COUNTRIES OF EAST BLOC CONTINUES INCREASE

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 5 Feb 84 p 3

[Text] Finland's trade with the small socialist countries has grown faster in recent years than its total exports or its exports to countries in the European Community (EC). Last week, representatives of Finland's building materials industry held a symposium in Warsaw, one of the objectives being to increase trade with Poland.

The symposium in Warsaw was arranged by Poland's Ministry of Construction and Construction Materials Industry and Finland's Foreign Trade Association. The participating Finnish firms were Partek, Ahlstrom, Yhtyneet Paperitehtaat, Perusyhtymä, Nokia, Makrotalo, and Raute.

Minister Sakari T. Lehto, Partek's managing director, said at the symposium: "Finnish firms, at least in the building materials industry, are ready to make a bid for trade with Poland and try out new forms of cooperation." Partek has a number of big projects under consideration in Poland, and Lehto hopes to see them firmed up in the near future.

According to Lehto, the long-term view and a selective approach are especially important in trade with the small socialist countries. Those countries differ from each other considerably in character and afford excellent cooperation opportunities for firms in various branches of industry.

Patience Required

The value of Finnish exports to the small socialist countries rose by an average of 19 percent annually between 1975 and 1982, thus increasing much faster than our total exports (15 percent) or our exports to the EC (13 percent).

Minister Lehto noted: "I believe that Finnish industrial firms can easily fail to take advantage of the possibilities in the small socialist countries, especially Poland and the GDR, if they fail to keep up their contacts."

The participants in the symposium feel that in particular, countries which can also find goods to import from Poland have a good chance of quickly getting active trade started again.

11798

CSO: 3650/130

FOREIGN INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES ANALYZED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German
24 Feb 84 p 2

/Text/ The highest-ranking personalities in the new Turkish government, which will soon mark the second month since it took office, are not concealing the fact that the promotion of the industrial upswing and of exports could not make headway without foreign investments. The lessons learned over the past 10 years adequately taught that, in Turkey, one cannot expect any further major investment impulses either from the private side or from the government. The government realized quite clearly that the larger export volume, which is urgently needed to produce a large foreign-exchange income, can be attained only if more foreign capital and top-level technology become available.

Head of government Ozal--who, during the November 1983 parliamentary elections was able to win a big victory with the election slogan "we will protect the poor and the middle class"--is fully aware of the fact that domestic industry, based on the privileges granted for many years by government protectionism, will continue, without being endangered, to offer the consumers goods of insufficient quality but at excessively high prices. Perhaps the Turkish textile industry, with its generally recognized "national record" in terms of high quality, performance capacity and competitiveness, might be the only exception. To put an end to such incongruities, Ozal considerably relaxed the import ban on a large number of foreign goods.

Relaxing import restrictions is indeed very necessary. A respected national economist remarked on the situation that one could close one's eyes to a price difference of 40 percent between domestic products and imported goods; but when the difference exceeds 140 percent, as is frequently the case, then a national industry is of no benefit. It is interesting to note the fact that Vehbi Koc, the big industrialist who has been called the "Turkish Rothschild" and who is participating in the local assembly of Fiat and Ford autos, immediately declared his readiness to import these passenger cars from abroad, the moment the lifting of the import ban was announced.

Ozal had already stressed the importance of German investments in public with the remark that he would visit the FRG upon the first opportunity in order to make it clear to German industry that "investments in Turkey," judging by the advantages, are to be equated with investments in the FRG; because he is presently completely busy with the campaign for the community elections which

have been scheduled for 25 March, he has begun to send his pertinent minister to the FRG as advance man.

First of all, Labor Minister Mustafa Kalemli went to Bonn for talks with Federal Labor Minister Norbert Blum, who in all Turkish circles is considered a "passionate" advocate of the Turkish cause in the matter of the guest workers. In this connection people love to mention the fact that he worked for several months in Ankara during his college days. Concerning the special fear of Turkish workers for their jobs and residence permit in the FRG, Blum reportedly gave his conversation partner assurances.

The wooing of German investments is something which Ozal assigned to his nephew and closest collaborator Husnu Dogan who is minister of forestry and village affairs. Dogan, who will go to Bonn next week for government-level talks (27 February to 2 March), will also visit Cologne on 28 February; there he will attend a seminar organized by the BDI (Federal Association of German Industry) and the Association of the Turkish Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Likewise present will be representatives from several German ministries, as well as from the BMZ (Federal Ministry of Cooperation), representatives from various government agencies, who are concerned with aid for Turkey. The president of the Turkish Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mehmet Yazar, who leads his country's delegation, is accompanied by a platoon of Turkish department heads, such as State Secretary for Economic Development Professor Pakdemirli, the new Governor of Turkish Bank of Issue Yavuz Canevi, the Department Head for Investments in the Government Planning Council Kilic, and several big industrialists. In Cologne, the Turks will present a catalog of about 40 offers for collaboration between German and Turkish industry.

Dogan is one of the authors of the most recent liberalization decrees and, during almost 3 years of military rule, was the only man responsible for the examination and approval of requests for foreign capital investments in the government planning organization. During his short term of office, more projects were approved and carried out than during the 15 years before. It is an undisputed fact that Dogan works in a spirit of extensive opening toward the West although he comes from a strictly Muslim family from Anatolia.

All foreign observers realize that the Ozal administration is more benevolent toward foreign capital and in ideological terms to begin with cannot be criticized as compared to all of its predecessors. As a result of the decrees that were published over a period of 6 weeks, it seems that all barriers are gradually coming down.

Foreign enterprises are now allowed--after getting the necessary permit--to settle in the country either by themselves or in the form of "joint ventures" with local capital investors and to acquire pieces of land without permit. Although the in-house export efforts by these enterprises are in keeping with the general wish of the government authorities, this is after all not a legal obligation. The domestic market is completely open to them with a population which will soon number 50 million. Borrowing in the country or from abroad is not subjected to any restrictions and interest on foreign loans is regularly transferred.

Profits earned by foreign investors may be transferred and the same applies to capital released in case of liquidation. Foreigners are free to acquire pieces of land and if a piece of land acquired by a foreign enterprise is resold at a profit and if the earnings are used to increase the enterprise's capital, there is no tax at all.

According to a decree, approved in May 1980, for the payment of unsecured commercial debts--at that time, Ozal was state secretary in the planning office of the right-wing administration of the Justice Party of Suleyman Demirel--foreign investors have the possibility of using such foreign demands, which have been converted into local currency, for their capital investments, for capital increases, or for new investments. The advantage consists in the fact that such debts at this time have a value of only 60-65 percent; several years ago, when the Turkish economy was in the midst of an acute crisis, it was possible to trade them even at 25 percent.

If the investment is made in an economically backward area, in eastern and southeastern Anatolia, then the investor would have a whole series of incentives, such as, for example, 100 percent tax exemption on profit and corporation taxes for several years, advantageous loans at low interest rates, acquisition of land belonging to the government at "preferential prices," reductions of up to 100 percent in the income tax on salaries and wages of personnel and workers.

There are no restrictions on foreign capital and that is the motto of the Ozal administration. Foreign investments are permissible in almost all regions. Even government-controlled enterprises--which until a short time ago behaved "suspiciously" but reluctantly in dealing with foreign enterprises--seem to have changed their attitude radically. Etibank, which operates mines and which had already entered into an agreement with the American Phelps and Dodge outfit, recently formed a joint venture with Preussag AG /Incorporated/ for the joint processing of copper ores. Preussag gets a majority capital share of 51 percent while the investment money from the FRG for the initial period has been estimated at about DM 60 million. Negotiations likewise turned out positively with the German metal company and the conclusion of a cooperation treaty is expected shortly.

Another field, in which the doors to cooperation with the West have again been opened after several years of hermetic sealing, is petroleum drilling. The National TPAO, the Turkish Petroleum AG, on orders from higher up, at last began to enter into cooperation agreements with Western groups for joint petroleum drilling operations. In the eager search for petroleum--for which the resources and the know how of TPAO are considered adequate--the hitherto "most explored" regions of the country will be opened to foreign geologists and drillers. It is recalled that, just 2 years ago, the VEBA /United Electricity and Mining Corporation/ affiliate Deminex tried particularly hard to arrive at an agreement with TPAO but, after lengthy negotiations, decided to forgo investing here.

These are the lessons of experience and wisdom. Well into the most recent past--when the tendency of a considerable segment of the more nationalistically inclined rather than economically knowledgeable civil servants, to consider the foreign investor as the heir of the notorious "capitulations," was still in vogue--only those enterprises were able to prevail which were

not willing to lose their patience in anticipation of "better" days. This is the reason for the continued existence--in the most widely differing regions--of investments and of the local manufacturer of top names from German industry which, according to all reports from reliable sources, can register outstandingly good business results. Here we have the following, among others: Bayer (100 percent capital share with three plants for the manufacture of pharmaceuticals and chemicals); Siemens with three plants, Electrical Appliances and Kabel-AEG /General Electric Company/ in cooperation with the government TEK (Association for the Distribution of Electricity), BASF /Baden Aniline and Soda Factory/ with chemicals; Bosch with injectors; Hoechst with pharmaceutical products; Henkel with chemicals and margarine; Merck with pharmaceuticals; Thyssen with forge and cutting tools; Mannesmann with pipes; MAN /Augsburg-Nuernberg Machine Factory, Incorporated/ with utility vehicles; and Schering with pharmaceutical products.

Foreign investments were stagnating at a figure of barely \$228 million in 197- /as published/; by the end of 1984, according to data from the appropriate Investment Division in the Planning Office, they reached a figure of \$950 million. By the end of the year, another \$400 million are expected. Switzerland is by far the most important investor, at this time, far in front of the FRG which is in second place.

5058

CSO: 3620/212

BRIEFS

OZAL, GENSCHER ON GUEST WORKER ISSUE--The Turkish civilian government has complete confidence in Bonn's preventing a new influx of Turkish guest workers into the FRG. This was announced in Ankara after conversations between Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher with Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and Foreign Minister Valit Halefoglu. Genscher expressed the fear on the part of the West German government that a new wave of immigration into the FRG will commence upon the start of the liberal policy agreed upon for Turkish guest workers within the Community between the EC and Ankara for the year 1986. In circles within the West German delegation it was said that Prime Minister Ozal, in talking to Genscher, expressly confirmed the attitude--which was earlier advocated by the former military government--to the effect that the application of a liberal policy in this case would have to be adapted to the economic conditions and that "detrimental effects" must be avoided. Bonn received this statement with a big sigh of relief. But the way the whole thing is to be handled in practice is something that Bonn and Ankara want to discuss in the course of further talks "in the near future." The final settlement must be made by the EC with the Turkish government because the Community is a treaty partner. In the West German delegation it was said that the right to a liberal handling of the problem should basically be retained. The issue of visas could be a control instrument here. The federal government is particularly worried about the problem of liberal handling of this issue because the FRG is by far the biggest host country for Turkish guest workers in the EC. The 1.5 million Turks in the FRG account for a share of 90 percent in the Community. Another 10 percent live in France and the Netherlands. /Text/ /Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German
8 Mar 84 p 8/ 5058

CSO: 3620/211

BRIEFS

PURCHASE OF SOVIET ELECTRICITY--DEI [Public Power Corporation] has again turned to a new, hasty procurement of electricity, this time from the Soviet Union, in order to cover power needs for the month of February. More specifically, with the DEI Administrative Council's decision number 38/1984, the supplementary contract for purchase of 70 gigawatts of electricity from the Soviet Union, through Yugoslavia, for 1,750,000 dollars, was approved. As is pointed out, it is thus shown, yet again, that DEI is unable to meet power consumption needs and is turning to numerous imports of power, paying "hard" currency, like the dollar, from the country's already meager exchange reserves. [Text] [Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 7 Feb 84 p 2] 9247

CSO: 3521/187

BRIEFS

NATURAL GAS SALES--The Hague, 2 Mar--The Dutch treasury is likely to be boosted this year by extra revenue from export sales of natural gas as a result of the strength of the dollar, a Finance Ministry spokesman said today. The spokesman was unable to estimate how much extra revenue the treasury could expect but said that it would probably be less than a billion guilders. In calculating gas export revenue the 1984 budget assumed an exchange rate of 2.80 guilders to the dollar, but the exchange rate has since risen to 2.94 guilders, the spokesman said. The recent strength of the dollar, which reached a level of three guilders at one point, would be translated into higher guilder prices for Dutch gas exports after a six month time lag, he added. Increased sales and a strong dollar also led to higher gas revenue last year than had been expected. Revenue eventually reached 18.3 billion guilders, exceeding estimates by 155 million guilders. Nederlandse Gasunie, the monopoly purchase and sell of Dutch natural gas, announced today that export sales rose 26 percent in the first two months of 1984 compared to the same period last year. Domestic sales also rose, the company added. [Text] [The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 3 Mar 84 p 3]

CSO: 3600/11

LABOR PARTY PAPER DETECTS STRAIN IN COALITION OIL POLICY

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 16 Feb 84 p 36

[Editorial: "Center Party under the Boot"]

[Text] The task of designing an allocation procedure for the eighth round of concessions was taken away from Oil and Energy Minister Kare Kristiansen. After the Oil and Energy Ministry had completed the task, the prime minister took over the reigns himself. A separate committee was established, directly answerable to Prime Minister Willoch, to make a thorough examination of concession principles.

The prime minister's committee has "examined" these principles so thoroughly that hardly any principles remain. And when the prime minister's proposals are on the table, they carry so much weight that the other coalition partners hardly dare raise their voices in protest.

For the Center Party, this examination of principles has meant that the party's primary spokesmen on oil policy, industry committee chairman Reidar Due and parliamentary leader Johan Buttedahl, have been forced within a period of several months to make a total retreat on the issue of a fourth Norwegian oil company on the continental shelf.

But it is not only on the question of a fourth oil company that Center Party spokesmen have had new principles rammed down their throats. This is also true of the main pillar of our national oil policy: the desire for a gradual Norwegianization of the shelf.

It was not so long ago that Oil and Energy Minister Kare Kristiansen, to the amazement of all, launched the idea of granting Norexplor a share of the Oseberg field. That occurred at a time when most people believed that a fourth oil company on the shelf was out of the question: especially since the prime minister had already rejected the idea.

The Center Party's parliamentary leader Johan Buttedahl and the party's foremost oil-policy spokesman Reidar Due of the industry committee rejected this idea outright. They said that the matter had already been dealt with by the government. Due characterized the proposal as an outright gift to Norexplor.

That was last fall.

Several months later these same people were talking about giving Det norske Oljeselskap (DNO) a share of the most promising block. They said this was a reasonable and prudent proposal. All the old arguments about the danger of watering down our national oil policy were suddenly forgotten.

It is not just NATIONEN [Center Party's main newspaper] that is having difficulty understanding this sudden change. What actually could have happened that could explain such a turnaround?

No objective relationships in our oil policy have changed during these months. Nor has the Center Party indicated that it has undergone any fundamental changes.

The explanation is as simple as it is obvious. Kare Kristiansen's earlier Norexplor plan opened new doors for the Conservatives and the prime minister. With Kare Kristiansen (and, thus, the Christian People's Party) on their side, the Conservative Party could take to the offensive. This new oil-policy grouping also made it possible for the Conservative Party to abandon the Norwegianization policy. The Center Party was defeated by a majority in the government and forced to accept a clean break with the Norwegianization policy that was the previous goal--for the Center Party, as well.

9336

CSO: 3639/73

MINISTER: GAS SUPPLY FROM NORWAY MORE RELIABLE THAN FROM USSR

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Feb 84 p 36

[Article by Bjorn H. Tretvoll]

[Text] Western European gas purchasers may be willing to pay a higher price for the reliability of gas from Norwegian sources. At the same time, however, Norwegian suppliers must examine future gas sales to Western Europe in broader terms than the simple desire to obtain the best possible price for their gas. Oil and Energy Minister Kare Kristiansen stated this Wednesday in a speech to the Norwegian Petroleum Association.

One of the questions that must be answered is whether Western Europe will be willing to consider the reliability of the gas deliveries in their commercial evaluations. We must find out what price they are willing to pay for the greater reliability of Norwegian gas and for the possibility of breaking the Soviet monopoly, according to Kristiansen.

At the same time, he stressed that Norway was interested in providing a reliable source to the Western countries and that Norway recognized its responsibility for meeting the gas needs of Western Europe throughout the 1990's. "In the long run, it is in our own interest to secure the energy supply of our allies--and of our export markets," Kristiansen said.

Statements made by the International Energy Agency (IEA) on the reliability of gas supplies to the member nations stressed the advantages of gas sales from the Sleipner and Troll fields, according to Kristiansen.

He described the negotiations on the sale of gas from Sleipner, which now have reached a decisive phase, as particularly important because they are seen as a preliminary stage of negotiations concerning the much larger Troll field. Kristiansen repeated his previous statements indicating that he was optimistic about the possibility of selling Sleipner gas to the state-owned British Gas Company (BGC).

If gas prices agreeable to the Norwegian side cannot be reached, the alternative is to increase Norwegian oil production. Kristiansen stressed that, in addition to the foreign policy effects this could have on relations with

Western Europe, an increased rate of Norwegian oil production could also result in a negative reaction from the member-nations of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Kristiansen saw no reason why oil activities in our northern waters should be seen as being separate from our North Sea activities. The government follows the same policies in the north, with regard to the role of foreign companies, as it does on the remainder of the continental shelf, according to Kristiansen.

He did not ignore the fact that Soviet drilling on what Norway believes is the true boundary on the continental shelf could complicate the use of resources in the Barents Sea.

The Oil Directorate is planning to conduct a rough seismic mapping by 1988 of the areas north and east of the Tromsoflaket areas that have been opened for exploration. These studies will be conducted eastward to the sector boundary and northward to Bjornoya. These regions will gradually be opened for more detailed seismic studies by the oil companies.

It is also possible that these regions of the Barents Sea could gradually be divided into blocks. This depends, in part, on the test results obtained by the Oil Directorate and the companies, according to Kristiansen.

In the tenth round of concessions planned for early 1985, the Oil and Energy Ministry expects to expand exploration in Tromsoflaket northward and possibly eastward. These questions will be dealt with in a parliamentary report scheduled to be complete by Easter.

9336
CSO: 3639/73

FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL ON JOINT VENTURES WITH CHINA

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Feb 84 p 34

[Article by Bjorn H. Tretvoll]

[Text] Bergen, 20 February--From a foreign policy standpoint, it would be a clear advantage for Statoil to participate in oil activities on the Chinese continental shelf. Such participation would be a concrete and positive contribution to future Sino-Norwegian cooperation. Undersecretary Eivenn Berg of the Foreign Ministry stated this at an oil conference at the Norwegian Commercial University on Monday.

Relations between Norway and China in the petroleum field enjoy a special position, following years of close administrative and technical cooperation, according to Berg. He stressed that the question of Statoil's international role would be clarified by the so-called Mellbye committee.

The possibility of Statoil participation in Chinese oil activity came up in 1983 when China sold concessions for oil exploration on the continental shelf to several foreign petroleum companies. Statoil has had an office in Peking for some time and has served as an advisor to the Chinese authorities.

Berg said that the company had acquired sufficient expertise to take on jobs of this type. The international experience will be useful for the company's present and future jobs on the Norwegian shelf.

He also stressed the importance of Statoil's role in China, and perhaps elsewhere, for other Norwegian offshore industries. Statoil and other Norwegian companies established abroad can open the door for other Norwegian companies, help them reach new markets, and possibly gain a solid foothold on the Chinese market, according to Berg.

The Oil and Energy Ministry has already given Statoil the go-ahead to develop more concrete plans for possible activities in China. These plans must be presented to the ministry before they can be carried out.

Berg also favored Norwegian attempts to deliver equipment for possible expanded activities on the Soviet continental shelf in the Barents Sea. He stressed that these sales must be subject to normal commercial conditions. There would be no extraordinary financial arrangements which, in effect, would

mean some form of subsidy.

"In our long-term goals, we must remember that mutually advantageous economic relations can have a possitive political effect. This is true not only of our relations with the Soviet Union, but also of our efforts to create better East-West relations in general," Berg said.

Norwegian sales to the Soviet Union for its oil activities must not conflict with the NATO regulation on the export of military technology. The Americans want to expand the list of equipment in the oil sector that cannot be sold to the Soviet Union. Berg believes, however, that there will be no conflict between this list and Norwegian plans to sell oil-related equipment to the Soviet Union.

9336

CSO: 3639/73

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STUDIES MAY SLOW DRILLING IN NORTH

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 Feb 84 p 60

[Article by Georg Parmann]

[Text] Environmental Affairs Minister Rakel Surlien supports the demand of the State Pollution Control Board (SFT) that an environmental impact study be conducted before exploratory activities in the Troms I, Troms II, and More I fields are expanded. An environmental impact study for these areas would take 3 to 4 years. This would lead to significant delays in oil exploration activities. The demand for an environmental impact study was raised pursuant to the new antipollution law.

In a letter to the Environmental Affairs Ministry, SFT wrote that an environmental impact study should be completed before any decision is made on possible new activity in the Troms II and More I fields and before exploration is expanded into the Troms I field. The reason given is that the coastal regions are particularly vulnerable. It is estimated that the impact study will take 4 years, until 1988 for the Troms region and 1987 for the More field. SFT also stated that no decision on new activities in the Barents Sea and on the Svalbard shelf should be made before an extensive research program is completed and an environmental impact study is made. It is estimated that this could occur before 1990.

Several Years' Delay?

It is believed that new areas of exploration in Troms I will be announced during the ninth round of concessions this summer. The tenth round of concessions, expected to be announced 1 year later, will include Troms I, Troms II, and More I, as well as several other areas in which SFT sees no urgent need for environmental impact studies. But if the State Pollution Control Board's demands for impact studies are approved, then exploratory activities in the affected regions could be delayed several years.

SFT's desire to conduct extensive studies before exploration begins resulted from the areas' vulnerability to oil spills. SFT pointed to the danger of damage to important fishing resources and biological production, to water fowl and other animal life, damage to business interests, recreational areas, and the general use of the coastal zones.

Risky

On Troms I, SFT wrote that the regions east of 18 degrees longitude probably are among the most risky areas on the Norwegian continental shelf from an environmental standpoint. It was pointed out that young Norwegian Arctic cod, Norway haddock, haddock, herring, and capelin are in the Tromsøflaket region during a critical period of growth. An oil spill of any magnitude in this region could also reach the coast and cause damage over large portions of Troms and Finnmark.

Concerning Troms II, which is closer to the coast, SFT wrote that the average drift time for oil is less than 1 day during the worst time of the year. Thus, even small spills could result in extensive damage to the environment. An oil spill could have an immediate effect on the entire fish population hatched that year. In More I the drift time for oil to the coast also would be extremely short. In this area, serious consideration must be given to bird life. It was pointed out that the mountain hatching area Runde is in the immediate vicinity. Runde is extremely important for bird life in southern Norway and throughout Europe.

The Environmental Affairs Ministry just received the letter from SFT and intends to respond as soon as possible. Environmental Affairs Minister Rakel Surlien already said in a speech last weekend, however, that the ministry supported the SFT demand for environmental impact studies in these areas.

"The reason for this is simple; we cannot make a decision on such important matters without sufficient background information and without knowing what we are doing. If the government and parliament decide to expand exploration here, we must do it with our eyes open. If we failed to make environmental impact studies in these fields, where the need for such studies is so strongly indicated, we would undermine the entire principle of environmental impact studies," the environmental affairs minister said.

9336

CSO: 3639/73

COUNTRY'S LARGEST-EVER GAS EXPORT CONTRACT REPORTED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Feb 84 p 26

[Article by Bjorn H. Tretvoll]

[Text] Negotiations over the sale of gas from the Sleipner field have been completed, resulting in a draft agreement for the delivery of gas to Great Britain. The Norwegian sellers, led by Statoil, and the state-owned British Gas Corporation (BGC) have agreed on all points in this draft agreement including the price, AFTENPOSTEN learned. All that remains before the largest export contract in Norwegian history, totaling over 200 billion kroner, can be signed is the formal approval of the British authorities.

Thus, it appears that expansion of the Sleipner field, which will cost about 45 billion kroner, can proceed according to plan. Norway expects the British to approve the deal within several weeks, so that plans for expansion can be discussed in parliament during the spring session. Thus, the Sleipner expansion could provide a valuable boost to Norwegian offshore activities throughout the 1980's.

It is not known what price BGC is willing to pay for the gas from Sleipner. The relationships that will determine the price trend during the production period also are unknown. AFTENPOSTEN learned, however, that the companies that are coowners of the field, i.e. Statoil, Esso, and Norsk Hydro, believe that the contract will provide a reasonable return on the considerable investments that must be made in the field.

The negotiations have been based on the sale of about 185 billion cubic meters of gas. Based on the prices that have been indicated during the negotiations, it is clear that the gas will cost over 1 krone per cubic meter. Thus, based on today's prices for the quantity to be sold, the total value would be over 200 billion kroner.

The agreement includes construction of a pipeline 40 inches in diameter from Sleipner to St. Fergus in Scotland. This pipeline would be wholly owned by the companies participating in Sleipner. According to the plan, BGC would not help finance the pipeline. But the pipeline will have a greater capacity than that required to transport the Sleipner gas. Thus, it will be possible to connect the British fields to this pipeline.

The Norwegian side believes it is unlikely that the British authorities will reject the draft agreement. It was stressed, however, that there would be a major debate in Great Britain on that country's future gas import policy. Some oil companies that have unsold gas finds on the British continental shelf, particularly British Petroleum and Shell, have maintained that, at the prices payed for Norwegian gas, these companies could build up a sufficient capacity to cover British needs from domestic sources. There also has been an extensive political debate over the future role of BGC in the British gas supply. These factors could make it more difficult for BGC to gain approval of the conditions to which it has agreed.

AFTENPOSTEN learned that the last disagreements between the sellers and BGC were ironed out during negotiations in Stavanger last Tuesday. The Norwegian authorities were given details on the draft agreement on Thursday.


Along with the contract negotiations, Statoil has worked on plans to expand operations in the field. As a result, these plans can be sent to the Oil and Energy Ministry relatively soon after the British approve the deal. The plan includes the use of three platforms. The first will be placed on the so-called Gamma structure, where production is expected to begin about 1990. Two platforms will be constructed at the Sleipner structure itself. According to plans, production will begin here in 1992 and 1994, respectively. The Gamma gas contains insignificant quantities of carbon dioxide, while the Sleipner gas has a considerable carbon dioxide content which would not be removed at the field, however.

According to what AFTENPOSTEN has learned, the price and conditions set forth in the draft agreement would provide approximately the same level of profitability for the Sleipner expansion as currently obtained in other fields in which activities are being expanded on the Norwegian continental shelf.

In addition to gas, Sleipner also contains about 50 million tons of condensate. This would be brought ashore through a pipeline over Ula to Ekofisk and Teesside or over the British Piper field to Flotta on the Orken Islands.

The Sleipner reserves are spread over several blocks. As a result, a unitization agreement among the three companies that are part owners will be required. The most significant reserves are located in block 15/9 in which Statoil owns 50 percent, Esso 40 percent, and Hydro 10 percent. Reserves also are found in block 15/6 in which Esso is the sole owner. Statoil will be the operator for the Sleipner expansion.

Now that agreement apparently has been reached on the Sleipner deal, new negotiations may begin on the enormous gas reserves in the Troll field. Gas companies on the European continent have expressed interest in purchasing this gas.



The Sleipner gas will be brought ashore at St. Fergus in Scotland where a new terminal will be constructed. Gas from the Frigg field also will be brought to St. Fergus.

Key:

- 1. Norway
- 2. Scotland

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CSO: 3639/73

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